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Abstract
Secure web gateways aim to protect end user systems against web based threats. Many
proprietary commercial systems exist. However, their mechanisms of operation are not generally
publicly known. This project undertook development and evaluation of an open source and
standards based secure web gateway. The proof of concept system developed uses a combination
of open source software (including the Greasyspoon ICAP Server, Squid HTTP proxy, and Clam
Antivirus) and Java modules installed on the ICAP server to perform various security tasks that
range from simple (such as passive content insertion) to more advanced (such as active content
alteration).
The makeup of the proof of concept system and the evaluation methodology for both effec-
tiveness and performance are discussed. The effectiveness was tested using comparative analysis
of groups of self-browsing high interaction client honey pots (employing a variety of security
measures) and recording different system alteration rates. Performance was tested across a wide
range of variables to determine the failure conditions and optimal set up for the components
used.
The system developed met the majority of the goals set, and results from testing indicate
that there was an improvement in infection rates over unprotected systems. Performance levels
attained were suitable for small scale deployments, but optimization is necessary for larger scale
deployments.
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APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group.
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization.
Caching Storing something for ease of access later.
CSS Cascading Style Sheets.
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service.
DEP Data Execution Protection.
DOM Document Object Model.
Fast Flux Network a network that is hosted upon or proxied through a fast changing arrange-
ment of compromised hosts..
Fingerprinting assessing details about the target.
FTP File Transfer Protocol.
GPL GNU General Public License.
HTML Hyper Text Markup Language.
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol.
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (Secure).
ICAP Internet Content Adaptation Protocol.
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force.
IP Internet Protocol.
ISP Internet Service Provider.
MAC Mandatory Access Control.
NAT Network Address Translation.
PCIDSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard.
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RFC IETF Request For Comment.
SGML Standard Generalized Markup Language.
TCP Transmission Control Protocol.
TLD Internet Service Provider.
UDP User Datagram Protocol.
URL Uniform Reference Locator.
W3C World Wide Web Consortium.
WMF Windows MetaFile.
WWW World Wide Web.
Zero Day Vulnerability A vulnerability for which no patch is yet available..
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Chapter 1
Introduction - Motivation and
Background
1.1 Project Overview
This project undertook to build a secure web gateway entirely out of open source software. Many
of the concepts in a technical note of a web user notification system [22] (which has since been
deployed into production by the American Internet Service Provider Comcast) were incorporated
into the design, and the associated ideas extended upon to form a system that performed security
mitigation measures. The system’s effectiveness against malicious downloads was evaluated,
followed by testing of the performance impacts (measured by content throughput and delay) of
the various security operations the system performed.
1.2 Motivation
World Wide Web (WWW) (or web) 1-based technology and tools are increasingly one of the key
media and information sources around the world. Furthermore, there has been a trend in recent
years of decreasing use of dedicated desktop applications in favor of increased use of web-based
applications and browser-based tools for both home and enterprise use. The secure undertaking
of affairs online is dependent upon many different factors, but the web facing application – the
web browser – is the common link across all web applications. Web browsers are both exposed
1”Web” content is carried on high layers of the Internet, and care will be taken in this work to use the terms
”Web”, ”WWW”, ”HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)”, or ”https” when referring to using those protocols (ISO
layer 5 and up[ref]) and ”Internet” when referring to the Internet as a whole or its underlying communication and
transport protocols such as Internet Protocol (IP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) (ISO layers 1-4)
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to the greatest number of users and the most used class of software on computers[12], making
them especially important.
The web is also increasing in interactive and dynamic content through ”Web 2.0” and simi-
lar technologies and approaches. The increased use of technologies such as JavaScript, AJAX,
Flash, and Silverlight has resulted in expansion of the functionality websites offer. Where early
websites were initially only sources of static data and content, content that is dynamic and exe-
cutable is now often provided and used. As a result, instead of being simple HTML renderers,
web browsers are now their own software environment[5]. Whilst enabling many new and excit-
ing behaviors and solutions to problems, this also greatly increases the potential attack surface.
Based upon the HTTP and HyperText Transfer Protocol (Secure) (HTTPS) protocols, web
content has become nearly ubiquitous in the modern world. Its success has come about because
the underlying protocols, HTTP and HTTPS are flexible, simple, human readable protocols that,
whilst designed for primarily textual content, can be used to carry any type of data. We shall
discuss these technologies in more detail in the Technical Introduction (chapter 2).
The content-agnostic approach of the web has resulted in an explosion not only in the num-
bers of its users, but also in the number of its uses. Unfortunately, these same principles of
flexibility and openness that make the web so flexible can also leave web users (and their com-
puter systems) open to abuse.
The security of web activities has become important for day to day affairs, critical business,
and national security. Almost every class of organization and government agency uses the web
to transport information of varying sensitivity. The compromise, loss, or corruption of that
information can result in losses that range from trivial to potentially life-threatening.
Undesirable Internet content that uses HTTP as an attack vector is increasingly affecting end
users and can be broken down into two main forms which we discuss next:
• Objectionable human targeted content, such as fraudulent or illegal content
• Dangerous computer targeted content, such as viruses, worms, trojans and spyware
1.3 Background
1.3.1 Problematic human targeted content
Problematic content targeted at people (not the computer) comes in various forms. The relevant
forms of such content to the web domain are those inappropriate due to the context, and those
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that facilitate fraud against the user.
Inappropriate Content
Whether content is classed as inappropriate is highly dependent upon the relevant context. Ap-
propriateness can be very contentious, as it often comes down to religious, political, legal, ju-
risdictional, or other subjective criteria. Common examples of content that are often considered
inappropriate in western organizations include hate speech and pornographic content, while in
other parts of the world politics, religion, or any form of sexual content can be considered in-
appropriate in every context. Less controversial examples of inappropriate content are games or
social networking sites in the workplace, which employers may consider a hindrance to produc-
tivity. This work, however, is concerned with the more general technical issues. As dealing with
inappropriate content is peripheral to information security, it will be addressed only briefly.
Fraud Driven Content
The other class of problematic content targeted at human users, content which facilitates fraud
against users, is far more clear cut and is a real risk to the computer or information security of
users. We shall use the term ”social engineering” because of the way these attacks are normally
undertaken: through the use of some normal behavior, assumption, or expectation to manipulate
the user. Two classic attacks fall into this category: disreputable or fraudulent retailers and
phishing or site impersonation.
Disreputable or Fraudulent Retailers and Websites Much as in the physical world, web-
sites have varying levels of reputability. Some can presumably be trusted with one’s entire net
worth (such as your bank), whilst you are better off with others not even knowing your name.
Also, like the physical world, disreputable types are often located together – in certain Top Level
Domain (TLD)s such as .cc, .cm, or .cn[104][83]
Disreputable sites can be dangerous to users in various ways, but common examples in-
clude fake storefronts that don’t actually deliver anything, the delivery of illegal or contaminated
goods (such as banned pornography, or pharmaceuticals, pirated software, or malware-infected
software), or the harvesting of user information. This can result in identity theft, legal liability,
illegal activity, or even death in some cases of fake pharmaceuticals bought online [159].
While the real world metaphor holds in some ways, it is deceptive in others. For instance,
while there are higher proportions of disreputable sites in the dangerous TLDs, there are more
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by number in the very populated ones such as .com, with the result that it can be very difficult
for users to detect dangerous groups of sites by address alone.
Unfortunately, other indicators often do not offer much help either. For instance, people
often judge the trustworthiness of a retailer by the amount of perceived quality and effort that
has gone into their storefront[54], but on the web (as often in real life) this is not a reliable
indicator. It can even be counter-intuitive, because reputable retailers have to deal with more
regulations and costs such as Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCIDSS) and
Health insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements, whereas scam sites
need only worry about getting the information they need as quickly as possible from the user.
Among the most valuable pieces of information are financial credentials such as credit card
information, but the target can often be something as simple as an email address, which can
then be sold. Irrespective of the sensitivity of this information, it is undesirable for it to become
compromised and inconvenience the owner.
So, due to the difficulty in assessing the trustworthiness of web content from the site con-
tent, a common approach is to look for user reviews from others who have dealt with the site.
However, it can be very difficult to assess the validity of the reviews themselves, with numerous
reports of retailers posting their own fake reviews on review sites. But these measures often will
not help at all if the user thinks it is a legitimate site they would normally visit such as their bank
or email.
Impersonation of legitimate websites is very simple to do online, because the markup needed
to display a page is, by necessity, sent to users. An attacker can copy the appearance of a site
simply by taking this code and putting it on a web server controlled by the attacker. By changing
the target address the form data is sent to, anything input by a user can be captured, and if the
attack is sophisticated it can then be submitted to the real site so the victim never knew anything
was awry.
Users are encouraged to look for “the “padlock” icon or HTTPS URL prefix when they are
on a website, but this itself is not guarantee of anything regarding the identity of the site, as
many legitimate websites use bad security practices. An example of such a bad practice is using
self-signed certificates[137]. This offers encryption, but no assertion of identity whatsoever, as
a self-signed certificate can be easily signed by an attacker[66]. Furthermore, browsers offer
weak differentiation between certificate types, so users often accept them anyway[137]. The
address bar in Internet Explorer’s latest version is shown below: note that it distinguishes sites
using Extended Validation certificates from those using other types of valid certificates by giving
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the extended validation address a green background. However, both sites have a padlock, so an
inexperienced user will have difficulty in knowing what the difference is.
Figure 1.1: The address bar in Internet Explorer’s latest version (9 Beta), with the difference be-
tween sites using Extended Validation certificates and those using other types of valid certificates
circled.
The difficult part is to get the user to visit the fake site in the first place. The methods used
to undertake this are usually collectively referred to as “phishing”.
Phishing is described by Microsoft as “A method of identity theft that tricks Internet users
into revealing personal or financial information online[103], while the Anti-Phishing Working
Group (APWG) has a broader definition: “a criminal mechanism employing both social engi-
neering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account
credentials The APWG definition includes what we term ’hybrid attacks’, which we discuss later.
Phishing emails are a high priority in the blocking and filtering undertaken by email providers
(along with spam.) Commonly impersonated sites are financial institutions, social networks,
and e-commerce sites[101]. The APWG reports that more than half of all targets were financial
for the 3rd quarter of 2009, because they are the easiest to monetize[6] and this pattern is also
reported more generally by other groups.
Some common methods to get users to visit phishing websites are misleading emails, mis-
leading links, and misspelled urls as well as more advanced techniques such as cross-site script-
ing. Misleading urls have the text set to one link, but can (usually) be seen to actually link to
another address when hovered over. Various methods are used to fool users into clicking these
links; one common approach involves using a confusingly similar looking domain, for instance,
by using http://www.paypaI.com[57]. However it gets more complicated when non-Latin char-
acters are involved, in so called homograph attacks, as then the Uniform Reference Locator
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(URL) is visually indistinguishable from the legitimate one[71].
The hosts for phishing websites can be anywhere, but tend to follow the pattern for dis-
reputable sites in general and be more concentrated in smaller and riskier locations, but more
numerous in absolute terms in the big TLD blocks (eg.com)[101]. The APWG reports that hosts
in the USA consistently contain the most phishing sites.[6]
1.3.2 Dangerous computer targeted content
Due to the way web browsers are designed to work (in an untrusted environment running un-
trusted code and unchecked data), they can be exposed to code and data from a very large number
of sources. For example, if a user goes to only 20 web sites in a day, each containing code for
advertising, widgets and included media, then the user could be exposed to code from hundreds
to thousands of subdomains.
Consider this: at the time of writing (September 2010), the main page on cnn.com[32] had
around 60 JavaScript elements (including inline) from 12 different subdomains, of which only 3
appeared to be CNN-controlled. The others included social networking sites, advertising sites,
survey delivery sites, and content delivery partner sites. If only one of those sources is com-
promised, then the user is at risk. Recent examples of this occurring include websites such as
The New York Times[116] (see figure 1.3.2), Fox News[38], Whitepages[96], Gawker[127],
and Trademe[52]. While prevalence of infection in legitimate sites is seemingly low, at fractions
of one percent for popular websites (as discussed in section 2.7.1), the sheer number of code
sources makes exposure to malicious code far more likely.
There are two main risks from compromise by untrusted code: it can mislead users, or it
can exploit their software. Both are damaging. Malicious code from the web targets one of four
attack surfaces:
• The Operating System
• The Web Browser
• Web Browser Plugins
• Other Web Aware Software
An attacker needs only find an exploitable version of any one to compromise a system in
most cases. User intervention beyond visiting a web site is not required for system compromise.
Note: Discussion of software measures for mitigating the exploitation of software is
included as background only. This thesis is concerned chiefly with methods of preventing
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Figure 1.2: Personal Antivirus -a fake antivirus that was delivered through malicious ads on the
New York Times webpage in 2009[176]
dangerous code making its way on to the system where the vulnerability lies.
Attacks Targeting the Operating System
Attacks targeting the operating system are generally the most dangerous, but are becoming rarer
as operating systems are becoming more secure. Attacks of this type take advantage of an op-
erating system weakness, usually in some shared library, and so can affect systems of many
different configurations. While all operating systems have been targeted by such attacks, we
shall limit our discussion here to Microsoft Windows, as it is the most commonly used and
attacked operating system at present. Notable examples of Windows operating system vulner-
abilities that have been used to attack web users are the GDI+ (MS04-028 vulnerability [99]),
Windows MetaFile (WMF)(MS06-001 vulnerability [100]), and more recently the .lnk (link) file
format vulnerabilities (CVE-2010-2568 [36]). These vulnerabilities were exploited by attackers
simply by attempting to display a maliciously crafted file on a website in any software that used
the appropriate Windows libraries. These all affected Internet Explorer, and other web browsers
to various degrees. The problems were exacerbated in early versions of Internet Explorer, which
had fewer separation techniques applied to isolate it from the Windows operating system than
more recent versions.
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Attacks Targeting the Web Browser
As the operating system libraries have become less easy to attack, the web browsers became
the next step. Although they add another layer of variation upon the operating system there
are still only four to five main players on the desktop, and they generally disclose their version
with every page request which makes correct identification trivial. Furthermore, because most
users log in and run software as an administrative user, compromising the web browser process
allowed full system compromise. The addition of protection technologies such as sandboxing2,
Stack Cookies3, Data Execution Protection (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR) have made the exploitation of browsers much more difficult, but not all browsers yet
implement such measures[5]. Furthermore, even when such protections are implemented, there
are measures of evading them and still exploiting vulnerabilities that exist in the browser[160].
The best way to protect browsers from exploitation is to ensure there are no exploitable bugs
in the first place. All of the memory protection technologies are designed to make exploitation
of bugs difficult, but they do not prevent the existence of the bug in the first place. The term Zero
Day is used to describe exploits of bugs for which there is no patch available. Exploitable zero
day bugs can be sold for thousands of dollars. A concerted effort has been made by browser
vendors to harden their products with each release, and to roll out patches to problems promptly.
Vendor awareness of the importance of repairing such problems before they become public has
also lead to some vendors offering so-called bug bounties of thousands of dollars for disclosure
and confidentiality of bugs found by others in their products [112] [47].
Attacks Targeting Browser Plugins
As web browsers have become more difficult to successfully exploit, attackers have changed
target yet again to more easily exploited classes of software: plugins, extensions, and addons
that run inside (or alongside) web browsers. Even though the browser may be sandboxed, by
linking to or running third party software in browser plugins, it is possible to infect an operating
system via weaknesses in that software. This linkage is illustrated in figure 1.3.
This additional layer of variation upon the systems again offers only marginal security, as
plugin versions installed upon visitor’s systems are easily determined by web sites. Furthermore,
much like web browsers, there are several plugins that most users can be reasonably expected
2Sandboxing refers to the execution of software in an isolated and controlled environment where it cannot affect
anything outside of the isolated environment (sandbox) without permission
3A stack cookie, or /gs protection adds a marker at the end of data portions of code that should never be modified,
and raises an alert if it is modified
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Figure 1.3: A simplified software hierarchy illustrating the linkages that may exist between web
browser plugins and third party software
to have installed. Those which about half or more users have installed include some variant of:
Flash, Java, Windows Media Player, Quicktime, Shockwave, Realplayer, Silverlight, and Adobe
PDF[56][165]. Of those the two particularly dangerous ones are also the most prevalent[5]:
Adobe’s Flash and PDF, which together accounted for over 95% of exploits in 2009[145].
Attacks Targeting Other Web Aware Software
Any software that uses the web can be theoretically exploited, but that which is of those most
risk to web browser users (other than that using plugins) is usually that which uses url-handlers.
A url handler is what the operating system calls for an associated protocol in a URL/URL. For
example, http://... will be handled by a web browser, whereas if iTunes is installed then iTunes
will be invoked for for itms://... URLs. Using these it is possible to open programs and open
files with those programs with no user intervention4. Combined with buffer overflows this has
been used for exploiting systems in the past [35].
1.3.3 Combined Attacks (Utilize both Exploit and Social Engineering )
While both social and technical attacks are dangerous in their own right, they are a far greater
threat when used in combination. This form of attack is becoming more prevalent as users
become more aware of (and thus less likely to be vulnerable to) simple types of attacks such
as those purely technical (ie trojan key-loggers) or those fully social (ie phishing sites)[190].
Although there is no limit to the combinations that can be used for these attacks, common com-
4Although later versions of web browsers warn before automatically calling external URI handlers
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bined social and technical attacks use one method to infect and another to gain the information
what they want. So, they use social measures to spread/infect and technical to accomplish their
aim, or technical to infect and social to accomplish their aim.
Combined social/technical attacks are the more commonly encountered, these are the attacks
which try to convince the user to bypass technical restrictions to install malware. This can range
from simply downloading and installing the software (thus bypassing the web browser sandbox),
to disabling anti-virus, firewall, web browsers and operating system security warnings before
downloading and installing. Once on the system the technical aspects of the attack take over,
and the software acts as a rootkit, keylogger, backdoor, or otherwise.
Technical then social attacks are more difficult to stop, and are reportedly one of the more
profitable forms of attack at present[ref]. The most popular form of this is fake anti-virus[ref],
which once installed uses software of a similar look, feel, and behavior to legitimate anti-virus
products in an attempt to convince the customer to provide payment details to “upgrade to the
full version”, “subscribe for protection”, “purchase the full version”, or similar. Legitimate
software produces very similar warnings, some of which even have been accused of offering the
same level of threat[62] The difference with fake anti-virus products is that they claim to remove
threats detected after scanning the system. Not only do the threats not exist, the software offers
no protection at all against threats and may come with software to installer further malware.
1.3.4 Technological and Usage Trends
There are also some other current general trends which also influence this project greatly. They
affect the security landscape for the web, thus some of these are worth noting as they affect the
threats, the vulnerability points, and how countermeasures can be deployed. These include: the
blurring of the line between producer and consumer everywhere online, the popularity of mobile
devices, and the rising sophistication of bot-nets.
Web 2.0 - and the blurring between content consumers and producers
Websites from trusted organizations are often bound by their brand (and the law) to provide
content that is truthful and safe, however, many such websites have some form of comments
feature enabled, and almost all have advertising. While not in themselves threats, any flaws in
the implementation of these features can allow code from a third party to be inserted into the
page, with the effect that the content of page itself cannot be trusted.
Social media sites can abuse user trust in a different way: by subverting the postings of
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users it is possible for them to impersonate them online and exploit the trust afforded to them
by other users. This can be used to get them to purchase goods, disclose personal information,
download software, or many other actions they would not do had it not been recommended by
their “friend”.
Shortened URLs
Although URL shortening redirections services (see section 2.4.3) have been in existence for
around ten years, the rising use of social media that is sensitive to message length (for example
Twitter with its 140 character message size) has driven significant growth in the usage of such
services. The prevalence of such links adds risks to users in several ways, but among the most
important of these are that such links break the 1 to 1 property of URLs (where one URL points
to one resource) and as such a user cannot know where a link is going before they click it. For
an example see the image from Twitter below:
Figure 1.4: An example of a shortened link on a social networking site
There is no way for the average user to know what that link is before clicking it. This
problem is exacerbated on mobile devices where typing or even displaying a full URL can be
laborious at best due to the difficulty of text input and small screen size.
Popularity of mobile devices
The rising popularity of mobile devices increases the risks beyond those introduced by short
URLs. Mobile devices such as netbooks, smartphones, and tablets have properties and are used
in ways that make them in some ways more vulnerable than traditional desktop or notebook
computers. Of particular note for this are the following issues:
• Limited system resource power (CPU, RAM, Storage)
• Battery life considerations
• Limited network capacity
• Only limited user access allowed
These each have effects upon the security environment of mobile devices.
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System resources on mobile devices are often limited. This has security implications, as the
effect of this is to make it undesirable for performance reasons to install client side protection
measures and leave them running the in background. This is improving with more recent devices
that have more power to spare, however the other issues given still act as constraints.
Battery life is another important consideration for mobile devices[133], and in the case of
smartphones often one of the more important – after all, if a mobile phone goes flat you lose
a major form of communication, an unacceptable and potentially dangerous situation for some
users. Because every CPU clock cycle uses energy from a finite storage battery (as opposed to
an effectively infinite electricity grid connection) mobile devices use low power modes when
not performing operations. Every operation above the minimal consumes some energy from the
battery that would not otherwise be consumed. This too is slowly improving with improving
battery technology, but is still important.
Limited network capacity is another important consideration for mobile devices. As mobile
devices often use the cellular network (when not on wifi or bluetooth) the bandwidth can be
expensive and of a comparatively high latency. While desktop security often requires numerous
software and signature updates, or lots of two way communication for cloud based approaches,
these add unacceptable costs to mobile devices. This affects not only client based security solu-
tions (such as antivirus or firewall), it also affects process such as regular automated patching.
To a user with a 200MB per month data cap even 10MB can be very expensive if it pushes them
over their data cap. Network capacity is improving, slowly improving this aspect of security
also, but in many cases users are not able to install such patches or software anyway due to
access limitations.
Limited user access is imposed upon many modern mobile devices, and particularly to those
on cellular networks. Unlike on a home PC, users ordinarily cannot perform privileged oper-
ations at all – even to administer a device they own. Common smartphone operating systems
including Google’s Android and Apple’s iPhone OS (iOS) come with root access disabled in
most cases (and all cases on iOS). This offers some security, as programs are run Sandboxed
(See section 2.6.1) and cannot access unauthorized system or program data, but it also disables
users from installing security software, changing locked security settings, or applying patches
that are not signed by the the vendor or network operator. It is possible to overcome this lim-
itation by performing a process known as jailbreaking on iOS devices or rooting on Android
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 15
devices and attain full access to the device, but this is not only technically complicated or risky,
but in some cases breaks contractual or legal obligations. There have been instances of rooted de-
vices being both less secure (for example the iKee worm spreading on jailbroken iOS 3 devices
(via SSH being default enabled with a default password[125]), and more secure (for example
Android devices after installing Security Enhanced Linux, SELinux [153])
Botnets
Rajab et. al.[1] describe a Botnet as follows :
... [N]etworks of infected end-hosts, called bots, that are under the control of a human
operator commonly known as a botmaster. ... The primary purpose of these channels is to
disseminate the botmasters commands to their bot armies...[1]
Because there is money to be made in utilizing infected machines, machines compromised
by many modern botnets can be intentionally very difficult to detect. They utilize rootkit and
process hiding behavior, disable client side protections, and often cause no discernible differ-
ence in system performance. However, the entire system is open to the attackers should they
wish to install malicious software, or use the system in an attack. Furthermore, often it can be
difficult for an end user to prove they did not perform some action that occurred through their
compromised system. This activity can include Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), spam,
website hosting, and even activity occurring through an installed web proxy.
Not only is a compromised machine a security risk for an end user, it is also a security risk
for the network operator, be they corporate or an Internet Service Provider (ISP). For an ISP risks
include increased network flow causing quality of service issues and bandwidth costs, potentially
having their user’s emails blocked, and even potentially being blacklisted from routing tables.
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Chapter 2
Technical Introduction
The modern World Wide Web (WWW) is built upon many different technologies, but the most
foundational of those are the markup language, HyperText Markup Language (HTML), and the
transfer protocol, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). We will discuss these technologies as
well as briefly addressing some of the additional technologies that are mentioned by or relevant
to understanding our work. Note that we will only discuss ISO layer 5 and above technologies,
as the underlying transport protocols are not generally relevant to the topic of this work. Proxied
HTTP in particular will be discussed in detail, as the interworking of proxied HTTP and Internet
Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP) is crucial to this work.
2.1 HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
HTTP is the primary technology used by the WWW to transport information around. Defined
and driven by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), it is a human readable text-based protocol initially designed for the retrieval of static
text-based documents from remote servers, that has since been expanded to allow additional
flexibility with regards to content types and better support for additional transfer operations such
as proxying and caching. HTTP is defined in a series of IETF Request For Comment (RFC)s,
but the one pertaining to the version in common use is defined in rfc 2616[51]. Knowledge of
HTTP operation is assumed, but an overview of HTTP and its operation as relevant to our work
is given in appendix A.1.1.
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2.1.1 Proxied HTTP
Proxied HTTP is very similar to normal HTTP, but requests and responses are served via an
intermediary server that understands and uses the HTTP protocol. This intermediary server is
called an HTTP proxy server, a Web proxy server, or sometimes simply a Web proxy or even
simply a proxy –with the type implied by the context.
A client requests that a web proxy perform an HTTP request (such as a GET request) to
a server on behalf of the client, and forward the result to the client. Note that the HTTP
specification[51] requires that clients using an HTTP proxy put the full resource URI in their
requests, rather than simply relevant to the server root. For example:
GET www.google.com/ HTTP/1.1
instead of the non-proxied request line:
GET / HTTP/1.1
Proxied HTTP Operation
The operation of proxied HTTP operates in an architecture like that in figure 2.1, and consists
of the following steps:
1. Client requests the content from the proxy.
2. Proxy requests the content from the web server itself
3. Proxy forwards desired content to the client
Figure 2.1: A proxied HTTP connection with a single proxy
Note that there can be multiple cascading levels of proxies, with a proxy requesting content
via another proxy (and so on) – but the logic is the same as with forwarded requests.
Proxied HTTP also has the benefit of facilitating the Caching of responses, thus saving on
resources and network bandwidth. However, we have disabled caching for this project; the
effects of caching upon the system are left to future research (see section 7.1).
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Transparent Proxied HTTP
Transparent Proxied HTTP looks to the client like an unproxied HTTP connection, but in reality
the request is served via an inline proxy that transparently intercepts requests. This enables the
use of a proxy without client configuration, and does not need the client to send the full absolute
path with each request, as the proxy performs the necessary transformation.
2.1.2 Direct HTTPS
HTTPS, or HTTP with SSL uses asymmetric encryption and digital certificates to set up a secure
and encrypted connection between an HTTPS web server and an HTTPS client. HTTPS is not
used in this project because it is by design not easily possible to inspect the encrypted content
without setting off errors, alerts, and warnings in web clients. There are ways around this,
and many related non-technical issues also – but these are relegated to future work (see section
7.2.1).
2.1.3 Proxied HTTPS
When an HTTP proxy that is unable to decrypt and re-encrypt HTTPS receives an HTTPS
request it should switch to tunnel mode, and simply pass on the raw content unmodified. This is
usually undertaken via the CONNECT method. See section 7.2.1 for proposed details on secure
connection termination and reencryption.
2.2 Web Content and Applications
The web has many associated technologies that use it, and many different types of static and
active content are carried through HTTP. We shall briefly discuss a few of the most important
types that relate to this project, and some of their associated security risks.
2.2.1 HTML
HyperText Markup Language, or HTML, defines the majority of textual web content and is the
primary markup which the web was (and generally still is) built upon. HTML was originally
proposed by Tim Berners-Lee in a document entitled Information Management: A Proposal[14]
written to the management at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (better known
as CERN) in 1989 while working there. Berners-Lee also defined the HTTP protocol to carry
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HTML content, and implemented the first web browser and web server. Already in various
implementations, a proposed draft standard for HTML was submitted to the IETF in 1993 [15]
and through the 1990’s various developments in HTML were handled by the IETF with input
from the W3C and software vendors. The details of early HTML development are irrelevant to
this project, with the notable points of HTML development being HTML 4.01 [131], XHTML
1.1 [98], and the undergoing development of HTML 5 draft [68].
Basic HTML Layout
HTML defines the content of a page with an Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML)
like syntax. It has some capability to define page layout, but this is generally considered best
handled by Cascading Style Sheets (CSS). It uses tags and pairs of tags, with each tag enclosed
between the characters < and >. Tag pairs make up elements that define some property of their
contents, with an element closed or terminated by a / character. For example, the b element,
which makes the content font bold is defined by <b> text </b>. Together the elements in a
page make up what is referred to the Document Object Model (DOM), which is a hierarchial
representation of the web page.
A page is comprised of an HTML element between a pair of HTML tags, and enclosed within
the HTML element are two further elements, the head and body elements. The head element
contains additional document information not including the content, and the body contains page
content. The basic structure of an HTML document is shown in figure 2.2.1.
<html>
<head>
head content
</head>
<body>
page body
</body>
</html>
Figure 2.2: The basic structure of an HTML document
HTML allows insertion of media such as video, sound, and images into HTML documents,
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but on its own it does not define interactive content beyond that needed to change the structure
of the page displayed.
Security Issues with HTML
Because it is by itself simply a markup language most of the security issues with HTML come
from either weaknesses in rendering engines which can be exploited, or from weaknesses or
problems with the way inserted media and active content is handled. Active web content is
handled by other technologies, the most notable of which is JavaScript.
2.2.2 JavaScript
JavaScript is a client side implementation of the ECMA script programming language originally
developed by Netscape[63]. It is implemented in web browsers to allow dynamic and interactive
content. While it can be used in an object-oriented fashion, it can also be used in a scripting
like fashion, even one function call at a time[43]. This versatility is what enables attacks on web
browsers if it is injected or manipulated
AJAX - Asynchronous JavaScript And Xml
AJAX is a term that is used to describe techniques that couple JavaScript and XML for partial
manipulation of page content outside of the normal HTTP page-at-a-time operation. The most
common example of this is updating small sections of a page from the server without reloading
the entire page, which makes the entire process seem far more responsive to users, and use less
bandwidth (as only the relevant content need be sent). AJAX is very commonly used in so called
Web 2.0 technologies.
Web 2.0
Web 2.0 is a word that seems to be widely used but that is difficult to define, as its definition
seems to change from source to source. A so-called “buzzword, nevertheless it is necessary to
define as it is very relevant to the current web, and the security thereof.
The first commonly attributed mention of the term is that of Darcy Dinucci in a 1999
article[41], where Web 2.0 was foreseen as follows:
The web will be understood not as screenfuls of text, and graphics but as a transport mech-
anism, the ether through which interactivity happens. It will still appear on your computer
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screen, transformed by video and other media made possible by ... speedy connection technolo-
gies... The web will also appear, in different guises, on your TV set..., your car dashboard...,
your cell phone..., and maybe even your microwave.[41]
The term is also commonly used at present to refer to technologies that break the distinction
between content producer or publisher, and content consumer. Examples of the types of sites to
which the term Web 2.0 is used today include social networks, AJAX-enabled web applications,
and mashups1.
JavaScript and Security
JavaScript’s versatility and ability to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM), the layout
and content of web pages, has also led to the use of it in many types of attacks. Some of the
attacks will be discussed in their own section (for example Cross Site Scripting in section 2.5.1,
and Cross Site Request Forgery in section 2.5.2). To protect against attacks using JavaScript, the
two main security mechanisms that web browsers impose (other than normal software protection
measures) are JavaScript sandboxing and same origin policies[63].
JavaScript Sandboxing Sandboxing is the use of techniques whereby code is only allowed
to perform a restricted set of operations on a restricted set of items[122, 63]. In web browsers,
such techniques are used to restrict code access to other web pages, and (above all) to restrict its
access to the underlying operating system. Furthermore, web browsers add a concept of security
levels so that the set of allowed operations can be controlled on a more granular level depending
upon parameters such as the source of the code. Commonly this will allow more functionality on
Intranet sites than Internet sites, and the most privileged functionality is allowed on on files from
the local system. Furthermore, there is separation between JavaScript from different domains
using same origin policies.
JavaScript Same Origin Policies are used to control access between scripts loaded from dif-
ferent sources. Scripts are commonly considered to be from the same origin if they are included
from the same protocol and (sub)domain[111]. Mozilla gives a good table of examples, which
we have replicated in figure 2.3.
1A mashup is a web application (using web 2.0 techniques) that uses content from two or more sources to create
a new service not foreseen by the original data providers
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Figure 2.3: Mozilla’s examples on the JavaScript Same Origin Policy [111]
This is intended to prevent scripts reading or writing things to or from other pages loaded
in the browser, while still allowing pages from the same origin to interact. Unfortunately these
policies are not comprehensive, and many classes of threat cannot be prevented by them. There
are ways to successfully violate or circumvent the intent of this policy. The most common
methods of circumventing this policy are to include remote JavaScript in elements of a page. For
instance by inserting a remote inclusion on http://www.site.com we include a JavaScript element
from http://www.attacker.com, now attacker.com can perform any operations that site.com can.
Even though the script is not from the same origin, because it is called from site.com it is treated
in the same security origin. We detail this in section 2.7.3.
2.2.3 Web Browsers
To handle web content on the client side, a variety of software is used which we will discuss as
relevant to this project. The most notable web software type is the web browser, but web browser
plugins (discussed next) are also important, as are some other classes of general software which
handle web content discussed in section 2.5.6).
A web browser is, at its most basic, an application that is capable of retrieving and rendering
HTML documents through HTTP. Modern web browsers, however, contain far more function-
ality and extensibility, usually supporting additional protocols such as File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) and the ability to install “plugins”, “addons” or “extensions”(See section 2.5.5) that per-
form non-core functions.
Web Browser History
Browsers for hypertext documents existed before the WWW web, but we are primarily con-
cerned with web browsers of the modern web. Although initally the only way to view the web
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the first browser written in 1991 by Tim Berners-Lee, WorldWideWeb, was quickly followed
by Mosaic in 1993, Netscape Navigator in 1994, Internet Explorer in 1995 and Opera in 1996.
Mosaic contained most of the common interface elements from modern web browsers, as can be
seen in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: A screenshot of the Mosaic 3 web browser. [9]
The successors to these web browsers include the majority of the modern web browser mar-
ket, with the exception of the WebKit (fork of khtml [1998] circa 2002) based Apple Safari
(released 2003) and Google Chrome (released 2008) browsers, which came much later.
The popularity of desktop web browsers at present is, in order of popularity [179, 164, 69]:
1. Microsoft Internet Explorer
2. Mozilla Firefox
3. Google Chrome
4. Apple Safari
5. Opera
These do change in popularity between operating systems. For instance, Internet Explorer is
only available on Microsoft Windows, and Safari is far more popular on Apple Macintosh Sys-
tems. Also worth noting is that in the ever more important mobile space WebKit based browsers
are predominant, with (among others) Apple iOS devices (iPod Touch, iPhone, iPad), Google
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Android devices, the latest Blackberry devices, and even some single purpose devices such as
the Amazon Kindle Ebook reader running WebKit based browsers.
Web Browsers at present
We cannot discuss all web browsers in use at present, but by covering the common families
and versions within those families we can cover the vast majority (over 99%) of web users. We
will discuss them in order of popularity as given above; we will then discuss mobile browsers
followed by a brief rundown of the security features and architectures on offer by the desktop
browsers. All popularity rates are taken from sources for September 2010 [179, 164, 69], but
because of different biases all rates differ slightly from source to source.
Internet explorer is available only on Microsoft Windows, and the versions of Internet Ex-
plorer in use at present include versions 6, 7, 8, and 9 Beta. They cannot all run on every
Windows version however. We summarize compatibilities in table 2.1.
Version XPSP0 XPSP1 XPSP2 XPSP3 Vista VistaSP1 VistaSP2 Win7
6 YES YES YES YES
7 YES YES YES YES YES
8 YES YES YES YES YES YES
9 beta YES YES
Server OS versions (Server 2003, 2008) excluded
Table 2.1: Internet Explorer Browser and OS/Service Pack Version Compatibility
From the table it can be observed that Internet Explorer 6 is not available on the latest two
versions of Windows, and that version 7 is not available on Windows 7 (Internet Explorer 8 is
included with Windows 7). Nevertheless as of September 2009 outdated versions of Internet
Explorer (6 and 7) have 5-15% and 10-13% share respectively, making up a total market share
of around one fifth of the desktop browser market.
Firefox was developed from the Netscape source code which was open-sourced in 1998. Re-
leased in 2002, it was originally called first Phoenix, then Firebird, the name changed due to
various trademark and name overlaps with other projects until the final name stabilized as Fire-
fox. Currently it is the second most popular desktop web browser with a market share of 20-25%.
The versions in use at present are 3.6.x, 3.5.x, and 3.0.x (now end of life after 3.0.19[111]), with
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the vast majority of users using versions off the latest 3.6 branch. Version 4 beta is also in limited
use, due for release sometime in late 2010.
WebKit [186] is not a browser, but a browser engine that is widely used in a massive variety
of applications and web browsers (see sample list[184]). Originally a port of a KDE library,
KHTML, WebKit was developed intially for Apple’s Safari browser[184], but is now used in
a far larger variety of applications and contributed to by many large oprganizations [185]. The
most important WebKit based applications for this project are Google Chrome/Chromium, Ap-
ple Safari, and many mobile browsers, we will discuss these ass appropriate below.
This widespread adoption of the WebKit engine means that on desktop web browsers webkit
has a market share of around 10-15%.
Google Chrome was released in late 2008. Developed by Google, it is a WebKit based
web browser the code for which was also open sourced in a project called Chromium[59].
Chromium’s source code is from a variety of sources using many different licenses [19]. For
instance, Google developed the JavaScript Engine (v8). Chrome and Chromium are based upon
the same main chromium codebase, but Chrome has some additional non-open source features
that Chromium does not, such as an automatic updater, integrated Flash player, PDF viewer,
and additional media codec support[18]. For the purposes of our work, however, we shall refer
to the Google Chrome browser and not Chromium builds. With major version releases every
few months, Chrome is the third most popular browser at present. Due to the automatic silent
updating most users are using versions from the last two major releases, at present2 versions 5
or 6, although the public beta version 7 and the development (or dev) version 8 releases are in
use by a few testers.
Safari was released to the public in January 2003[8], originally as a browser for Mac OS X
(becoming the default web browser with Mac OS X 10.3 or Tiger), but was later also released
for Windows in 2007 [7]. Safari has a small market share of around 5% on desktop devices.
Apple’s iOS which is used on the iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch devices uses a version of Safari
as its primary web browser (discussed in more detail below).
Opera is the browser with the smallest share that we shall discuss, with a market share of
around 2%. It has a history that goes back to 1995, making it one of the older contenders. It
2As of September 2010
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retains a small market share, but has some features that make it worthy of note. Although not a
feature, the property which many use Opera for is that fact that it is a fully usable web browser,
but because it remains separate from the main browsers in codebase and is small in market share,
it is thus less likely to be targeted by attackers.
Mobile Devices at present have a large variety of software arrangements, however in the more
functional and power so-called smart devices the variety is significantly less, especially in web
browsers. The majority (over 99% in many cases eg[138]) of the smart devices browsing the
web consist of devices running Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android, or Blackberry OS. All devices
running iOS or android, and the latest Blackberry devices all use WebKit based browsers. The
browsers do differ significantly in features and layout (and things like JavaScript engines) but
with the same family of rendering engine making the mobile browser space at present quite
homogenous when compared with the desktop space.
2.3 Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP)
The Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP), is a standard for content modification servers
that was developed by Network Appliances in 1999 and has been used in the decade since. ICAP
is defined in RFC 3507[46] and the ICAP Forum[75] provides some technical discussion with
industry members and other stakeholders.
2.3.1 General ICAP Overview
The Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP), as its name suggests, is a protocol designed
for modifying Internet content. ICAP is an HTTP-like protocol discussed in the IETF informa-
tional rfc 3507[46]. It is designed to facilitate the modification of content that passes through
proxy servers. Introduced in 1999, it is a standard protocol for communication between proxy
servers and callout (separate content modification) servers. ICAP is able to receive and modify
both HTTP requests and HTTP responses. Our descriptions of ICAP operation are all derived
from RFC 3507[46]. It is worth noting that ICAP can only inspect what the icap-client (proxy)
can see. Generally this means it cannot inspect any encrypted traffic (we will discuss this later
in sections 2.6.3 and 7.2.1).
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2.3.2 ICAP Overview
The architecture for an ICAP system is essentially the same as for an HTTP proxy, but with an
additional server (the ICAP server) that the proxy forwards both requests and responses to so it
can check if modification is needed. The proxy server is called the ICAP client, and the content
modification server is designated the ICAP server.
Figure 2.5: A Proxied connection utilizing ICAP
General ICAP operation
An ICAP server performs two main operations: HTTP request (see section A.1.3) modifica-
tion, and HTTP response (see section A.1.4) modification. By monitoring and modifying both
directions, full supervision and control over the HTTP stream can be attained. Request and Re-
sponse modification are performed by two ICAP operational modes designated REQMOD and
RESPMOD; these shall be discussed later, but first we shall outline general ICAP operation.
ICAP Operation Steps
The general ICAP operation is as follows for content alteration. Figure 2.6 has the steps labeled,
and these are explained in brief immediately following.
We shall use the same terminology used for HTTP in section A.1.3 for ICAP regarding
requests and responses: request denotes communications from the ICAP client (proxy) to
the icap server, and response denotes communications from the ICAP server to the ICAP
client directly caused by an ICAP request.
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Figure 2.6: Numbered steps in a proxied connection utilizing ICAP
1. Client system requests the content from the proxy.
2. Proxy forwards request to the ICAP server (reqmode)
3. ICAP server responds to proxy with either modified request or an OK to continue unal-
tered.
4. Proxy sends the request (or modified request) to the web server itself
5. Web server responds to the proxy as appropriate
6. Proxy forwards the received response to the ICAP server
7. ICAP server responds to the proxy with either modified response, or an OK to continue
unaltered
8. Proxy responds to client system with either the response from the web server or the mod-
ified response from the ICAP server
2.3.3 ICAP Operation
ICAP Request Format
ICAP is a text-based protocol like HTTP, and looks very similar to the HTTP protocol, although
it is much simpler. ICAP requests are in the style of an HTTP request chain (section A.1.4), but
with a slightly different makeup. An ICAP request chain is the series of communications that is
sent from the client to the server. An ICAP response chain contains the following separated by
newlines (CRLF) with the body separated from the headers by a further blank line:
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1. Start/Request line
2. ICAP Request Headers
3. ICAP Body
Start/Request Line
The first line in an ICAP request is very much like the first line in an HTTP request, the status
line is of the form:
icap-method <space> icap-uri <space> icap-version <CRLF>
The ICAP-method parameter is one of three ICAP methods, namely: REQMOD, RESP-
MOD, or OPTIONS. For this project we are only directly concerned with the REQMOD and
RESPMOD methods. REQMOD indicates that the ICAP server should perform request modifi-
cation, that is that the rest of the message will contain an HTTP requests that the server can act
upon. Conversely RESPMOD indicates that the ICAP server should perform response modifi-
cation upon the HTTP response contained within the ICAP body of the message.
The ICAP-URI parameter is used to hold the address for the ICAP server. It may also be
given a path and query, but these are not normally used except to allow conceptual separation of
request and response modification. In the case of an ICAP server however the scheme is icap://,
and the default port is 1344.
For a request example, if the ICAP server is at the ipaddress 192.168.1.1, the relative location
of the request response processing is /req mod the the ICAP-URI will be:
icap://192.168.1.1/req mod/
The icap-version parameter is used to indicate what ICAP version the requesting ICAP client
(proxy) supports, this will always be 1.0 at present, as it is the only version.
ICAP Request Headers
ICAP Request headers follow the same format as HTTP headers, but differ in content. The most
important part of this for the purposes of this work is the encapsulated HTTP header, which
indicates details regarding any HTTP content carried in the ICAP-body section. In this project
however neither this nor any other ICAP headers were ever directly modified, and were left to
be automatically handled by the ICAP client (the proxy server).
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ICAP Body
The ICAP body is simply the full HTTP request, request headers, and request body repeated
after an empty line.
Example ICAP Request
The example below illustrates the makeup of an ICAP request, and is modified from one in RFC
3507 [46] section 4.8.3.
REQMOD icap://icap-server.net/server ICAP/1.0
Host: icap-server.net
Encapsulated: req-hdr=0, null-body=170
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.origin-server.com
Accept: text/html, text/plain
Accept-Encoding: compress
Cookie: ff39fk3jur@4ii0e02i
Figure 2.7: An example ICAP request (modified from RFC3507[46] )
ICAP responses follow a similar syntax.
ICAP Response Format
The ICAP response format is very much the same as the HTTP response format according to
the definitions in the RFC’s[3507]. An ICAP response chain contains the following separated
by newlines (CRLF) with the body separated from the headers by a further blank line:
1. Response line
2. ICAP Response Headers
3. ICAP Response Body
32 CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
Response Line
The first line in an ICAP request is very much like the first line in an HTTP response, of the
form:
ICAP-version <space> status-code <space> status-description <CRLF>
The ICAP-version parameter will always contain ICAP/1.0, as this is the only ICAP version.
The Status-Code and Status-Description parameters act the same as in HTTP – they han-
dle not only the content but also error handling. The status codes follow the HTTP pattern of
3 digit numeric numbers from the protocol specification, where the first number denotes which
class of status. ICAP status codes also follow the HTTP pattern, with the exception of the 300
(redirection) codes, which are not used.
There are four classes of status code used in the ICAP specification:
• 1xx Informational
• 2xx Success
• 4xx Client Error
• 5xx Server error
While there are numerous status codes in the specification, for our purposes only a few are
relevant, namely “200 - OK”, and “204 - No Modification”.
The response status 200 - OK indicates success for the request. In the context of ICAP this
means that MODIFIED content follows in the ICAP body. This may be either a modified version
of the original request or response, or in the case of request modification the ICAP server may
reply with a full HTTP response directly, thus the request is never sent to the web server.
The response status 204 - No Modification indicates that the ICAP client need not modify
the content but may send it on unmodified. Note that in this case the ICAP body is empty, it
is assumed that the ICAP client kept a temporary copy.
ICAP Request Headers
ICAP response headers are very similar to HTTP response headers. They do however define
content encapsulation exactly the same way as in ICAP request headers, however in this project
we never directly access these and leave them to be automatically handled by the ICAP server.
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ICAP Body
The ICAP body is simply the full HTTP response, HTTP response headers, and HTTP response
body repeated after an empty line.
2.3.4 Considerations for ICAP Use
When compared with competing technologies ICAP has some relative advantages and disad-
vantages that must be taken into account when planning a deployment. The considerations
surrounding ICAP are context dependent.
The use of a remote server for content modification means that ICAP is remote to the
proxy infrastructure, and removes much of the dependence upon specific proxy implementa-
tions. When combined with the statelessness of ICAP, load balancing is also facilitated across
multiple ICAP servers.
The requirement for the use of proxies does, however, have some drawbacks. Due to the way
they function, all traffic passing through proxies is visible to them, which has potential privacy
concerns. The proxies also become points of failure, as they are central to operation: if they fail
then any clients using them cease to have web access. Furthermore, due to the versatile nature of
ICAP it can also be used for nefarious purposes that are either subversive, or undesirable from a
user perspective.
Many related issues for content modification and the effect of its use upon the integrity of
web content are discussed in [53]. Of the measures discussed to maintain trust and integrity,
we use the notification and non-blocking properties. The notification property means that users
will be notified of modifications, and the reason for them, while the non-blocking property is
implemented so that users can still access non-modified content after the notification if they
wish.
2.3.5 Alternatives to ICAP
ICAP is not the only content modification technology in use or proposed, however. Alternatives
include similar callout server3 based approaches, as well as proxy level approaches. While ap-
proaches based upon client based software are not directly comparable as a means of content
modification in the context of this work (as they do not use a single web gateway for content
3A callout server is a server that some sort of client calls out to to request some information
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modification), they are important in the context of security measures however, so will be dis-
cussed briefly.
The OPES Callout Protocol (OCP) 4 is a protocol proposed by the Open Pluggable Edge
Services working group for content modification via callout servers. Discussed in [139] it has
also been proposed for use as ICAP 2.0. At present, implementations are application specific,
and no widespread implementations are available.
Figure 2.8: In an ICAP or OCP based security system, the ICAP Server handles the security
operations.
ECAP (Not an acronym) has a name similar to ICAP, but ECAP is not discussed in an RFC
like ICAP. Furthermore it achieves content modification via a different approach.
ECAP is at a very early development stage (version 0.02), and is not yet widely supported
or documented. The E-cap.org website describes eCAP as follows:
eCAP is a software interface that allows a network application, such as an HTTP proxy or an
ICAP server, to outsource content analysis and adaptation to a loadable module. For each ap-
plicable protocol message being processed, an eCAP-enabled application supplies the message
details to the adaptation module and gets back an adapted message or a ”not interested” re-
sponse. These exchanges often include message bodies.
If you are familiar with the ICAP protocol (RFC 3507), then you may think of eCAP as an ”em-
bedded ICAP”, where network interactions with an ICAP server are replaced with function calls
4OPES = Open Pluggable Edge Services working group
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to an adaptation module.[169]
Proprietary proxies and modified existing proxies are among the the most flexible meth-
ods for content modification, but also the most labour-intensive. Setting up and modifying the
behaviour of such proxies via source code modification is a very intensive and time consum-
ing process, requiring a software restart. Building a proxy from scratch also requires a large
investment.
Figure 2.9: A proprietary web security proxy handles all content sanitation itself
Proxies which have been modified or built to facilitate content modification can perform the
modifications natively with no use of a callout protocol either locally or remotely. By develop-
ing a product from the ground up, intellectual property rights to the full product remain with the
developing organization, and unlike modifying open source products there are not normally any
required disclosure issues. For many commercial secure web gateways, however, while docu-
mentation on their claimed functionality abounds, little detail is publicly disclosed concerning
specific details of operation.
Clientside Content Modification Mechanisms may be functionally similar to proxy based
methods, but are similar only in that they modify content and not in the mechanism by which
they achieve it. Content is modified on the client itself via the use of a local proxy or via software
that hooks incoming and outgoing network traffic and modifies it on the fly. While central
management is possible for these systems in some cases, normally it is more complicated since
integrity of the client is required for full functionality.
Figure 2.10: Client Based Web Security proxies through a local proxy
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2.3.6 Example Uses Of ICAP
ICAP is implemented in many products and devices, and also is detailed as being suitable for
others. Among the things for which ICAP is, or is detailed as being suitable for are:
• Advertising insertion
• Content censorship
• Content transformation (e.g. mobile device proxies [181])
• Automated translation (e.g. redirection through translator[40])
• Virus scanning
• User message insertion [20].
Current Security Implementations For ICAP
The utilisation of ICAP to modify page content has been investigated for filtering of objection-
able content, and also for other content transformation situations such as content classification[55]
and the modification of pages to reformat them for mobile devices[181]. This project investi-
gated the use of ICAP for security, and there are numerous security publications and security
products that use ICAP for their operation5. At the time of writing, the products listed on the
ICAP-forum webpage as implementing ICAP [76] included multiple commercial security prod-
ucts implementing ICAP servers. These include antivirus scanners, censorship servers, dataloss
prevention and Secure Web Gateways (discussed in 2.4.1). Security products not listed by the
ICAP-forum also claim to utilize ICAP (such as the DrWeb Antivirus for Internet Gateways
[183]). Thus ICAP is used both in literature and in commercial products for similar purposes to
those in this work.
2.4 Related Technologies, Protocols, and Services
2.4.1 Secure Web Gateways
A secure web gateway is a centrally managed system that monitors network perimeter points and
is designed to protect clients from web security risks (such as malware). It is designed to prevent
both the entry of external threats (such as malware) into the network, as well as the exfiltration
5In addition, mentions were found of an open source proxy that used ICAP and Clam Antivirus to scan HTTP
content (httpav), but it has since disappeared, and is presumably abandoned.
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of data by internal threats. They generally function as proprietary filters or proxies, however
some commercial implementations support the ICAP protocol [132].
The normal functionality of a SWG includes URL filtering and anti-malware, although other
functionality may be included. For a discussion of the enterprise products and the enterprise
market see[132].
2.4.2 Twitter
Twitter[173] is a web based microblogging service that was originally designed to allow mes-
sages of only 140 characters, to fit within the constraints of cellular messages (SMS). It is widely
used on desktop web browsers, desktop applications, and mobile devices. Because messages are
so short it has a very quick response time to events, with some message trends lasting only
minutes, trends in the messages that flow through it are very indicative of the things that users
are discussing. Twitter is very commonly used to publicise things quickly, but also it commonly
used to share links, although to fit within the length constraint most of these are shortened URLs.
2.4.3 Short URL Services
Short URL services offer redirection service that takes full URLs, and maps them to shorter
URLs at the domain of the URL shortening server. While they are run privately, and many
companies run their own, many are also available for public use. They use HTTP redirects, and
often track statistics.
Some of the most well known public URL shorteners include:
• bit.ly
• ow.ly
• tr.im
• is.gd
• goo.gl
• tinyurl.com
They may each be used by going to their URL and requesting a shortened link. For example,
instead of:
http://www.alongurl.com/folder/subdirectory/anotherfolder/filename.htm
which is 70 characters long, the user can post a message containing:
bit.ly/c9Lgcz
which is only 13 characters long.
Two notable examples of companies using their own servers for URL shortnening include
the New York Times with nyti.ms, and Youtube with youtu.be.
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Mechanisms for Short URLs
URL shorteners look up the requested short URL key (the part after the /), and redirect the
web browser to the full URL. Although they could use other mechanisms, most use HTTP 301
(moved) redirects, but some use 302 (found) or 303 (see other) redirects. The exact mechanism
is not relevant to our work.
Additionally, the server that handles short URL processing can gather and store information
regarding the use of the links. This includes basic things, such as a count of the number of times
a particular short URL has been used, the IP address of the request, and additionally information
from the HTTP headers of the requesting browser. The gathered analytic information is usually
publicly visible too, enabling a party who is not in control of a site to track some usage of it
via monitoring short URLs that point to it. The statistics can contain details such as a count of
accesses, referrer details, and country location from IP addresses. An example statistics page
from bit.ly is shown in fig 2.11.
Figure 2.11: Bit.ly’s short URL statistics page
Security Risks surrounding Shortened URLs
Shortened URLs present a few types of security risk to users due to the way they operate. Be-
cause URL redirection services break the standard one-link-to-one-resource hyperlink model,
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the end user is potentially exposed to a greater security threat than would occur with a direct
link. Short URLs are non-transparent, that is, the destination of the link cannot be seen by end
users before clicking it, and also third party as neither the person requesting the link, nor the user
controls the short URL server. Thus, users cannot know where they are going, or even if they
are going where intended – this has been abused by phishing attackers and malware distributors
alike. “Link rot” is also a potential risk, as if the short URL service ceases to function, then all
links going through it will cease to operate too, even if their end destination is still available.
System Virtualization and Virtual Machines
In this project, system virtualization was used in the client honeypot components (discussed in
section 2.4.3 next) as the oversight and control afforded allows guest states to be monitored,
captured, and restored quickly.
System virtualization is used to abstract software away from the hardware upon which it
runs. This performed with the use of a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) which provides soft-
ware with the same interface (inputs, outputs, and operations) that physical hardware normally
provides. The use of a VMM means that the physical hardware state is no longer relevant mul-
tiple operating systems to be run on the same hardware, each inside a separate virtual machine
(VM). A virtual machine represents a logical machine that runs upon the VMM, and may have
an operating system installed upon it (called a guest). Each guest will perceive that is has com-
plete control over the system, whereas in reality the VMM has full oversight and control over
all operations of the virtual machine. A VMM may run multiple virtual machines, and thus may
have multiple guest operating systems running on the same hardware.
Figure 2.12 gives the VMM architecture as used in this project, a so called Type II VMM,
where the VMM is installed alongside an operating system on the host physical machine, and
uses the operating system on the host machine to handle Input/Output (IO).
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Figure 2.12: The type II virtual machine architecture, as used in this research (VMware Server)
[136]
Client Honeypots
A honeypot is a system that is set up to either deliberately attract attackers and then observe
behaviour, or to distract them from critical systems. Normally a network honeypot is a server
that has open ports and waits for attacks. A client honeypot, is a client system that performs
actions as a client and waits for attacks. Client honeypots comer in two main types: High
Interaction (HI), and Low Interaction (LI). A Low Interaction Client Honeypot (LICH) is a
honeypot that provides an emulated environment for attacks, wheras a High Interaction Client
Honeypot (HICH) runs actual software that a client could be expected to run. We only briefly
discuss client honeypots as they relate to our research 2.7.3, for more detail see: [31] [150]
2.5 Relevant Threats
Like any untrusted network, the Internet has many different threats that it introduces, however
those of interest to this project are those that affect clients and may be mitigated6. Many of
the negative effects on clients can be prevented or detected by monitoring the client or network
connection, including most attacks where arbitrary code or commands are run on or by the client.
2.5.1 Cross Site Scripting
Cross Site Scripting, or XSS is a form of code injection attack that abuses the the trust model
and mixed data/code/presentation nature of HTML to do things that the website creator did not
intend. Because the same origin policy of JavaScript treats all code originating at the same
6There also exist many threats surrounding servers, but they are not of interest to this work.
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subdomain at the same trust level the code displayed, if an attacker can get the web server to
display something on the page, then it is run on clients exactly as if the server itself requested it.
A cross site scripting attack is when an attacker manages to inject some content, code, or data so
that the web server displays it in a page sent from the server and is run on the client. For more
detailed discussion of XSS attacks see: [119, 191, 188, 178, 77]
There are three main types of XSS: reflected (also called non-persistent), stored (also called
persistent), and Document Object Model based. While it intially appears a trivial threat, many
other types of attacks can be executed with the help of XSS, including page defacement, session
stealing, and phishing (among others).
Reflected XSS attacks abuse pages which use some form of server side scripts to display user
input back to a user. Common examples of this include site search, which will often repeat the
search terms in a message on the results page. For example, if searching for “fish tanks“, the
results page may contain the line:
your search for “fish tanks” returned 45 results
So, if an attacker was to use JavaScript code as the search terms it would be displayed and run
on the results page. This does not generally allow an attacker to target another user, however.
To target another user, there needs to be some way that a user can visit the results page directly;
often this is done via query strings in the URL. A query string is a part of a URL that defines a
parameter passed to server side scripts. So, to search a hypothetical site for fish tank accessories
the full URL may be:
http://www.site.com/search.php?search=fish+tank+accessories
An attacker may enter malicious code instead of search terms, thus, if they can get a user to visit
the URL in question then the code will be run. When combined with short URLs this becomes
a far easier task to accomplish, as the user cannot see anything about the link destination before
they click it (and even if they did they are likely to see the domain and assume all is safe).
Persistent and DOM-based XSS Persistent XSS is similar to reflected XSS, where user input
is injected into site generated code, but it does not depend upon information passed in by the
user’s browser (such as query strings). Common examples of stored XSS include user comments
or forum postings where user input is not adequately screened or sanitized to stop user input
running on other users’ browsers.
Document Object Model (DOM) based XSS is similar to reflected and persistent XSS, but
42 CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
differs in the source of the data that the attacker manipulates. In a DOM based XSS attack, the
attacker modifies an aspect of the page that appears in the output, but not a standard aspect like
a query string. This can include manipulating the referrer, page anchor target, or other technical
aspects of the page model.
These forms of XSS are not relevant to the work of this project, as countermeasures that
are not server based need to be quite sophisticated. Conversely, countering reflected XSS in the
most basic form simply involves checking whether aspects of the request that are reflected in the
output contain active content.
2.5.2 Cross Site Request Forgery
Cross site request forgery (XSRF) attacks are similar to reflected XSS attacks in that they involve
manipulating the client browser into doing something unintended, however where XSS aims to
manipulate server output, XSRF attacks aim to manipulate server operations. This is largely
caused by the way cookies work to maintain login state on websites - if a user is logged in to a
site, then every request sent to that site will contain the cookie. This can be abused if the user
can be made to send a request for the server to do something, such as message a user. Consider
the following example:
If the way to post a forum message is to send a POST request to webforums.com/postmessage.php
containing the message while logged in, if JavaScript attacker.com forces the user’s browser to
send a spam message to webforums.com/postmessage.php, this will then be posted as that visitor
if they are logged in.
2.5.3 Malware downloads
Malware, or malicious software is software that performs some action the user does not desire
or has no control over. This can include any operation the system can normally perform, and
also operations the malware author or controller may desire. This can lead to data loss, personal
information disclosure, the sending of spam, or other undesired consequences.
Few users intentionally infect their machine, but many are infected nonetheless. The vec-
tors malware uses for entry systems are quite varied, but some common forms include email
attachments, trojan horses (unwanted software that is hiding in legitimate-looking software),
worms (automatically propagating through the network – not in scope of this work), or drive-
by-downloads (which we discuss next). In many cases is it very difficult for a user to correctly
identify malware as dangerous before they download it.
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2.5.4 Drive By Downloads
Drive-by-download (dbd) is a form of malware propagation that makes use of client software
vulnerabilities to download and install malware on a machine. The user need only visit a website
containing (or including) attack code and a weakness in a software component on their system
is exploited to infect their system. Commonly this will involve buffer-overflow exploits in the
browser or plugins, but it infection may also occur via other mechanisms such as improper URI-
handlers. Exploit packs, server side software designed to automatically fingerprint software on
the visitor and deploy the appropriate attack, have made this form of attack far more common.
Drive by downloads are particularly dangerous due to the lack of requirements for user inter-
vention and ability to infect if only a single software component is vulnerable. Some discussions
of their prevalence, mechanisms, and countermeasures can be found in [182, 108, 147, 106, 129,
128, 152, 101, 104, 45, 44, 102, 103, 91], and further discussion follows in section 2.7.3.
2.5.5 Important Web Browser Addins, plugins, or extensions
Browser plugins have become particularly important as an attack surface [5, 17, 56], because
not only do they often not contain as many protection measures as the browsers themselves,
but as they can call external executables and libraries it is possible to affect multiple browsers
through the same plugin. The most attacked recently include Adobe’s PDF and Flash plugins,
and Oracle’s (formerly Sun’s) Java[94, 103], although many others are important, such as media
players. Almost every type of attack at present is a file format mishandling vulnerability.
The important classes of browser addons and extensions include those for handling Rich
Media, Multimedia, Scripting, and additional types of document file formats.
Rich Media Plugins display their own non-HTML dynamic content media format inside sec-
tions of the web browser’s display of the page. These include the very ubiquitous Adobe Flash
and Microsoft Silverlight, as well as the less common Adobe Shockwave. Although they display
web content, they run separate executables that until recently were not sandboxed as effectively
as web browsers.
Multimedia Plugins are similar to dynamic media plugins, but they are more specific to dis-
playing audio or video content. The common multimedia plugins include Apple Quicktime,
Microsoft Windows Media Player, and Realplayer, although there are many others available.
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These normally render the content with helper software, and in most cases have associated URI-
handlers that can be used to call the external software to display the content as well.
Document Plugins are similar to the rich media plugins, but are used to display particular
document file formats. This is used to allow the convenience of viewing the documents without
loading external software. The most common example is the Adobe PDF viewer, but Microsoft
Office formats are also often viewed in a web browser. These plugins try to bring the full range
of their component formats into the web browser setting, including nacros and scripting.
Scripting or Programmatic Content Plugins are used to add additional programmatic func-
tionality that web sites may use. In contrast to the other plugin types these are more flexible and
less constrained in what they do. Instead of performing a constrained set of operations, these
can perform the full range of operations that their security settings allow. Common examples of
this include Java Applets, which are a form of Java programs that run inside web browsers, but
web browsers may also support full Java programs through the use of the external Java runtime.
2.5.6 Other web aware software
Software such as media players, email clients, and office software is also a risk to drive by
downloads, as if it is vulnerable and can load remote code (for instance a file via a URI-handler),
then exploitation can occur.
2.6 Protecting Clients
Protecting clients against threats that the web presents is a large area of research, with many
different proposed solutions. There are many different measures proposed to deal with specific
threats that systems may use. Systems that attempt to mitigate the risks use a few different
architectures and may be divided into the following main classes (or combinations of them):
hardening client software, client based detection and mitigation measures, and centralised or
network point of entry based solutions. The architectures are discussed first, followed by dis-
cussion of some specific mitigation measures.
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2.6.1 Hardening client software
The most prevalent piece of web software is the web browser, and indeed much of the recent
development in web security over the past decade or so has centred around making web browsers
more difficult to exploit.
Web Browsers and Security
Web browsers were initially written as normal software, simply requesting and rendering a file
format. Inherently, however, the Web is untrusted, and as the web and the associated threats have
evolved different approaches have been applied to their mitigation. Frei et al[56] note a rising
prevalence of web browser attacks, and discuss web browser security in depth.
Unlike some security domains, the web is inherently untrustworthy. No Internet facing web-
site should be considered fully trustworthy, especially those that are unencrypted and contain
large amounts of active content. As attackers have broadened their attack vectors to not only in-
fect from websites commonly considered risky or untrustworthy (such as pornographic or warez
sites), but to also infect users of legitimate or otherwise trustworthy sites. This is usually ac-
complished by methods of remote code inclusion such as remote advertising, but also through
compromising the website itself and injecting content on it.
Browsers have also started to natively support memory protection measures intended to pre-
vent or detect memory corruption exploits such as buffer overflows, and also measures that make
the crafting of successful repeatable exploits much more difficult. This has been assisted by op-
erating system development improving the available protections also. For instance, on Windows
buffer overflow prevention measures include Data Execution Protection (DEP), while detection
measures include stack cookies (/gs protection) and exploit complication measures include Ad-
dress Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)7. The technical details of such protections are not
relevant to this work, and protections change from operating system to operating system and ver-
sion to version, so this list is not comprehensive. However, the acceptance of browser vendors
that their products will be attacked and will fail is an incredibly important shift of philosophy.
While these measures make attacks more difficult, they do not completely prevent successful
attacks, nor protect older versions of the software.
Outdated versions of Internet Explorer are one of the biggest web browser security issues.
Furthermore, many of these outdated browser versions require old version operating systems
7Address Space Layout Randomization - This changes the address of absolute memory addresses, to make it more
difficult to write static exploits that jump to run code in a known address.
46 CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
that are less of a challenge to exploit than later versions (see table 2.1). Thus, around one in five
desktop browser users are using insecure versions of Internet Explorer, and are far more likely
to get infected with malicious software that users of later versions [104, 103, 56]. Many of these
users will have automatic updating disabled, as early versions of Windows XP did not enable it
by default, or because of corporate patch or version management policies. This is exacerbated
by the non-standard rendering of some HTML pages in Internet Explorer 6, motivating some
organizations to keep using version 6 for legacy web application support without rewriting the
application. This is becoming a more difficult position to maintain, as many websites have
stopped supporting version 6. Among the most notable organizations to have done this is Google
[156].
Other web browsers such as Firefox, Safari, Chrome and Opera have vulnerabilities of their
own that are important [5, 17], but because these have less market share they are less commonly
targeted.
With more recent web browsers have come not only security patches, but changes in archi-
tecture and security model in an attempt to deal with security threats online. Most notable among
these at present are sandboxing (which has been extended beyond just JavaScript), and automatic
updating, which now occurs on most browsers. The mainstream browsers started to apply such
techniques in the mid to late 2000’s, notably Internet Explorer 7’s protected mode[157] which
attempted to sandbox the browser process through applying Mandatory Access Control (MAC),
and later Google Chrome with process separation between tabs and the multiple layers and sep-
aration of sandboxes for different components (such as rendering processes)[42] – See figure
2.13.
Figure 2.13: Chrome’s multi-layered sandboxing, from [134]
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The most common attack vector used to attack web users is thus outdated or unpatched
software which contains unfixed vulnerabilites [104, 103, 56], especially if the vulnerabiites
are publicly known and in use (also referred to as in the wild). This is relevant not only to
web browsers, but also to software which uses web browser components or to plugins in web
browsers.
Sandboxing and memory protection measures made it more difficult for attackers to target
the web browser itself, so they migrated their attacks to target the browser plugins, which were
not commonly sandboxed. As a response more recently browser architectures are beginning
to either sandbox browser plugins, or to include sandboxed versions for particularly targeted
ones[48, 56]. This approach is augmented with warnings to users of outdated plugins, for in-
stance figure 2.6.1.
Figure 2.14: The Firefox Plugin version check page [110]
A summary of the security features for the notable browser versions in use (historical, or of
approximately 1% use or more) is given in table 2.2. Note that some browser security features
and their threats are yet to be discussed.
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]
Int Explo 6 01 No Non default
OS Setting
None Some
Vers
None No Non
Default
Int Explo 7 06 Security Lvls Non default
OS Setting
No Yes No No Non
Default
Int Explo 8 09 Security Lvls OS Setting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Int Explo 9 TBA Tabs Yes (Notify) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firefox 2 06 No No (Notify) Yes Yes No No No
Firefox 3.0 08 No Yes (Notify) Yes Yes Yes No Partial
Firefox 3.5 08 No Yes (Notify) Yes Yes Yes No Partial
Firefox 3.6 08 Plugin (Par-
tial) [109]
Yes (Auto) Yes Yes Yes No Partial
Opera 9 [120] 06 Unknown Yes (Notify) Yes Yes No No No
Opera 10
[120]
09 Unknown Yes (Auto) Yes Yes Yes No Partial
Chrome 3,4 09 Tab Yes (Auto) Yes Yes Yes Some Partial
Chrome 5,6,7 10 Tab Yes (Auto) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chrome 7, 8 10 Some Plug-
ins
Yes (Auto) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Safari 3 07 Unknown Yes (Notify) Yes Yes Yes No No
Safari 4 09 Unknown Yes (Notify) Yes Yes Yes No No
Safari 5 10 Unknown Yes (Notify) Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial
Table 2.2: Browser security feature support (Sept 2010)
Note: Sources for data on this table comprise around 40 sources; as this data is easily pub-
licly available, source detail has been omitted for brevity.
CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 49
2.6.2 Client based detection and mitigation Approaches
Client based solutions to preventing web threats (other than hardening software) come in a few
main forms and include web browser addons, antivirus and anti-malware software, and web
security software and firewalls. Here, their general protection models are discussed and some
specific protection measures are discussed afterwards in section 2.7. Note that often these mod-
els are integrated together in software packages or suites.
Web Browser Addons are software components that run inside the web browser, and thus
can process information at the web browser endpoint. Because they are logically located at the
web browser layer, they can process any and all data as the web browser receives or sends it,
irrespective of what occurs at any other layer such as network encryption. While offering good
flexibility, web browser addons are difficult to centrally manage, and can become problematic
for system performance and web browser usability if too many are used.
Antivirus and Anti-Malware/Anti-Spyware Software consist of software installed on sys-
tems to detect, prevent, remove, and mitigate the effects of, unwanted or dangerous software.
The detection of unwanted software occurs through two mechanisms, signature based and heuris-
tic. Signature based approaches scan files and Input/Output sources for characteristic byte sets or
patterns that are contained in a signature database. Heuristic approaches examine the operation
of software both before execution (through methods such as decompilation or sandboxed virtual-
ization) and during execution (monitoring the operations performed) for behaviours commonly
exhibited by unwanted software8.
Because system operation is monitored at quite a low level, known attacks can often be pre-
vented by signature based methods if the signature is in the database, however heuristic methods
are not as accurate. The top antivirus software at present has detection rates in the 95-99% range
for known viruses, but this rate is considerably lower in some cases[11].
The different types of software (antivirus, antimalware and antispyware) use similar mech-
anisms of operation, but target slightly different sets of unwanted software. Antispyware and
antimalware software monitor for software (or data files) that may store or disclose personal
information or log user activity, or allow another to monitor and control the system (including
software deeply hidden in the system (rootkits)). Antivirus systems target more general po-
tentially dangerous software, such as trojans, worms, and viruses. Although antivirus software
8An example of this could include software trying to write its own code into system executables.
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sometimes monitors for the same type of software as antimalware/antispyware software, it does
not always do so. Some types of software such as adware9 or corporate remote monitoring
software are not always unwanted or dangerous and so they are not always removed.
Web Security Software and Software Firewalls have similarities to antivirus software, but
are more targeted in their threat protection model. Where antivirus software monitors system
Input/Output, web security software and software firewalls manage software network access
and the content that flows through the network. This is undertaken by intercepting traffic to
and from the network and performing various checks upon it. These checks include checking
for access to blacklisted sites, performing antivirus scans on incoming traffic, and checking for
outgoing personal information in some cases.
2.6.3 Centralized or gateway based mitigation approaches
Most networks have a constrained number of perimeter entry and exit points that all incom-
ing data must pass through. Monitoring these perimeter locations promises to prevent external
threats from entry and internal threats from exfiltrating data. The monitoring may occur either
at the network layers, as in routers and firewalls, or at the application level in the case of web
gateways and application layer firewalls.
Routers and Firewalls can monitor the traffic flowing through them for patterns of malicious
traffic, and block it if necessary. However, they cannot inspect application level content such
as state in a meaningful way without adding the functionality of web gateways and application
layer firewalls.
Application layer firewalls
monitor network traffic with an understanding of the workings of the higher level protocols and
content contained within it. A secure web gateway is a special case of an application layer
firewall that is designed to protect against threats from web traffic. A proxy with filtering rules
is a simplified secure web gateway, however a comprehensive secure web gateway attempts to
mitigate many different types of web attack by monitoring web traffic and intercepting the traffic
as either as a network firewall or as a transparent web proxy. The common secure web gateway’s
approach to the detection of undesirable content is simple blocking via a blacklist approach.
9Software that is installed as a condition of running some other software and displays ads to the user. Many
unwanted browser toolbars follow this model
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The inspection of encrypted content presents a possible problem to secure web gateways. If a
secure connection is terminated, decrypted, inspected, and re-encrypted then client errors occur
(by design). The gateway may reencrypt without error if it signs transactions with a certificate
signed by a mutually trusted root CA10.
2.6.4 Other Protection Models
Other protection models in literature include cloud based and immune response models. Cloud
based models perform content scanning operations on an external server and then act upon the
reported results. They are useful for system with limited processing power and for situations
where a single point of monitoring is useful. For more information see: [118, 192, 117].
Immune and Intelligent Agent Models function through the use of applying biologically
inspired immune models to computer security. They utilize numerous mechanisms including the
use of autonomous agents to provide protection in a decentralized fashion. For more information
see [85, 65, 49]
2.7 Related Research
2.7.1 Threat Prevalance Surveys
Many different research labs and vendors of both software and hardware regularly release vari-
ous security reports, threat surveys, or annual reports on web threats. Varying greatly in quality,
these must be approached with caution as they can be heavily biased. Nevertheless, many are
released by well-known and well-respected organisations. A careful overview that considers
multiple such works can provide a useful overview of the state of web security, as the authoring
groups are in positions that enable them to collectively monitor the vast majority of malicious
activity detected worldwide.
The organizations that release these reports consist of groups within large software com-
panies, security product vendors, and governmental or industry bodies. The motivations and
background for each source should be considered when assessing any information given. While
reports from general vendors, government, and other industry organizations are likely to be rea-
sonably correct, those from security vendors must be approached with caution (after all, they
need to sell you the problem they claim to solve). There is insufficient space for discussion of
10This can be undertaken either by installing either an additional root certificate on the client or a certificate on the
proxy signed by an already trusted root.
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every report consulted for background information used in this work, but a general overview of
the most important and well regarded sources referred to in this work is given in Appendix D.
Where information from a specific report is used, that report is cited individually.
2.7.2 Fraudulent content and countermeasures
Fraudulent content in the form of fake storefronts or phishing sites is widespread, largely target-
ing financial institutions [103], and is hosted particularly on compromised legitimate web sites
[73] 11. Fraudulent website protection techniques in the literature come in two forms: reputation
based (blacklists and web of trust approaches), and automated score based approaches.
Blacklisting and whitelisting approaches aim to prevent users falling victim to fraud by pre-
venting (or warning about) access to bad websites and only allowing access to good sites respec-
tively. Blacklists are very effective at preventing attacks by sites on their bad list, but necessarily
only as effective as their list is. Blacklist update speed is crucial to the effectiveness of such an
approach[155]. Blacklisting is widely discussed [155, 95] and implemented [193]. Blacklisting
is used in many current implementations of web software such as Google Safe Browsing (used
by Firefox), Microsoft Internet Explorer’s Phishing Filter, and many web security toolbars such
as McAfee Siteadvisor[158].
Web of trust Web of trust approaches break conceptually from the centralized trust model by
using input from multiple users to make decisions – most still work in a blacklist like approach,
though by collating responses centrally. The My Web Of Trust (MyWOT)[114] web browser
addon uses this principle.
Automated Fraudulent content detection functions in a similar way to blacklisting, but ex-
tends the trust model beyond a simple binary decision. While blacklisting is inherently reputa-
tion based, it is non-granular and can only return a true or false result. A score can be generated
either by manual or automated means, and in return the score can be either processed automat-
ically or by the user. Automatic score generation can may be undertaken by similarity analysis
of page or URL features [187, 81, 95] or by examining other page features such as the use of
HTTPS (most phishing sites do not use HTTPS, yet legitimate sites should use it to request login
information).
11Refer to the sources in appendix D for specific numbers, as by the time this work is read the information used
will be outdated.
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2.7.3 Malicious Web Sites
Much of this work is concerned with protection against technical threats, thus the following
from the literature is important: malicious website prevalence and attack mechanisms, methods
of malicious web site detection, and methods of protection from the effects of malicious web
sites.
Malicious Web Site Prevalance
Malicious website studies have been undertaken by many groups over the past half decade or so,
and the publicly available statistics and studies are compiled from two main study methodolo-
gies: removal tool statistics and crawler based studies.
Removal and protection tool statistics consist of statistics released by software vendors re-
garding the number of attacks detected and blocked. These can be over quite a large sample set
and userbase, but can only include information about attacks which are within the scope of the
associated tools’ ability to detect.
Microsoft produces biannual Security Intelligence Reports (SIR), which contain compiled
information about malware removed from Windows machines with the Malicious Software Re-
moval Tool (MSRT) or blocked by the Internet Explorer Smartscreen website filter. The MSRT
runs automatically on millions of Windows PCs worldwide to remove a limited (by no means
comprehensive) number of malicious software families. Each SIR gives the information broken
down by many different variables, including Windows versions, malware found, and geographic
location. For instance, in the first half of 2010 the SIR volume 9[103] reports that websites
with domains in the .cn, .ru, .de and .uk top-level domains contained approximately 13% of all
malware sites hosted with infection rates of .67%, .23%, .1% and .1% respectively.
Symantec reports that overall in 2009 approximately 5% of websites were classed as risky
(this is a less specific criterion than the Microsoft statistics) [83]. The potential bias in each
source should be considered, as it could be argued that Microsoft has a business interest in
downplaying malware rates while Symantec has an interest in the opposite.
Crawler Based Studies are studies undertaken where an automated system crawls websites
(either working through a list, or collecting links off websites and visiting those) and checks
for infected files or infections acquired without intervention (via drive-by-downloads). Infected
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binary file rates were assessed in [108], who report that after automatically collecting binary
files from a large number of websites approximately 4.4% were flagged as Spyware infected.
Global crawler studies report drive by download rates rates around three tenths of one percent
but differ slightly in approach and security settings. [108] report approximately 0.2% of websites
resulted in an infection via a drive-by-download while [128] report rate of approximately 0.3%
after a thorough analysis to remove false positives. [123] reported a drive by download rate of
around 0.5% which although higher, is in the same region.
Search engine results are often targeted by attackers as a vector to use to get users to their
sites. [103] reports that 0.2% of Bing results shown to users contain malicious content, while
[128] reports that 1.3% of Google results pages contain malicious links.
For a New Zealand based perspective, a study by Seifert et al[148] in 2008 recorded a mali-
cious web server rate of 0.2% in the .nz domain space, and this is consistent with other reports
that .nz domains have a low infection rate (e.g. [103]).
Malicious Web Site Attack Methods
Malicious web sites successfully attack by somehow exposing vulnerable users to attack code
that then executes an attack to infect their system. We briefly discuss these steps as user ex-
posure, exploitable user vulnerability, attack execution, and infection. Although we will not
discuss them here these steps can be automated by “exploit packs” installed on web servers as
discussed in [5, 80, 93].
User Exposure User exposure occurs via three main methods: Blackhat Search Engine Op-
timization (Blackhat SEO), Malicious Advertising (malvertizing), and the compromise of a le-
gitimate site. Blackhat SEO is the process of compromising search engine results in a way
that users searching for popular things get links to sites operated by attackers (discussed in
[5, 64, 73, 97, 195]). Malvertizing is the practise of somehow getting advertisements controlled
by the attacker on websites and can occur either directly (as discussed in the introduction), or
via the compromise of multi-site advertising networks (discussed in [128, 129, 101, 64, 143]).
The compromise of a legitimate site can occur via some form of credential compromise such
as hosting details, a website weakness such as SQL injection, or the compromise of a web host
(discussed in [39][166][171]).
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Exploitable Vulnerability Once the user has been exposed to attack code, the next step is
to somehow execute the attack. This requires some form of vulnerability which can be either
human (user), or technical. The user may be exploited if they can somehow be convinced into
running the attacking executable and potentially disabling other technical defenses.
Technical vulnerabilites are the cause of the automated attacks (known as drive by down-
loads) and are usually in the form of unpatched remote code execution bugs (such as buffer
overflows) in software. Although vulnerabilities that are publicly known but for which no patch
exists (so called zero-day vulnerabilities) are a risk at times and difficult to protect against, the
particularly vulnerable users are those who remain unpatched after a patch is available. Accord-
ing to Frei et. al. [56] 45% of browsers in use at the time were not the latest release available,
while from [103] it can be inferred that this is improving (<25% of windows users do not have
automatic update enabled in mid-2010 and although this would not protect them against all
threats, it would certainly help).
Attack Execution usually occurs when an executable written by the attacker is run. This
executable may be contained in the original exploit code, it may be contained on another website
to which the browser is redirected, or it may be in the form of a second executable which is
downloaded by a dropper that the exploit first downloaded.
Embedded executables are the simplest case conceptually, however they are not often used
as they are the least flexible for campaigns that infect a wide variety of websites. Redirection
is the most commonly used attack method [128, 147, 37], as it allows the attacker to modify
the attack binary without needing to change it on every infected site. Droppers are similar in
approach to redirection, but rather than the redirection being handled by the web browser, it is
handled by an executable that is first downloaded (the claim could be made the the running of
the dropper is the culmination of the attack’s success).
Malicious Web Site Detection
The detection and study of malicious web sites in the literature has primarily been undertaken
via crawler based studies. The crawlers used are of three forms: virus scanners, static heuristics,
and honeypots.
Virus and spyware based crawlers as discussed in Moshchuk et. al.[108] reportedly exhibit
a poor detection rate[129] (high false negative rate), and were not used in this work as they
also have a smaller research footprint. Static heuristics, as discussed in [152], look for page
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characteristics that are commonly found on malicious pages. They achieve higher performance
levels than honeypot based methods, but also report high false positive rates.
Crawlers that use client honeypot based methods (as used in this work) are very common in
the literature but these are considerations that must be taken into account regarding their use. A
client honeypot is a system that emulates a client system in some capacity to detect attacks, and
they come in two main forms: high-interaction and low-interaction [126, 115]. A low-interaction
honeypot (e.g. Phoneyc [115]) emulates only a subset of the target system, and exhibits a high
level of performance, but can have problems detecting unknown attacks [84]. High-interaction
honeypots are comprised of systems running a full software environment and while they can
exhibit a good degree of target emulation, they can have slow performance when compared to
other methods due to the additional resource overheads[151].
High-interaction based honeypots12, were used in the bulk of the crawler based studies in
the literature and in this project. The main studies and the name of the honeypot software used
are13:
• Shelia[16]
• Strider Honeymonkey[182]
• Honeyclient (Also known as MITRE Honeyclient)
• Capture-HPC[72, 146, 67]
• <Unnamed system at Google > Provos[129]
This project makes extensive use of Capture-HPC which is discussed in [146, 67, 148, 151], and
used in [84, 37, 45, 147]
2.7.4 Related Protection Mechanisms in the Literature
Protection of clients against malicious websites consists is usually undertaken with the use of
software updating, antivirus, and web security suites. Research into infection detection methods
before and after infection is ongoing [129].
This work is concerned with protections that do not reside on client systems, particularly
those that reside on proxy servers. Among the particular tools in the literature that present as-
pects of interest are BrowserShiled, SpyProxy, and Blade. Browsershield as discussed in Reis
et. al. [135] rewrites page content to enforce “vulnerability driven filtering. That is, it removes
12While honeypots may be run on a physical system the use of Virtual Machines (as discussed in 2.4.3) have
allowed the use of high interaction virtual honeypots[182]
13Other relevant literature includes [128, 151, 148, 108, 130, 84, 115, 106, 82, 83]
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code which appears to be attempting to use known exploits to attack clients so that the attack
cannot succeed. Spyproxy (discussed in Moshchuk et. al. [107]) first sends content to client
honeypots and checks for malicious activity of websites before sending the content to users.
Block All Drive-by download Exploits (BLADE), as discussed by Lu et. al. [91][92], uses soft-
ware installed upon the system to perform what the authors term unconsented-content execution
prevention (put simply it attempts to block executable code unless explicit user permission is
given).
2.7.5 Related System - Comcast Constant Guard
The American Internet Service Provider Comcast has recently deployed a system which many of
the early ideas in this work were derived from. Discussed in IETF informationals, there are ten
versions available on the IETF website, eight denoted drafts [20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]
and one that is not denoted a draft [21] 14. Comcast deployed the system under the product name
Constant Guard in October 2010 [33].
Constant Guard was designed to enable Comcast to notify customers of Bot infection, as
discussed in the IETF Informational Recommendations for the Remediation of Bots in ISP Net-
works (latest version:[90]). Constant Guard uses a similar architecture and similar software to
that we use for the system in this work, however it only undertakes inline notification, and does
not in any way attempt to protect users actively. The warning is supplemented with an email to
the ISP held email account, and a screenshot of the Constant Guard user alert is shown in fig
2.15:
Figure 2.15: The inline warning web page overlay as used in Comcast Comstant Guard from
[121]
14This project began around the time of the first draft.
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Chapter 3
System Development
The web browser is a common point of network attack, as content can both enter and leave
a network through the web browser. Users may be completely unable to detect anything is
amiss, as often their computer’s defensive measures are silently disabled. It is one thing to find
information regarding infection or danger, and quite another to make use of it.
The most common response to security alerts is to log them and alert system administrators,
but this is inherently retrospective and can come too late to make a change. Among other possi-
bilities are automated responses to either alert users directly or to respond to the threats. Those
options are investigated in this project to develop a secure web gateway to prevent clients from
external threats. Protection against exfiltration of data from internal threats has been relegated
to future work (section 7.2.3).
The Secure Web Gateway developed for this project deploys automated responses to both
alert users and deal with some threats directly. One way to do this would be to set up proxy
servers that users can choose to use on an opt-in basis. These specific proxy servers contain
these security controls, thus not affecting in any way the browsing experience of users who
choose not to use them; however, this is a policy decision, not a technical one, and is beyond the
scope of this project.
3.1 Goals
Current approaches to securing web access from external threats take two forms: client side
solutions, and centralized proprietary systems (as discussed in section 2.6). Our goal in this
project was to develop and test a centralized system (a so-called secure web gateway) that is
open source and standards based. This will perform operations within the following general
60 CHAPTER 3: SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
classes (which we will briefly discuss next):
• User Messaging
• User Notifications and Security Warnings (Inline)
• Automatic Mitigation of Threats
3.1.1 User Messaging
User awareness is an important part of security. But care must be taken to ensure security
warnings are not so obtrusive that they either get perceived as noise and ignored, or annoy users
into disabling the warnings. User notification can be achieved through different methods, and
different workflows, each with different considerations.
A notification method is needed that can reach users directly, noticeably, and immediately.
Email serves this purpose in many businesses, but it is still not immediate and can be easily
lost to a spam filter. The type of Internet use that most users will undertake most regularly
outside of email is website browsing, however it is inherently demand-driven – users seek out
specific content and cannot be assumed to be checking a specific information source regularly.
One solution to this problem is that used by Comcast in Constant Guard (as discussed in section
2.7.5), which uses the Internet Content Adaptation Protocol (ICAP) to insert messages in web
traffic. The ICAP protocol enables web traffic to be modified on the fly as it passes through a
gateway system, thus messages to users can be inserted on any website they visit.
The notification can be carried via a side channel (such as email), it can be displayed in a
separate area to the item to which it is relevant (such as a pop-up dialog), or it can be presented
inline. Side channel notifications such as email and telephone are used by many ISPs to contact
customers, but can be slow to reach the customer (as not every customer compulsively checks
their ISP email account). Pop-ups and out of workflow alerts can require additional software,
and sometimes be missed as the user is not concentrating on them. Inline notifications have
some trust issues, as it can be impossible to verify the source of the notification, thus leaving
users open to abuse such as phishing style attacks.
We developed inline notification due to the nature of the technologies we are using, however,
multiple types of notification should be used in a full-fledged notification system. The following
user targeting styles were implemented for the user messaging functionality:
• Message individual users
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• Message the entire userbase
• Message the entire userbase based upon a database rule of an arbitrary form (E.g. all users
in Wellington)
User notification may also be desirable in some situations that are not necessarily security
related, for instance, as a method to effectively reach large numbers of users who are not easy to
contact via direct mediums such as email or a website, or broadcast mediums such as television
or radio. Broadly targeted inline-modification could be a useful method for system wide outage
alerts, or for more general situations such as natural disaster notification. Narrowly targeted
inline notification could be useful to service providers in scenarios such as account compromise,
data cap issues, or billing problems.
3.1.2 User Notifications and Security Warnings (inline)
Messaging users has many security uses, but it is inherently based in the past, as it requires the
message to be added to the database before it is shown. Security warnings of a more immediate
nature are also used in some widely deployed products. For instance, the Firefox web browser
uses an inline notification (see fig 3.1 below) for dangerous websites which shows many features
that are relevant to our user notification implementation.
Figure 3.1: The Firefox ”reported attack site” primary warning
This particular warning is very difficult to naively ignore – in order to bypass it the user
must acknowledge the message and consciously find the small ”ignore this warning” link in
the bottom right. Furthermore, should the user click ”ignore this warning”, a further warning
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overlay with options to ”Get me out of here” or report a false positive is displayed at the top of
the window as shown in fig 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The Firefox ”reported attack site” warning bar, which remains visible if the user
continues past the warning
The use of content modification, allowing quick communication with users and warnings
about detection of malware on customers’ systems, is already demonstrated in use by the Amer-
ican Internet Service Provider Comcast in their Constant Guard system (discussed in section
2.7.5).
Among the aims of this project are the deployment of inline security warnings to users to
alert them to the following problems:
• Browser Version Outdated
• Plugin Version Outdated (where possible with simple checks)
3.1.3 Automatic Threat Mitigation
The Comcast Denver (Constant Guard, or CG) system offers notification to users, but it does
not offer any protections to them. We built upon their ideas in a similar system to offer users
some security protection measures in addition to notification. Specifically, our system attempts
to automatically detect and notify the user of malicious content, and to perform selective alter-
ation of content to sanitize it. This will violate some of the documented core requirements of
the Comcast CG system, but the system we are developing is intended for deployment in an
environment with a higher level of control (such as a business or corporate environment). 1
Users can and should be notified of any content alteration, and this can occur in various
ways, ranging from usage agreements, to small messages, to page overlays or complete page
replacement. The ICAP protocol can also be used for modification of active page content such
as JavaScript because it is content agnostic, and can inspect all unencrypted content. This can
1We are concerned with the technical issues, not the potential legal, copyright or ethical issues which may arise
from such a deployment. We leave those issues to any who choose to deploy such a system. Furthermore, many of
these issues are already prevalent with technologies such as caching web proxies.
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also be used to block bandwidth intensive page content (such as many types of advertisement),
cutting bandwidth usage, and mitigating some types of cross domain attacks.
Our general architecture offers proof of concept protection against some classes of threats.
The specific threats we intend to investigate protection against are:
• Objectionable (keyword based) textual content
• Browser exploitation and drive by downloads
• Dangerous filetypes
• Virus downloads
• Phishing and site impersonation
• Cross site scripting
3.2 Hypotheses and Assumptions
The hypotheses evaluated in this project are inherently simple, as this work is concerned with
the development and evaluations of a system using existing technologies.
3.2.1 Base Assumptions
There are a few assumptions that are required to establish a context for the remainder of this
work. These primarily include, but are not limited to those below. For further detail on each see
the appropriate referenced material:
• User notifications to end users can be used to inform their decisions and thus improve
their security choices [149, 87, 88].
• Some classes of web threats may be mitigated to a degree through automated means[167,
45, 37, 44, 180].
• Open source tools allow for a good degree of software transparency and flexibility[89, 70,
189].
3.2.2 Primary Hypotheses
• (The open source tools used for and with) The Internet Content Adaptation Protocol can be
used to modify, sanitise, or deactivate specific web content, and thus act as an application
layer Intrusion Protection System (IPS) for World Wide Web content.
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This work did not use null hypotheses. As a project focused on the development of a tech-
nology rather than understanding the working of a technology, it was felt that a null hypothesis
such as “The ICAP protocol cannot be used to act as an application layer IPS for WWW content”
would be both justifiably false (since ICAP can block all web, which is traffic the most trivial
IPS operation) and would add nothing to the pool of knowledge.
3.2.3 Secondary Hypotheses
• The modification, sanitization, or deactivation of web content as performed by ICAP is
able to improve web browsing security by reducing exposure to threats.
• The modification, sanitization, or deactivation of web content as performed by ICAP may
be performed without a large or unacceptable impact upon system throughput, as request
delays may negatively affect user experience.
3.3 Novel Aspects
Our work has novel aspects above and beyond existing secure web gateway products, some
of which are shared with the Comcast system, and others which are unique to this project.
Specifically these are:
• Open Source and Standards Based
• Integration Simplicity
– E.g. Security monitoring systems put messages in the database for infected users.
• (Pseudo) Stateful
• Modular Security
• Novel Effectiveness Testing Methodology
Open Source and Standards Based - the system developed uses entirely open source tools,
and the operation of it fits documented expectations for the protocols used. This enables inspec-
tion, expansion, and modification of the setup and operation by any user thus enabling better
security assurance. A similar product, Untangle [175], was found late into the project and shares
some similarities.
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Integration Simplicity - an implication of the open source and standards based aspect of
our system, because it fits standards and the operation can be inspected, the integration of new
functionality, systems, or clients should be simplified.
Modular Security - a result of the way the ICAP server used (Greasyspoon) functions. For
security this results in each security operation being able to be treated independently, and for
operations to be modified, enabled, and disabled on the fly.
(Pseudo) Stateful - HTTP, ICAP, and the related protocols are inherently stateless 2, and each
request/response is treated independently. Many security threats (such as XSS) rely upon inter-
actions over multiple requests, and thus cannot be adequately prevented with stateless security
measures. By coupling request and response security modules pseudo stateful security opera-
tions can be performed via the ICAP server.
3.4 Requirements
The secure web gateway developed protects HTTP traffic only, and does not integrate with a
firewall. The Comcast system is architecturally similar with a history spanning many versions3,
and has some overlapping usage criteria, so some requirements also overlap. Our requirements
are not identical and we do in fact need to deliberately violate some of their requirements to
make our system functional. We will therefore assess which of their requirements are applicable
to this project, and add our own.
3.4.1 Requirements as relevant from [21]
The Comcast System Requirements are given in full including details in appendix C. Those
which are relevant to our system are discussed below:
2Some measures like cookies attempt to work around this and add the concept of sessions.
3There are 9 versions on the IETF website[20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 21], of which 8 were published while
this work was in progress)
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REQ1: TCP Port 80
REQ2: Block Listing [Blacklist some sites from modification]
REQ3: Instant Messaging (IM)
REQ4: Handling of Active Sessions
REQ5: No TCP Resets
REQ6: Non-Disruptive
REQ7: Notification Acknowledgement
REQ9: Unexpected Content
REQ10: No Caching
System Requirements 1: - General [Abridged – Full Details in Appendix C]
Our system should follow requirements 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10, however it is necessary
that it not follow requirements 8 and 11 due to the extra functionality we intend to include that
necessarily violates those rules.
REQ12: Open-Source Software
REQ13: ICAP Client
REQ14: Access Control
System Requirements 2: - Proxy [Abridged – Full Details in Appendix C]
Our system will follow these requirements (12-14), as we are using the same web proxy
(Squid). There is no need to test these requirements.
REQ15: Request and Response Support
REQ17: Multiple Notification [or Modification] Types
REQ18: Simultaneous Differing Notifications [or Modifications]
System Requirements 3: - ICAP Server [Abridged – Full Details in Appendix C]
Requirement 15 will be followed as we will use the same software, we should meet re-
quirements 17 and 18 which we have broadened to cover general modification and not simply
message insertion. Requirement 16 is inapplicable to us, as our notifications change with the
web page input which we do not control.
REQ19: Messaging Service
REQ20: Process Acknowledgments
REQ21: Ensure Notification Targeting Accuracy
REQ22: Keep Records for Customer Support
System Requirements 4: - ICAP Server [Abridged – Full Details in Appendix C]
We intend to follow requirements 19 - 22.
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3.4.2 Additional Requirements
In addition to the requirements above out system will require a few more:
• REQ A1: User Override
- Users must have the ability to safely bypass any warnings and perform the desired action
in a potentially unsafe manner
• REQ A2: Automated Update
- The system must be capable of unattended signature updating for antivirus
• REQ A3: Acceptable Delay
-The system must NOT cause unacceptable delays for users (More specific than REQ6)
• REQ A4: Throughput and Concurrency
- The system must support a reasonable throughput and number of concurrent connections
before performance degradation
• REQ A5: Improved Security against malware attacks
- The system must provide measurably decreased infection rates for clients that use it as a
web proxy.
3.5 System Architecture
Because this project is primarily concerned with extending the functionality offered in the Com-
cast Web Notification System, we based the core components around the components used in
that implementation. Thus, we developed our system upon the core components of a Squid Web
proxy and a Greasyspoon ICAP server. We chose to use ICAP directly for our notifications, and
to not use an external webserver for this, as Chung et al. [21] did with a Tomcat server. This core
was integrated with the following other software tools to allow additional functionality required:
a MySQL database server, a Clam Antivirus server, and a Freeradius authentication server. Ad-
ditionally, IPTables was used on the network gateway to provide Network Address Translation
(NAT) access to the Internet. An overview of the system architecture is shown in fig 3.3 below.
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Figure 3.3: A logical architectural overview of System developed
Table 3.1: Testbed architecture components & network details
Machine (OS)a Component (Interface) Address : Port
1 (Ubuntu) Firewall / Gateway (External Side) (Eth0) 132.181.19.2
Firewall / Gateway (Internal Side) (Eth1) 10.1.1.1
Clam Antivirus 10.1.1.1
2 (Ubuntu) Squid HTTP Proxy 10.1.1.2 3128
SafeSquid HTTP Proxy 10.1.1.2 8080
3 (XP) Greasyspoon ICAP Server 10.1.1.3 1344
GreasySpoon Admin N/A (client)
4 (Ubuntu) MySQL Server 10.1.1.5 : 3306
(Ubuntu) Free Radius Server 10.1.1.20 : 1812
a Ubuntu 10.04, Windows XP professional Service Pack 3
3.5.1 Component Overview
Similar to the Comcast System, but with a few additions.
• Squid Proxy Server - The HTTP gateway that handles all HTTP traffic.
• Greasyspoon ICAP Server - Interfaces with the HTTP Proxy and gives content modifi-
cation Instructions to the Proxy. Also communicates with remote third party servers for
blacklist checking.
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• MySQL Database Server - Stores user, message, and configuration information and in-
terfaces with the ICAP and authentication servers.
• Antivirus Server - Interfaces with the ICAP server to perform antivirus scanning. Also
interfaces with a remote third party server to update signatures.
• Radius Authentication Server - Interfaces with Squid proxy to check with the database
server on user authentication and credentials.
3.5.2 Additional Software Used
The following software was also used:
• IPtables Firewall - To allow SQUID proxy transparency in later testing.
• RADIUS Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) for SQUID - Allowed Squid to
authenticate users using RADIUS.
• Google Safe browsing API with jGoogleSafeBrowsing [154] - Used to check URLs
against Google’s bad site blacklist.
• Ubuntu Linux 9.10/10.04 - Base Operating System for ClamAV, MySQL, and network
gateway.
• Windows XP - Base OS for Greasyspoon server.
3.6 Main Component Details
3.6.1 Squid
Squid is an open source (GNU General Public License (GPL)) web caching proxy server that is
derived from a codebase which has been in development and use for around 15 years. The initial
project was the Harvest cache, and Squid was one of the projects that forked off the Harvest
Project. The initial Squid project itself was funded under grant funding, but after grant funding
ran out development was continued through volunteer donations and “occasional commercial
interest” [163].
The latest major version of Squid (version 3.x) offers support for ICAP, which is a require-
ment for this project. Squid also supports transparent mode, where web clients need not be
configured to use a proxy. While it may be desirable for clients to opt in to using the secure
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proxy due to privacy concerns, if circumvention is not desirable (i.e. a corporate environment)
then transparency support is a requirement. Most of the additional Squid features are irrele-
vant as we can also perform them through the use of the Internet Content Adaptation Protocol
(ICAP).
3.6.2 Greasyspoon
Greasyspoon is the ICAP server used in this projects, it “allows you to manipulate HTTP traf-
fic by creating simple scripts in various possible languages” [105]. GreasySpoon is a cross-
platform Java application and supports scripts written in Java and JavaScript/ECMAscript ini-
tially. Support for other scripting languages (such as Ruby or Python) can be added by using
Java JSR223 (Java Specification Requests) modules to interoperate other interpreters with the
Java interpreter. The greasyspoon logical architecture is shown in figure 3.6.2
Figure 3.4: The Greasyspoon architecture – from the website [105]
Greasyspoon is controlled via a web based interface, and is designed to be easy to use and
administer. The web interface provides graphical reports, access to system settings, and man-
agement of scripts. Greasyspoon scripts come in two types to correspond with the two ICAP
modification methods: response modification scripts, and request modification scripts. Because
they are interpreted, scripts can be enabled, disabled, and modified on the fly, and Greasyspoon
provides an in-browser script editor that includes syntax highlighting and auto complete. This
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wqorkflow for Greasyspoon is illustrated in figure 3.6.2:
Figure 3.5: The Greasyspoon ICAP server basic architecture and operational workflow [105]
Scripts contain headers that define some basic parameters surrounding their use that are de-
fined in a standard format. Headers are defined inside a comment (appropriate to the scripting
language) and consist of <parameter name><parameter value>. The relevant control parame-
ters include status (on or off), include and exclude (which define the URLS to which the script is
or is not applied, defined by regular expressions), and timeout (defines a script specific operation
timeout if the default is not desirable).
3.6.3 MySQL
MySQL is a widely used Open Source Relational Database Management System (RDBMS).
MySQL is used so pervasively it is not felt necessary to go into detail here: for more detail see
the official MySQL website [113]
3.6.4 ClamAV
ClamAV is a command line virus scanner for Unix like systems designed for use on Internet
mail servers It was acquired by Sourcefire in 2007, but continues to be developed under an open
source license [30].
...ClamAV is one of the most commonly-used open source antivirus and antimalware prod-
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ucts in the world. ... ClamAV ... is currently integrated within leading enterprise solutions,
including Unified Threat Management Systems (UTM), Secure Web Gateways and Secure Mail
Gateways, to identify deeply embedded threats such as viruses, trojans, spyware, and other forms
of malware.[161]
ClamAV also allows remote file scaning via TCP sockets, which is very useful for this
project. Unfortunately ClamAV has poor detection rates [10], but as probably the only open
source antivirus product available (we are unaware of any other), the choice was constrained.
3.7 Component Configurations
Component configurations were kept as close to the default as possible, with modifications made
to interoperation of the system components.
3.7.1 Squid
Squid was set up in with the following changes from a default configuration (initially non-
transparent):
• Caching completely disabled.
• All ports above 1024 added to the safe ports list.
• ICAP Settings:
– ICAP enabled.
– ICAP bypass on error disabled.
– Squid Sends ICAP server the Client IP and Username
• Radius PAM for SQUID set to use the FreeRadius Server.
The appropriate squid.conf file is given in Appendix E.1.1.
3.7.2 Greasyspoon
Required Modifications to Greasyspoon Greasyspoon source required some modifications
for functionality we desired. Namely:
• Get content of requests/responses in binary
• Accept all file types (previously ignored non-textual types)
The configuration files used for Greasyspoon are given in Appendix E.1.2 (for greasyspoon.ini)
and Appendix E.1.2 (for icapserver.conf).
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3.7.3 MySQL
MySQL permissions were set open to all for simplicity – not a real world implementation but
irrelevant to the effectiveness of the project. For Freeradius, the default schemas were used, and
the schema for user messaging is found in Appendix G.
3.7.4 ClamAV
Signatures were automatically and remotely updated every 2 hours via running the Freshclam
service. The configuration of ClamAV in clamd.conf was mostly the default, with the following
notable settings:
• TCPSocket: 3310
• TCPAddr: 10.1.1.2
• MaxThreads: 25 – Scan 25 files concurrently, queue others
• ReadTimeout: 120 – Timeout if no data ion 2 minutes
• StreamMaxLength: 20M – File Larger than 20MB skipped
• ScanOLE2: enabled – Scan office macros
• ScanHTML: enabled – scan HTML files
• ScanMail: enabled - scan mail files
• MailFollowURLs: disabled – do not follow URLs in files (too intensive)
• ScanArchive: enabled – scan archives
3.7.5 Freeradius
Freeradius used the MySQL server’s database. There were no other relevant configuration
changes.
3.7.6 Host Operating Systems
Linux (Ubuntu 9.10/10.04) or Windows XP 32bit Service Pack 3
Base Operating Systems were used for various components, no relevant reconfiguration was
necessary.
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3.8 General Script Operations
The scripts developed perform a variety of request/response inspection and modification opera-
tions, however, these are all composed of one or more of the following basic operations. These
same cases are also used in performance testing as representative examples.
1. Request Header insertion - Unconditionally insert a header field into the HTTP request
sent to the web server
2. Request Header Modification - Inspect and, if necessary, alter/remove/add some combi-
nation of HTTP headers in the request
3. Request URL Conditional Change - Inspect and, if necessary, alter the request URL of
the request sent.
4. Request to Response Modification - Inspect the request and, if necessary, send the client
a response directly without the request being serviced externally.
5. Response Content Modification (Static Conditional) - Inspect and, if necessary, alter
some content in the HTTP response body
6. Response Content Modification (Caching DB lookup) - Inspect and, if necessary, alter
some content in the HTTP response body as controlled by a database server. The database
is not checked on every call, but the change is cached and updated periodically
7. Response Content Modification via Remote Server - Response body is sent to a remote
server which instructs the ICAP server in how to proceed.
3.8.1 Feature Set
The specific features implemented (discussed later) correspond to basic features that can be
found in enterprise secure web gateways, client web security packages, and the Comcast system,
as well as some unique features. How they fit in the broader context and overlap is illustrated in
figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: A Venn diagram of the proposed feature set and some other solutions
3.9 Specific Operations Implemented
The security operations performed fit into three main feature groups: user messaging (from a
database), inline warnings, and content scanning and filtering. Of the scripts developed, some are
included in the appendices for background (Appendix H), however we will discuss the operation
of each major script developed briefly next.
76 CHAPTER 3: SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Type Implemented Functions
User Messaging Global Userbase Messaging
User Specific Messaging
Rule Based Messaging
Inline Warnings Browser Version
Plugin Version
Content Scanning and Filtering Site Blocking and Blacklist Checking
Keyword Based Blocking
Reflective XSS Filtering
User-agent Anonymizer
Content Type Filtering
Content Type Redirection
Remote Antivirus Scanning
Table 3.2: The Greasyspoon scripts implemented
3.9.1 User Messaging From a Database
While it is possible for a script to perform message insertion with no external store for the data,
it is not very flexible or extensible. Therefore we developed scripts that check the database and
display the appropriate messages from there. (There are some as yet unresolved concurrency,
performance and caching issues, as discussed in the results.)
Global userbase messaging
This script searches for the body HTML tag, and if it finds it it inserts the message code. The
message code used in testing includes that needed for an HTML layer element (DIV tag), CSS
to format the layer, and simple Javascript to enable a link that minimizes the layer to the bottom-
right page corner or shows it in full. The code inserted is given in appendix H.1.1, but the effect
of its use on the TradeMe website under Chrome is shown in figure 3.7.
This was designed to appear independent of the rest of the page content, and does not affect
the flow of content on the desktop browsers we tested it on (Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox,
and Safari). Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show how underlying content remains unaffected when the mes-
sage is minimized. The effect on pages viewed on mobile devices is unknown, but it should be
trivial to modify the insert surrounds to suit different client browsers. The insert used could also
be a problem on pages that have a crucial element in the bottom right, but this space was chosen
because most websites have top or left navigation, so it is unlikely to be an issue. Should it be
desired, it is a simple matter to change the minimize functionality to hide the insert completely.
The content and formatting of the message inserted are trivial to modify, however at present
we can only insert messages into HTML pages which contain a body tag, and cannot easily
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Figure 3.7: An example insert shown on trademe.co.nz
discern the main page from any smaller partial pages such as advertisements in iframes4. Fur-
thermore, although not unexpectedly, some pages display strangely with the inserted code for
various reasons.
Rule Based Messaging
Rule based messaging first checks whether some condition is true before inserting the message.
This condition is arbitrary, but in testing corresponded to a condition such as something to do
with the content or URL of the page being accessed.
User Specific Messaging
User specific messaging is a specific sub-group of rule based messaging that checks the access-
ing user’s details against a database entry and displays a message specific to that user. The user’s
identity can be assessed by checking the proxy login (as sent in the ICAP header), or by looking
up the IP address in the database. Although functionality such as the ability to dismiss a message
or set an expiry time could be implemented simply enough, it was not felt to be necessary for
this project.
4An iframe is a small inline frame that displays one HTML page inside a section of another.
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Figure 3.8: The insert in non-minimized form
Figure 3.9: The insert minimized
3.9.2 Inline Warnings
These scripts display warnings to users based upon something they see in the traffic - they are
more specific examples of the rule based messaging detailed previously. The operations used in
this section are all what we term pseudo-stateful in that they require the coupling of request and
response scripts to function. Generally this will involve making some observation on the HTTP
requests, and triggering some change or alert in the HTTP response if necessary. Some of these
operations also allow the user to bypass an initial warning that blocked them from accessing a
resource.
Although some of these scripts make use of the messaging functionality, we consider them
a distinct part of the security solution because they are contained entirely within it. It would
be possible to emulate some of the functionality here through the use of an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) to inject messages into the database - we discuss this in further work (section 7).
Browser and Plugin Version Warnings
Outdated versions are a major source of security vulnerability for drive by downloads, as well as
a problem for site display and general usability (as discussed earlier). Many users are, however,
unaware of this, and may be completely unaware that they are running an outdated browser. This
problem may be exacerbated when users reinstall from backup, system restore points, or do a
clean reinstall – as many automatic update systems only come by default with later software5.
The user-agent HTTP request header may contain a lot of information on the software ver-
sions of the accessing system. The details included in the user-agent can include the versions of
5For instance early versions of Windows XP either do not have automatic updates through Windows update, or
have it turned off by default.
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the client operating system, web browser, and sometimes also available browser plugins. While
it is not necessarily practical to recommend users upgrade their operating system, upgrading the
browser and plugins is a very important thing which can generally be done by running a single
download or updater.
The User-Agent sent in HTTP requests differ in the level of detail between various web
browsers, however, the structure generally remains the same. Lately many web browsers have
taken to impersonating the user-agents of other browsers.6 For instance, on the system on which
this document was written four browsers all gave “Mozilla/5.0” as the beginning of the user-
agent they supply to sites.
• Internet Explorer 9 Beta
– Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0)
• Firefox 3.6:
– Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/20101026
Firefox/3.6.12 ( .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET4.0E)
• Chrome 7:
– Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.7 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/7.0.517.44 Safari/534.7
• Safari 5:
– Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/533.19.4 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Version/5.0.2 Safari/533.18.5
Not all web browsers supply Mozilla/5.0 at the beginning, but irrespective it is possible to
deduce the exact browser version from other parts of the text anyway. Furthermore, in the case
of Firefox two versions of the .NET framework can be seen.
In the system developed, the functionality to warn users about outdated browser and plugin
versions is a request script component which works in conjunction with the user-messaging
script to alert users. The request script at present requires outdated browser versions to be
defined and listed manually in the request script. To make the user-alerts functionality, the user-
agent string is scanned, and if a blacklisted version is detected, a message is inserted for the user.
6There are plenty of lists of user-agent strings online, for instance http://www.useragentstring.com/pages/All/
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This functionality is perhaps oversimplified for users who use more than one device, as they will
then potentially receive the message on all their devices – for instance if their laptop is running
an outdated but their desktop is not, they will receive the message on both anyway. Methods
exist to work around this, such as putting short timeouts on the message (which won’t work if
the user is using devices concurrently), or displaying the message only in response to specific
user-agent bearing requests, but these add complexity and are not within the proof of concept
scope of this project.
3.9.3 Content Scanning and Filtering
The scripts here examine something about a request or response and then perform an operation.
This can involve examining HTTP headers, textual content, or binary content of requests and
responses. If some condition about them is met then various operation are performed, such as a
message being inserted into the database for the user, the content being modified in some way,
the user being redirected, or the content being blocked completely.
Site Blacklist Checking and Warning
Site blacklisting (as discussed in section 2.7.2) is a method whereby sites are checked against a
list of disallowed sites, and if they are on the list then access is denied. Blacklisting is useful for
protection against malware, fraud, and potentially Data Loss Prevention (DLP)(for instance, by
blocking external email) and organizational IT policy (for example banning social networking
sites in a workplace).
Although they only work against known bad sites, and are useless against new rogue sites,
blacklists can nevertheless be a useful security measure. This is particularly true if a good regu-
larly updating blacklist source is used and the lists used are themselves regularly updated. What-
ever the motivation for their use, three types of blacklisting were implemented in this project:
static blacklists, automatically updating blacklists, and blacklist services. When an attempt was
made to access a blacklisted site the request was not serviced, but an HTTP response warning
page returned directly to the client. Note that the address in the URL bar is the same as the site
requested, because as far as the browser is concerned it has received the page it asked for.
If the user wishes to bypass a blacklisted page, they can override this block by clicking the
override link on the blacklisted response page. This is handled by allowing the user to access a
forbidden site if there is an additional string of text at the end of the URL and the referrer of the
request is the same as the site being requested. The referrer is there because this is a rudimentary
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way to ensure that the user clicks the link on the response page, and didn’t fall victim to a CSRF
request.
For example if “http://www.google.com” is blocked and our bypass text is “&&bypass=true”,
then the override link on the blacklisted response page will point to
“http://www.google.com/&&bypass=true” and will function only if our referrer is
“http”//www.google.com. This override treatment is far from perfect, and is still vulnerable to
some forms of attack. For brief discussion of methods we believe may improve the security of
the bypass functionality, see section 7.2.1.
Static and Automatically Updating Blacklists In the static blacklisting script, a predefined
string array contained blacklisted domains that the request URL was checked against. This
functionality was present in the Greasyspoon default example scripts, but we slightly modified
the way it worked. In the provided scripts the sites to which it was applied were defined by the
Greasyspoon script “@include” and “@exclude” filters, whereas we moved the blacklist from
there into the script contents to that it could be programmatically updated and checked.
Although the script used had sites defined initially, they could just as easily be read from a
file or database during program initialization7. Programmatically updating the list also adds the
advantage of enabling updating the list while the program is running, although this was not done
successfully due to concurrency errors that were not overcome (as discussed in Results (chapter
5) and Future Work (chapter 7).
Blacklist Database Lookup used a relational database which is used to look up the current
URL in a list of blacklisted sites rather than storing the list programmatically in a data structure.
If the URL is found, then the site is treated as blacklisted. Using a database rather than statically
coding it or using a flatfile has some advantages. A database is designed with concurrency and
speed in mind, so rather than the Javascript needing to do many comparisons this is handled by
the database server. The use of a database also considerably simplifies updating blacklists, as
this can be done by an external script, with concurrency and locking handled by the database
system.
The Google Safe Browsing API library used (jgooglesafebrowsing) uses this method, except
that rather than looking up the site name directly the MD5 hash of a canonicalized url (an URL
7This could cause significant performance problems however due to the way Greasyspoon loads and unloads
scripts with each request. The lists can be stored in Greasyspoon’s Java shared cache which uses hash based data
storage and persists across the execution of multiple scripts.
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converted to a standard format, see [58]) is used so that the blacklist cannot be looked up in
reverse to generate a list of blacklisted sites. Update functionality is included with the library in
the form of a java function call, we ran externally to the Greasyspoon script, because if included
in the Greasyspoon script it blocked the call that triggered it until the update was complete, and
if the update took longer than the Greasyspoon script timeout, then the update never successfully
completed.
Third Party Blacklist Services Using a similar method to the database lookup script, ex-
cept that the lookups are handled by a third party. The lookup can be done through various
forms including network API’s, DNS lookups, or web services. We used a DNS lookup service,
Spamhaus’s Exploits Block List (XBL) [162], where blacklisted sites return bad values indicat-
ing the reason for blocking. The DNS lookup method was used because DNS lookups can be
undertaken in Java, and can be very fast in response.
Keyword based blocking
Although not strictly a security operation, blocking or censoring pages based upon keyword
contents is an operation which may be desired in some contexts to control user browsing. The
script to achieve this functions in a similar way to the static blacklisting used for page URLs, but
rather than checking the page URL against the list, it checks whether the page body is HTML,
and if it is whether it contains any of a predefined list of words. If any blocked words are
contained then an erorr page was displayed (as for blacklisted pages), but it could be simply
modified to insert a message for the user, alert an administrator, or similar. The list of blocked
words is treated in the same way, and raises the same issues as with static blacklisting above.
Reflective XSS Filtering
A simple method of protecting users against reflective XSS attacks is to encode or block any
special characters or keywords that are contained in a GET request 8. For example, if the
user requests http://www.google.com/search?q=<script>...</script> then something strange
is probably happening.
The XSS prevention script looks for the< character and many of its encoded variants (using
Rsnake’s well known list of 81 versions at [142]), and if it detects it then the request is blocked
8Filtering post requests is more complex, as there are many situations where a user may legitimately need to send
scripting content to a server. An example of this would be if they were using an online HTML/JavaScript editor
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and a warning page returned. Although this is a simplified attack detection mechanism it should
detect most types of XSS attacks that use the < character. Some types of attacks do not use this
character though, and as such the script developed does not protect against them. We briefly
discuss how this script could be expanded to offer protection against a broader variety of XSS
attacks in section 7.
Content Type Detection
Section 2.2 discussed the security of various content types, and how some types of web content
present larger security threats than others. Among the dangerous types at present are SWF, PDF,
and Java content. While blocking SWF may cause many sites to stop functioning correctly and is
probably best left unhindered, PDF and Java content do not normally need to be loaded without
user intervention and so security can be improved by intercepting them and warning the user
that they are about to be loaded or redirecting them to an online viewer (see section 3.9.3 next).
There are three main ways we use to detect the type of web content, with the reliability of
methods correlated with difficulty. In order of difficulty, detecting the content type of a file can
be undertaken by checking one of: the file extension requested, the MIME type returned by the
web server, or some signature characteristic of the filetype.
File extensions refer to the part after the period character (.) in the filename, and are the the
most efficient guide for the content type of a file. For instance .htm, .html are HTML files,
.exe indicates Windows executables, .pdf .doc .docx each indicate various document formats.
The use of file extension can cause problems however, as sometimes the extension is not useful
at all to determine the filetype. Ambiguity can also be an issue, as some server side scripting
languages have file extensions to indicate the script type to the web server, and the content they
send to the client can be of any type. For instance a .php script may generate and send a .pdf
file to a client. Furthermore, there is nothing to stop a file being given a deceptive file name to
intentionally bypass filters. To overcome some of these problems the client can look at the file
MIME type as sent by the web server.
File MIME type is sent in the HTTP headers of an HTTP response to indicate to the client
how to handle the transfer and display of a file. Transferral of a file may depend on whether the
file is in a text or binary based format (for instance 7 bit based ASCII text, 8 bit based binary, or
16 bit based Unicode), and if the client expects a binary and receives a textual file (or vice versa)
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file corruption can occur.
MIME type is used by some web browsers to decide how to handle a file, for instance
whether to display it as an image, render it as text, run it as a script, or send it to a plugin. Web
servers may determine the MIME type of a file from the file extension (as above), or they may
look it up in a so called magic number file, which contains lists of characteristic bytes that show
up in each file type. We discuss this in more detail in file signatures next. A web server is under
no obligation to send the correct MIME type, however, and a malicious server may send the
wrong type and thus deceive a client application into mishandling the file.
File Signature File types usually contain some sort of pattern in how they store their data,
and usually there are structures in the data structure that can be used to assess the type of file
being analyzed. These structures which can be detected are called file signatures, and often
(but not always) consist of a set of header bytes at the start of a file. The binary representation
of these bytes is known as a magic number, and a file containing a list of magic numbers and
the corresponding file types is known as a magic number file. Unix machines contain the file
application that can be used to assess the file type of a file via a magic number file in /etc/magic.
Greasyspoon is supplied with its own magic number file, and when the magic.mime setting is
enabled it uses it on incoming files to determine the MIME type. While they could rely upon this
Greasyspoon functionality the scripts used in this system tend to only be looking for a specific
filetype, and so check the file contents themselves.
For instance the PDF detection script looks for the following characters in the header of a
file to detect a PDF file:
• %PDF- (ASCII Text)
• 37 80 68 70 (Decimal bytes)
• 25 40 44 46 (Hexadecimal Bytes)
Once a relevant filetype is detected then the appropriate action can be taken, whether block-
ing the file or redirecting the user as we do next.
Filetype Redirection
Much of the security risk around client side web browsers involve improper filetype handling on
client software. Some client software can be bypassed through the use of free services online
CHAPTER 3: SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 85
that do not require the user to to receive the file at all, but uses server side rendering to display a
file retrieved directly from the web server in an online viewer.
The service used in this project is the Google Docs viewer [60] which renders the contents
of document files in the PDF, DOC, DOCX or PPT formats without loading the file contents (or
any scripting content ) on the viewer’s machine. Fig 3.10 shows the Google docs viewer which
document types were redirected to during security testing, although other services such as the
Zoho docs viewer [194] or Samuraj Data AB’s viewer [144] could be used. Alternatively, the
organization could install software such as Adeptol’s server based viewer software [2] on it’s
own server and use that instead. The use of these services should prevent much PDF file format
based malware from affecting client machines, as the rendering and scripting engines are run
remotely, and these services do not normally support embedded files or scripting.
Should the user wish to download a file after viewing it in the Google Docs viewer, this was
enabled through the use of a HTTP referrer check; if the referrer was docs.google.com then the
file is not redirected, and the user receives the file directly. The user must view it in the viewer
first however, preventing many automatically loading exploits from affecting the user.
Antivirus Scanning
Antivirus scanning was undertaken with a script that sends all files the ICAP server receives to a
remote ClamAV antivirus scanner service listening on a TCP port (either remote or on the local
machine). The file is downloaded to the proxy, which then sends it to the ICAP server, which
then forwards it to the antivirus server and reads the response before telling the proxy to send
the content unmodified or send the error page. The script written was supplied to the project
lead, and is now available as an example script on the Greasyspoon web site at [61], and is also
supplied in Appendix H.2.1.
The anti-virus script functions by connecting to the Anvitirus server and sending the STREAM
command. It should then receive a reply containing a TCP port number to send the file to, a sec-
ond connection is opened to which the file is sent, if a virus is detected then FOUND is output
to the first connection, as well as the virus name which was detected. In the event of a detection
then the file is blocked and a warning page is displayed. This is illustrated in fig 3.11.
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Figure 3.10: A remote PDF file being displayed in a web browser inside the Google Docs online
viewer
Figure 3.11: Order of operations for the antivirus script
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While suitable for testing, this has a few implications for a production rollout: the file must
be transferred across the network four times, adding latency which may lead to a client time-
out; files larger than 10MB are skipped as they will cause this timeout too often to be useful.
Although the antivirus engine used was ClamAV, any ICAP or TCP enabled engine should be
able to be used with a few modifications. This particular scripts works for a proof of concept
scenario, but should be refined for use in a production environment.
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Chapter 4
Testing Methodology
While developing the architecture and operations for an open source based ICAP secure web
gateway add to the body of knowledge, it is important to know if the solution shows any promise
for real world application. Two main aspects were judged as important to assess the usefulness
any network security service such as this: effectiveness against threats, and performance impact
upon users.
4.1 Testing Overview
Three main types of testing were undertaken for the system developed in this project: inspec-
tion to verify that simple operations functioned correctly (such as user messaging), automated
comparative testing of effectiveness against both unknown and known malicious datasets, and
comparative performance testing of representative script types in a variety of load conditions.
4.1.1 Qualitative Verification
All simple script operations (such as those for user notification) that performed very simple
or trivial operations were verified manually, mostly while the scripts in question were being
developed. Verification was undertaken for each script developed, and examples of it include
checking that sites on a blacklist were blocked correctly, messages were displayed with the
correct user or users, and that modified data was sent across the network correctly. Early issues
and enhancements for many of the scripts were identified at this stage also. The results of this
are discussed in the next chapter.
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4.1.2 Quantitative Verification
The testing of effectiveness and performance was undertaken using a methodology that gave
quantification of results, and comparisons with various controls. Effectiveness testing was per-
formed by using four sets of client honeypots (as discussed in section 2.4.3), with each set
visiting the same sites as the other sets, but utilizing a different protection measure. By compar-
ing the difference in infection rates between the sets of honeypots, the comparative protection
was assessed. Effectiveness testing is discussed in detail in section 4.2.
Performance testing was also undertaken in a comparative way. The time taken to service
requests to an internal web server was measured using ApacheBench under different load situa-
tions. Performance testing is discussed in detail in section 4.3.
4.1.3 Quantitative Testbed Overview
Because the system developed requires all web traffic to flow through the web proxy server,
any testing architecture may connect to the proxy to use it. Two different testing architectures
were used, one that was used to test performance, and one to test effectiveness. The testbed
was composed of multiple PC machines with identical hardware configurations 1 connected by
Gigabit ethernet and connected to the Internet via a gateway that allowed outbound connections
via Network Address Translation (NAT).
The systems that were used in the performance and effectiveness testing were set up in a
dual-boot configuration, with one operating system used in the effectiveness setup, and another
in the performance testing setup. Figure 4.1 shows the entire testbed (including third party
Internet servers used) and the logical connections between them. Details on the effectiveness and
performance testing methodology and setup are discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.
The network details for the full components are given in Appendix B.
4.2 Effectiveness Testing
The effectiveness testing methodology used is believed to be novel. Testing was undertaken
using client honeypots (Capture-HPC version 3.01), automated web browsing virtual machines
that visit lists of sites and perform integrity checking to check for traces of malicious actions
while, and after, visiting each page. The effectiveness testing system discussed here crawled
around 5 000 pages per day for each protection measure, for a total of around one hundred
1Core2 CPU at 2.2GHz, 2GB RAM
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Figure 4.1: Our testbed components
thousand web site requests over the course of the effectiveness testing. Further details on the
testbed’s operational conditions are given in the next chapter.
4.2.1 General Methodology
To gain a comparative view between effectiveness of the system developed and some alternatives
including unprotected systems four sets of honeypots were set up to visit the same sites in the
same situation in parallel with the only difference between them consisting of the protection
measure used.
4.2.2 Honeypot Integrity Checks
The software component of Capture HPC (version 3.01) installed in the honeypot virtual ma-
chines monitors the following aspects of system behaviour:
• Windows Registry keys and values - reads, changes, and deletions
• Network ports and connections - opened or started listening
• Files - reads, writes and deletes
• Processes - started and stopped (and the parent or terminating process)
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Figure 4.2: Capture-HPC server layout
All operations detected were compared with a whitelist of acceptable operations, and if any
non-whitelisted operations occur, the details were logged. The capture client could also gather
any files that are changed and capture network traffic. The logged details and files were then
forwarded to the server, and the virtual machine was reset to a clean state before continuing.
4.2.3 Comparative Detection Measures and Controls
Honeypots utilizing four different levels or types of protection mechanisms were used: Unpro-
tected, AVG free antivirus, Safesquid, and the system developed. The use and motivation for the
use of each is briefly discussed below.
The ICAP System developed, and unprotected systems were used as one is the system we
wish to evaluate. The unprotected systems were used as a control so that any difference in
effectiveness over an unprotected system could be measured.
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AVG Free Antivirus was used to represent client side antivirus protection measures. AVG
was chosen because at the time of preparing the testbed it appeared to be the most commonly
used free home antivirus system that offered web browsing protection. It is difficult to deduce
market share of such things as vendors do not seem to readily disclose such facts, so the metric
that was used was the number of downloads in the previous month from the major software
website download.com.
SafeSquid was chosen to represent the proprietary web security proxies. Safesquid was cho-
sen because it has a similar feature set to the system developed, is widely deployed, and has a
downloadable version for small deployments (up to three users) that could be easily accessed.
4.2.4 Client Honeypot Configuration
The configuration of the client honeypots is documented here so that the attack surface exposed
to threats can be understood. An overview of the software installed in the honeypots is given in
table 4.1, and further details are given in the rest of the section.
Software Type Details
Operating System Windows XP Professional SP0 with SP2 Installed (5.1.2600SP2)
Web Browser Internet Explorer 6.0.2900.2180.xpsp sp2 rtm.040803-2158
Software with Flash 10.0.45.2
Browser Plugins Quicktime 7.1.5.120
Java 6.0 (update 16)
Acrobat Reader 8.1.1
Other Software Capture-HPC Client Software (3.01)
VMWare Tools (VMWare server 1.09)
Clickoff 1.76/1.82
WinPCAP
AVG Antivirus 9.0.819 Virus DB 271.1.1/2967
Table 4.1: The software installed on the client honeypot
Virtual Machine Settings
The virtual machines were set up in VMWare server 1.09 with 384MB of memory and one vir-
tual CPU allocated to each VM. All VMs were cloned from the same source VM after all con-
figuration other than that needed to separate protection mechanisms (proxy settings, installing
AVG etc). During testing four VMs were initially run concurrently on each physical machine,
however by later test runs this was reduced to two per machine to reduce errors. Windows on
94 CHAPTER 4: TESTING METHODOLOGY
each virtual machine was logged in with an administrative account (as users commonly are on
Windows XP) and it’s inbuilt firewall was also disabled.
Finally, a VM snapshot was taken after the VM operating system had been started and left
for a few minutes, this allowed the snapshot to be taken after any background processing and
IO operating had ceased. This was the snapshot which Capture-HPC restored regularly during
testing.
Modifications from Default Behaviour
All forms of software updating (except antivirus definitions) were disabled to keep the versions
consistent across test runs. This included Windows update, and auto updating of Flash, Acrobat
Reader, Quicktime and Java. Windows update was disabled through the windows update set-
tings graphical interface. Flash automatic update was disabled by modifying mms.cfg using the
method at [3], Acrobat Reader updating was disabled according to the instructions at [4], while
Quicktime and Java automatic updating were disabled in the appropriate settings menu.
Internet Explorer had the security settings applied to Internet zone sites changed because
too many dialogs were being triggered and hampering testing. The settings were changed from
medium security to low security, exactly as a user annoyed at the same dialogs might be inclined
to do. Asian language packs such as Chinese (Mandarin) were also installed so that websites in
non-western scripts could be rendered.
Clickoff [74], a tool that automatically simulates a predefined click on a pop-up dialog option,
was installed and configured to automatically click OK or Continue on warning dialogs, and
to automatically attempt to run any downloaded files. This was done to simulate a naive user
(potentially a child) that ignores all Windows security dialogs. While this decision potentially
resulted in more infections, it does not bypass any security warning pages generated by our
scripts, and so it enables the assessment of protection against malicious downloads that require
the user to run them.
Reasons for software versions chosen
Versions were chosen to represent a computer system with out of date software. This was done
because it would firstly increase the number of attacks the system is vulnerable to, and secondly
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it would enable assessment of the level of protection offered to systems with few client side
defenses.
• Windows XP Service Pack 3
– Still used by many users, vulnerable to many types of attacks with few client side
protections compared to later Windows Versions
• Internet Explorer 6
– Still used by some home and corporate users, vulnerable to many types of attacks
with few client side protections compared to later Versions.
• Adobe Flash
– Version a few months old and vulnerable to a few in the wild attacks. Flash automatic
update is quite difficult to disable in the version used, so unlikely to be much older.
• Adobe Reader
– Difficult to find old versions, used very old version. Not problematic for this soft-
ware as old versions still come with software and driver cd’s (for reading manuals).
• Quicktime
– About 3 months old, had weaknesses being exploited in the wild at the time.
• Java
– Not unreasonably old (about 3 months and 3 versions old), had weaknesses being
exploited in the wild 2.
• AVG Antivirus (and definitions)
– Updated software and antivirus definitions before each test run then took a fresh
snapshot.
• Capture-HPC client, VMware tools, Clickoff, WinPcap, AVG Antivirus (and definitions)
– Utility software, installed latest version available at the time and updated antivirus.
2The Java Web Start Vulnerability - CVE-2010-0886 [34]
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The use of deliberately obsolete versions of software may have skewed the experimental
results. Future work 7.3 includes the use of more varied and comprehensive client honeypot
configurations including updated systems that should result in improved testing applicability
with real world protection.
Capture-HPC configuration
The Capture-HPC settings used were refined iteratively over several tests. Initially they were
far higher than the final figure but problems with errors caused by exceeding system resources
required these to be lowered. The final settings used are given in Table 4.2, and the full configu-
ration file is given in Appendix F.1.1.
Setting Explanation Value
Visit Time Time spent visiting each group 90 Seconds
before moving on to next
Group Size Number of pages in each group 5
VM Stall After How long to wait for reply after snapshot 180 Seconds
Revert Timeout revert before assuming a crash
VM Revert Timeout How long to wait for a successful 120 Seconds
snapshot revert
Client Inactivity Timeout How long unresponsive 120 Seconds
before crash presumed
VM Stalled During How long unresponsive 120 Seconds
Operation Timeout before crash presumed
Same VM Revert Delay Minimum time between different 12 Seconds
reverts of a VM
Different VM Revert Delay Minimum time between reverts of 12 Seconds
any two VMs on same machine
Table 4.2: The Capture-HPC server settings in config.xml
4.2.5 ICAP System Configuration
The system architecture discussed in 3.5 was used as protection measures for one of the honeypot
systems. The configuration is generally as described in section 3.6, with the scripts given in table
4.3 used initially3. Some of these were disabled after test runs, as discussed in section 4.3.
3Scripts which performed operations targeted at notification were not used during testing of automated measures.
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Type Script Operation Settings
Request XSS Filter < character blocking
Request Google Safe Browsing Flatfile not database. Disabled after preliminary test
runs due to problems (discussed in results section 5.1.3)
Request Redirection to Docu-
ment Viewer
Google docs viewer for pdf, ppt, doc, docx, pptx.
Response File Signature Blocker Blocks pdf files by signature
Response Antivirus Scanning Remote ClamAV Server
Table 4.3: The automated response scripts used in effectiveness testing
4.2.6 URLs Used
There are no security operations performed that are in any way novel or controversial, but it is
important for a system such as this to be tested for effectiveness against real world attacks. This
is because, due to the rapid speed of this type of attack, many of the attacks encountered will be
novel, use Zero Day Vulnerabilities, or be hosted on Fast Flux Network4 networks. Testing was
undertaken on Internet URLs from one of two URL lists: known malicious URLs taken from a
3-day delayed blacklist, and automatically gathered URLs from online trends gathered hourly
while testing (to ensure active and current threats).
Both unknown and unknown datasets were used for four main reasons: the unknown set was
used to provide a higher rate of novel and active attacks, whereas the URLs from the blacklist
were used to act as a control, to increase the overall number of malicious sites encountered, and
to test effectiveness against attacks for which antivirus signatures could reasonably be expected
to be released.
Unknown / Harvested URLs
For the unknown data set large numbers of URLs were harvested from the social networking
site Twitter through the use of a set of Python scripts (given in Appendix F.1.2) that searched for
links mentioned alongside popular (or trending) topics.
Motivations Three main reason led to the decision to use URLs gathered in this fashion: the
need for a realistic sample of real world threats, the need to sample effectiveness against fast
4A fast flux network is a network that is hosted upon or proxied through a fast changing arrangement of compro-
mised hosts.
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moving threats which quickly change location or attack mechanism, and the need to sample
threats that make use of black hat SEO (as discussed in section 2.7.3).
Twitter search was used because it is less filtered than the listings on a search engine such as
Bing or Google 5. A large proportion of the links gathered were from short URL services (see
section 2.4.3), some of which are filtered anyway (Such as bit.ly through its partnerships with
Verisign, Websense, and Sophos [170]), nevertheless malware links were found in the URLs
gathered (discussed in the results section 5.3) next).
The List Building Script (given in Appendix F.1.2) was written in Python and used the fol-
lowing procedure to gather URLs which were then fed to the honeypot. 6
1. Collect trends into a list (Twitter instant (current), Twitter daily, Twitter Weekly, Google
search current)
2. Remove duplicate and non-textual (such as trends in Asian character sets) trends from list
3. Search Twitter for messages which use the terms in the trend and the term “http”
4. Extract URLs from the results (using a regular expression)
5. Append URLs to file.
6. Wait 1 hour, then start again.
Duplicate URLs are not removed, as Capture-HPC handles this automatically.
Known Bad URLs
A set of URLs known to be high risk or to contain malware was used in effectiveness testing
because it enabled us to test the effectiveness of the system against targets which were of the
type the system developed was designed to protect against. Furthermore, given the relatively low
rate of malicious sites in the unknown data set (less than 0.5%) the use of this dataset enabled
testing against a larger number of malicious sites, thus improving the likelihood results were
representative.
The blacklist used was the free list from http://www.malwareurl.com, which was 3 days
delayed and from which the top 1000 URLs were used. While the paid version of the blacklist is
not delayed, it was not felt to be a problem for the testing we undertook. However, this delay did
5Google’s JavaScript API was used in initial testing, however it was discovered that it removed malware sites
completely from the listings returned, even if they show up on the normal search page with a warning of “this site
may harm your computer”. This could be overcome easily by scraping the page, but it was ultimately decided that
Twitter would provide much quicker moving results.
6Debugging and information text is also inserted into the file, but is not detailed here.
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result in high error rates for the URLs in this list, as many of them were on compromised hosts,
had been taken down by the provider, appeared to be on fast flux networks, or were otherwise
inaccessible. Those which were still accessible did have high malicious rates.
The delayed nature of the blacklist used also allowed a comparative between the signature
based methods (antivirus) used in testing and the non-signature based methods used in the system
developed.
4.3 Performance testing
While effectiveness testing was undertaken against alternative systems, performance testing was
undertaken to work out the performance characteristics of the system developed. This approach
was undertaken because usually inadequate performance can be augmented with software opti-
mizations or more hardware, and we desired to test the system developed and not the underlying
hardware/software test base. Performance characteristics were tested to ascertain the following,
and the interaction between them:
• System performance of different modification operations
• System performance under different load conditions
The remainder of this section discusses the testing undertaken to ascertain the general char-
acteristics around these.
4.3.1 Architecture and Tools
Testing was undertaken using the web server benchmarking tool Apachebench[168], and an
Apache web server (version 2.2.14 from the Ubuntu 10.04 repositories) running on another
machine on a Gigabit ethernet link.7 Apachebench automates requests to a web server and
measures characteristics of responses, including time taken to fully service requests (broken
down by percentile). For the testing undertaken in this project Apachebench was configured to
send the requests through the proxy server, thus testing how request delay is affected by the use
of various elements of the system. This is illustrated in figure 4.3.
4.3.2 Variables and Controls
Twelve cases were used to determine comparative performance of different operations and
scripts developed. To test each, five different types of variables were used to test the characteris-
7The Ethernet link was tested using Netperf [79] and had a throughput of 111.66MB/s between the machines.
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tics under load. Thus each of the twelve cases was tested through one hundred load conditions.
This was performed in an automated fashion (using the Linux shell script given in Appendix
F.2) for a total of one thousand two hundred test runs comprised of a total of around six-million
requests made from the web server.
Representative Script Classes
While Greasyspoon is used to perform many types of operations in this project, the operations it
performs can fit into several main types. We also use various controls to ensure that the testing is
hitting a limit of the system developed, and not hitting some bottleneck in a system component.
The script classes used are given in table 4.4.
Test Case Scripts Used (if relevant)
No Proxy, No ICAP, No Scripts
Proxy, No ICAP, No Scripts
Proxy, ICAP, No Scripts
Proxy, ICAP Request Header Insertion insertheader.req.server.java
Proxy, ICAP Request Header browseragentchanger.req.server.java
Inspection / Alteration
Proxy, ICAP Request pdfonlineviewer.req.server.java
URL Conditional Change
Proxy, ICAP Request blacklistcheck.req.server.java
to Response Modification
Proxy, ICAP Response Content test.resp.server.java
Insertion - Static
Proxy, ICAP Response Content globalmessagesnocache.resp.server.java
Insertion - Database (Non-caching)
Proxy, ICAP Response Content globalmessages.resp.server.java
Insertion - Database (Caching)
Proxy, ICAP Response Content antivirus.resp.server.java
Antivirus Scanning
Proxy, ICAP Request & Response insertheader.req.server.java
Multiple Operations browseragentchanger.req.server.java
pdfonlineviewer.req.server.java
blacklistcheck.req.server.java
test.resp.server.java
antivirus.resp.server.java
antivirus.resp.server.java
Table 4.4: The test cases used for performance testing
Note: All scripts had modifications undertaken so they worked at full speed and did not
leave the local network. For example, pdfonlineviewer redirected to an identical file on the same
webserver.
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The classes used as control variables were used to ensure that testing functioned to evaluate
the system developed, and not a bottleneck elsewhere. These results needed throughputs ad-
justed when link bandwidth was saturated, as overheads arise with the use of the system that
do not arise when it is not present. For instance, the use of a proxy will halve throughput as
content must be sent over the network twice, and using an ICAP server will further diminish this
to no more than one third of the original bandwidth, as it requires yet another transmission. If
the ICAP server modifies something this diminishes again as the content must be sent across the
network four times (web server to proxy to ICAP server to proxy to client) This is discussed in
the results.
The request and response script classes are comprised of scripts which fundamentally oper-
ate upon the body or headers of requests sent by the client or responses sent from the web server.
This is how the performance of individual aspects of the system developed is evaluated.
The multiple operations class is used to gain an overview of how performance is affected
when multiple operations are used in at the same time. Because Greasyspoon runs the scripts
in a serial fashion, this should be approximately the sum of the component performances with
overheads removed. Database scripts were not used in this test for two reasons: putting them in
parallel would provide a non-realistic use case, and they had major performance issues making
the performance tests fail completely.
Load Testing Variables
The load testing variables were used to ascertain how the system performed under various load
conditions. The maximum values chosen were used because they hit link limits in many cases,
or commonly resulted in system timeout when servicing requests. The variables used are given
in table 4.5, and were tested in an automated way (by a Linux shell script) under every possible
combination for each script class.
Test duration had a value of 60 seconds. Because the central aim of this project was not
performance, this was kept low enough to keep the duration of overall testing manageable. With
1200 tests testing still took 20 hours, if this was set higher, which it probably should be for
stability reasons, then testing would take too long. This is mentioned as a possible testing
enhancement in section 7.
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Variable Values Used
Test Duration 60 Seconds
Total Number of Requests Made 10 000 ( 166 / second)
100 000 ( 1666 / second)
Concurrent Connections 1
10
100
200
400
File Size Used 1KB
10KB
100KB
1MB
10MB
File Contents Random Binary
Textual HTML
Table 4.5: The performance testing variables used to measure system characteristics under load
Total number of requests made, with values of 10 000 and 100 000, was used to provide
pure request load conditions that were medium-low, and medium-high respectively.
Concurrent connections, with values of 1, 10, 100, 200, and 400, had the values chosen to
range from the trivial control case of 1, to around the point where the system failed to resolve
many tests (400).
File size used, of 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, 1MB, and 10MB was designed to spread around a
usual webpage size of 100KB in a logarithmic fashion.
File content type, of binary and textual, was used to ascertain if any content compression or
string handling facilities were impacting performance.
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Chapter 5
Results
While this project generated a large amount of code and experimental data, it is presented here
in digest form. We first discuss the completion state of the system developed as it related to the
project’s required functionality and system requirements. Next the results of testing the effec-
tiveness of the automated mitigation measures against drive by downloads, malicious websites,
and virus downloads is discussed. Finally we cover the performance characteristics of the system
under various load situations.
5.1 Functionality of System Developed
All functionality was implemented to at least a proof of concept level, undertaken with a view
to meeting the overall system requirements given in section 3.4. We shall discuss the implemen-
tation state of each functionality class, before moving on to discuss system requirements in the
following section. Some of the Java code used is given in Appendix H for background.
5.1.1 User Messaging
All user messaging functionality was implemented to the point where it provided reliable mes-
sage insertion in HTML based web content. An overview of the status of each specific user
messaging functionality is given in table 5.1.
Global Userbase Messaging is the most trivial of the user messaging functionalities, as it only
requires inserting a message into the HTML stream and no checks are performed to ascertain
anything about the user. This script uses the database to store the messages, and caches the
message between regular updates.
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Functionality Status Notes
Global Userbase Messaging Implemented
Specific User Messaging Implemented User Selection Mechanism RADIUS or IP
Address
Userbase Subset Messaging Implemented Arbitrary User Selection Using Database
Table 5.1: User messaging functionality status
Specific User Messaging is an extension upon the global user messaging script where (in
addition to checking the message is HTML) the response is checked for user identity before
the message displayed is chosen. The user’s identity is ascertained from either the proxy’s
authentication header, or the IP address of the request (as configured to be sent by the proxy).
Upon review it was noticed that this identity is put directly in a static SQL lookup, thus leaving
the script open up to abuse via SQL injection if a malicious username is used, this should be
investigated further and mitigation measures implemented.
Userbase Subset Messaging is an extension beyond messaging a specific user which is ac-
complished via an additional database join that adds information about the user upon which
message selection is based. For example, by joining a table containing user addresses then all
users in a specific city can be messaged. As with the user specific messaging, this script is
potentially vulnerable to abuse via SQL injection and this should also be investigated further.
5.1.2 Inline Warnings
Inline warnings were implemented, but not to the level originally intended due to difficulties in
detection and delivery. An overview of the current status of the inline warning functionality is
given in table 5.2 below, and discussion follows. We briefly discuss the issues here, however
much of the investigation is relegated to future work.
Functionality Status Notes
Browser Version Warnings Partially Implemented Sends message via user messaging
functionality. User-agent based de-
tection only.
Plugin Version Warning Partially Implemented Sends message via user messaging
functionality. User-agent based de-
tection only.
Table 5.2: Inline warning functionality status
Detection of some software versions is simple because it is carried in the user agent header
sent in requests, however version detection in other client side software would require the injec-
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tion of various client side scripts (such as Javascript or VBscript) into the page, and this could
cause major compatibility issues. The result of using only user-agent detection is that it is not
possible to determine the versions of much client side software beyond the web browser. The
injection of version detection scripts should be investigated, but current behaviour of checking
every request may need to be changed, perhaps through the use of a single regular check, or a
separate page that is used to detect this.
The inline notification is delivered through user messaging. While this does reach the cus-
tomer, it will go to all devices the customer is using, and not just the device that triggered the
warning, potentially causing confusion. Determination of a specific device would require some
method of full state handling so that each request can be linked to its own response, and the no-
tification inserted in only that response. While it is possible to currently perform simple linking
of request and responses by measures such as page URL or client IP address these can be eas-
ily confused in common usage scenarios such as multiple clients browsing the same sites from
behind a NAT router. In an organization with tightly controlled address allocation of one per
device this could be accomplished, but further investigation is needed.
5.1.3 Automatic Threat Mitigation
Several different methods of automatic threat mitigation by content modification were imple-
mented, and they used varous combinations of header inspection, request redirection, and con-
tent scanning to accomplish their tasks. All scripts were implemented fully, however some
performance issues remain to be resolved with the more complicated functions. Browser ex-
ploitation and drive-by-download mitigation is not a single functionality, but is an effect that is
desired of the end system. Discussion of this drive by download mitigation continues in section
5.3.4. The status of automatic mitigation measures is given in table 5.9.
Objectionable Text Warning has been implemented for a static list of words. If anything on
the list is seen in the page content (as detected by a regular expression) then the page displayed
is replaced with a warning page that the user can bypass. Currently the bypass mechanism
is simple, and prone to cross site request forgery (which could be used by attackers to trick
browsers into automatically overriding warnings without user input.) should the attacker know
the nonce used to bypass. While the execution of the bypass mechanism could be improved (as
discussed in section 7.2.1), the functionality works to an adequate level for a proof of concept
system.
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Functionality Status Notes
Objectionable Text
Warning
Implemented Functions via static list in script. Would benefit
from flatfile or database use.
Dangerous Filetypes Implemented Some dangerous document filetypes redirected to
an online viewer sucessfully.
Virus Downloads Implemented Antivirus scanning implemented on all down-
loaded files smaller than 10MB.
Site Blacklist Checking Partial Blacklisting via Static list, and database lookup
(Google Safe Browsing). Protects against Phish-
ing/Site Impersonation, and known malware sites,
but significant performance issues remain
Reflective Cross Site
Scripting
Implemented Simple mitigations remove reflected scripting con-
tent successfully
Browser Exploitation
mitigation
Partial More a behaviour than a specific functionality, see
effectiveness testing (section 5.3.4) .
Table 5.3: Status of automatic threat mitigation functionalities
Dangerous Filetype Redirection has been implemented for Word 97 (.doc), Word 2007 (.docx),
Powerpoint (.ppt and .pptx), and PDF (.pdf) document formats. These filetypes are redirected to
an online viewer As drive-by-download mitigation measure, with the intention of isolating the
user from any malicious content contained in them. The user can bypass by clicking the down-
load link on the page, and this should be somewhat safe from cross site request forgery attacks
as the verification is referrer rather than nonce based. The script used for PDF redirection is
given in Appendix H.2.3, while a script that simply blocks PDF files based upon the file header
is given in Appendix H.2.2.
Download Virus Scanning, also a drive by download mitigation, is working well for scanning
and blocking viruses. The performance impact seems to be less than was anticipated, and the
script is given in Appendix H.2.1.
Site Blacklist Checking functions well for static blacklists, however the use of the jgoogle-
safebrowsing library resulted in severe performance impacts and concurrency crashes that re-
sulted in it stopping the entire system.
Reflective Cross Site Scripting Warning is functional and effective at blocking simple at-
tacks that utilize the greater than (“<”) character or an encoded variant of it. Although many
attacks use this character, it is not a required aspect of a reflected cross site scripting attack. Thus
this functionality is adequate for a proof of conecpt model, but a more comprehensive system
should be developed for production usage.
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Now that the results of implementing specific functionality have been implemented, we will
discuss the results of the system as a whole as pertains to the original requirements specified in
section 3.4.
5.2 Requirement Evaluation
Five sets of system requirements were given in section 3.4, with some derived from the stated
requirements for the Comcast system, and others added to allow the additional functionality
developed in this project. These requirements were met in varying degrees; in this section we
discuss the state of those requirements’ completion. As with the functionalities, we give sum-
maries in tabular form, followed by discussion.
Requirements are designated as either met (completed to the level necessary for a proof
of concept system), partially met (completed, but no way to evaluate completion, or has issues
remaining), not met (not undertaken or results unsatisfactory for proof of concept), or abandoned
(later determined to be a non-core requirement). Some of the requirements, which we denote
dependent were met indirectly and automatically through the characteristics of the software
used. Requirements met through this dependency shall only be discussed briefly, as they were
trivial to meet.
5.2.1 General Requirements
The majority of the general system requirements were met: out of the ten specified eight were
met, one not met, and one abandoned. Of those that were met, three (TCP port 80, active
session handling, and non-use of TCP resets) were dependent and met purely by virtue of the
technologies used. The overall summary of the status of the general requirements is given in
table 5.4.
The block listing requirement (that sites can be exempted from modification) is met by the
capabilities of the system, however it has not been deployed in any scripts in use. This behaviour
can be in scripts directly via either the @include and @exclude directives for greasyspoon (dis-
cussed in section 3.9.3), or by implementing an additional conditional (if ) statement in individual
scripts.
The instant messaging requirement was abandoned as a requirement, as this was not felt to
be necessary for an environment in which a secure web gateway might be deployed, such as
108 CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
Req # Name Status Notes
1 TCP Port 80 Met Dependent
2 Block Listing Met Not Used
3 Instant Messaging Abandoned
4 Handling of Active Sessions Met Dependent
5 No TCP Resets Met Dependent
6 Non-Disruptive Met Subjective
7 Notification Acknowledgment Not Met Planned
9 Unexpected Content Handling Met Leaves Unmodified
10 No Caching Met Caching Disabled
Table 5.4: Results concerning system general requirements
a company. A controlled environment will have (ideally) have control over the software used
internally, and could thus use instant messaging software that neither interferes, nor is interfered
with by, the use of the system. Furthermore, should unauthorized software be used then it is
unlikely to be considered a problem if it performs strangely.
The non-disruptive requirement is subjective to assess, as what one user considers useful
another may consider disruptive. However, in the many test cases we ran manually on commonly
used websites, no unexpected interference considered disruptive was encountered.
The notification acknowledgment requirement was not met and remained unimplemented
for two main reasons. Firstly, in a secure web gateway acknowledgment that dismisses a message
from future appearances is only acceptable in some cases. If a user downloads a virus, they still
should be alerted of future incidents. Secondly, as with user warning bypass, we were unable
to develop a satisfactory mechanism for message acknowledgment and dismissal which was not
vulnerable to cross site request forgery attacks which could be used by attackers to trick browsers
into automatically overriding warnings without user input. We discuss this in section 7.2.1
The unexpected content handling requirement was met in all scripts used. If unexpected
content was used then modification was skipped. While as a fail open security mechanism this
may lead to weaknesses, web content is composed of such a large number of different content
types and scenarios that a pure whitelisting approach will lead to problems for users.
The non caching requirement was met by configuring squid to not cache content.
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5.2.2 Proxy Requirements
The proxy requirements (table 5.5) were all met through the use of the same Squid web proxy
as used in [20].
Req # Name Status Notes
12 Open Source Software Met Dependent
13 ICAP Client Met Dependent
14 Access Control Met Dependent
Table 5.5: Results concerning proxy server requirements
5.2.3 ICAP Service Requirements
The ICAP service requirements apply primarily to the messaging aspects of the ICAP service,
and were all met successfully (see table 5.6). The request and response support was met by
the use of Greasyspoon as the ICAP server. The multiple and simultaneous differing message
requirements were met in the messaging functionality implemented.
Req # Name Status Notes
15 Request and Response Support Met Dependent
17 Multiple Notification [or Modifi-
cation] Types
Met Can message arbitrary messages to arbi-
trary set of users
18 Simultaneous Differing Notifica-
tions [or Modifications]
Met Can message arbitrary different mes-
sages to an arbitrary set of different users
Table 5.6: Results concerning ICAP service requirements
5.2.4 Messaging Requirements
The messaging service developed met one requirement and partially met another while two of
the requirements were not met. The requirements necessary for messaging operation were met,
while those necessary for organizational reasons were not. This is summarized in table 5.7.
The requirement for a (Caching) Messaging Service was partially met. The messaging
functionality was successfully implemented, however issues remain to be resolved with the
caching of messages from the database. These issues are related to those that occurred with
blacklist update for the blacklist functionality , and the resolution of these is issues is relegated
to future work and discussed in section 7
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Req # Name Status Notes
19 Messaging Service
(caching)
Partially Met Messaging and caching works, some con-
currency issues on refresh from database
20 Process Acknowledg-
ments
Not Met Planned
21 Ensure Notification
Targeting Accuracy
Met No false messaging observed
22 Keep Records for Cus-
tomer Support
Not Met Planned
Table 5.7: Results concerning messaging service requirements
The requirements to process acknowledgments and keep records for customer support
were not implemented as they were not considered core to the protection functionality of a
secure web gateway. They are however important for the deployment of such a system, and
while implementing simple handling of these may be undertaken through adding database writes
to scripts, a useful implementation of this functionality requires the development of a full user
interface and work flow to handle the resulting data. This has been designated as future work
and is noted in section 7.2.1.
The requirement of ensuring target notification accuracy was met. During development of
the functionality no display of a message to an incorrect user was encountered at any stage.
5.2.5 Additional Requirements
The additional requirements that were defined as necessary to make the system developed useful
in a real world implementation were all met to some degree. One was met to a large degree of
satisfaction, while the remaining were met partially to a level that was considered adequate for
some deployments, but perhaps requiring improvement for others. This is summarized in table
5.9.
Req # Name Status Notes
A1 User Override Partially Met Not XSRF safe (Future work: 7.2.1
A2 Automated Update Partially Met Software updates enabled
A3 Acceptable Delay Partially Met Subjective threshold, see 5.4 for testing
results
A4 Acceptable Throughput Partially Met Subjective threshold. See 5.4 for test-
ing results
A5 Improved Security Against Mal-
ware
Met Protection comparable to other mea-
sures. See 5.3.4
Table 5.8: Status of additional automatic threat mitigation functionalities
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The user override requirement was met in a simple way, but not in a way that was considered
safe from cross site request forgery attacks which could be used by attackers to trick browsers
into automatically overriding warnings without user input (relegated to future work in section
7.1).
The automated update requirement was met for some of the software used that relies upon
detection software updates, but not for others. The antivirus signatures automatically updated
whilst blacklist updating was problematic. This is discussed in future work (section 7.1).
The acceptable delay and acceptable throughput requirements were tested using the method-
ology discussed in section 4.3. However, as with any performance characteristics these will be
considered to meet an acceptable level for some situations but not for others. See section 5.4
later in this chapter for full discussion of the results.
The improved malware security requirement was tested using the methodology discussed
in section 4.2 and achieved a degree of protection comparable to other measures. Because a
comparable level of protection was achieved this was considered to be sufficient to meet the
requirement. See section 5.3.4 later in this chapter for full discussion of the results.
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5.3 Effectiveness Testing
Testing the effectiveness of the automated measures at mitigating web threats was undertaken
by visiting approximately 90 000 total web pages on the client honeypots, producing results
that indicate that protection is comparable to other measures. However, due to unresolved issues
with the stability and consistency of the testbed used to evaluate effectiveness, while these results
appear to show promise the results are indicative only, and cannot be considered conclusive.
Nevertheless, the results appear to indicate that there may be promise in the full development
and implementation of a system upon the foundation of this project. We did find malware, much
of it with low detection rates for antivirus. For example, one particular file (named mldkse.exe)
which was downloaded via a drive by download from site accessed via a shorturl (bit.ly) link
had was detected by 15 of the 41 antivirus programs the VirusTotal [177] service uses to scan
submitted files.
The results cannot be considered conclusive for the following reasons: the system under test
is at a proof of concept stage and is not considered production ready, the sample size of the tests
and number of test runs is insufficient to perform an adequate statistical analysis, and some test
error cases could not be adequately managed.
Seven total test runs were performed: three test runs that were used to refine the process,
two test runs using a set of known malicious URLs, and two using URLs collected at the time
of testing. The summary of the test run results is given in table 5.9.
5.3.1 Data and Measurements
Within each of the four capture-hpc client honeypot testbeds each site in the url list was visited,
and the results reported by the client component inside the virtual machine were recorded.
Capture-hpc categories
Each URL visited by Capture-hpc was recorded as either safe (no errors and no malicious activity
detected), malicious (No errors and unauthorized activity detected), or urlError (errors loading
page).
The preliminary runs had error rates that were near complete for the system developed, and
differed widely between the other protection mechanisms. This caused problems as unless these
rates were at a similar level then any effectiveness test results were unreliable and invalid. The
error rates were improved by reducing host system load, and solving or isolating the causes of
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Run # Type Status Notes
1 Preliminary
(Mixed Type)
Preliminary
Run
ICAP System failure after 4 minutes due to concur-
rency error in database update
2 Preliminary
(Mixed Type)
Preliminary
Run
Complete System Crash in Unprotected System (Re-
source overallocation). ICAP system restarted nu-
merous times
3 Preliminary
(Mixed Type)
Preliminary
Run
Database timeouts in ICAP system, resource overal-
location led to numerous VM timeouts on all systems
4 Collected
URLs
Indicative Safesquid performed twice as badly as unprotected
(Result questionable). System developed stopped
about one third compared to the unprotected system
while antivirus performed stopped around half.
5.1 Known Bad Indicative Antivirus performed well, safesquid marginally
better than unprotected and system developed
marginally better than safesquid.
5.2 Known Bad Indicative Continuation of run 5.1 after multiple system crash.
Antivirus performed well, safesquid marginally
better than unprotected and system developed
marginally better than safesquid.
6 Collected
URLs
Indicative Antivirus performed only slightly better than unpro-
tected, antivirus and safesquid each prevented around
two thirds of that detected in unprotected system.
7 Known Bad Test Failure Safesquid system had no results, furthermore the er-
ror and malicious levels on other systems varied from
previous tests. (Results Discarded)
Table 5.9: Summary of effectiveness test results by run
major performance and reliability issues on the developed system.
For each malicious site a record was sent to the capture server before reverting the VM to
a clean state. The record sent to and stored by the server contains a list of the modifications
detected and a copy of the files modified, added or deleted. Although significant effort was
undertaken to improve the whitelist which defined safe events, a substantial number of false
positive malicious results were encountered and later manually screened out. A heavily simpli-
fied sample set of executions extracted from the record of a drive-by-download encountered is
given in Appendix I.
URL Error rates
Early test runs had page error rates that differed widely between the different detection mecha-
nisms. This indicated that the results could not be relied upon to indicate anything useful. The
error rates were improved in later tests by reducing the load upon the honeypot host systems,
and by removing problematic scripts from the test. The error rates for the three test runs are
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shown in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Error rates in preliminary runs
Host machine load was reduced by decreasing the number of concurrent virtual machines
hosted. Reducing the number of concurrent virtual machines from four in the first run, to three
in the second improved the rate marginally, in the third run logging was set to a higher level so
that the source of the problem could be found. Reviewing Greasyspoon logs after the third run
indicated that problems were caused by scripts that block while waiting for a database request
or update. The Google Safe Browsing blacklist check script was disabled as it was blocking on
update and also encountering errors in spikes in the number of concurrent connections (which
occur when the honeypot visits a batch of sites).
After another unrecorded short test it was observed that the error rates had converged to
approximately similar levels, and for further tests the error rates within a test class were com-
parable. The error rates for the experimental runs over known URLs are given in table 5.2, and
while not completely consistent they were close enough for indicative testing. Run 6 had lower
rates compared with run 4 due to optimizations undertaken to in the testbed network and router.
Furthermore, error rates in the known bad data set were consistent also, as shown in figure
5.3. They were much higher, however this is was expected, as any known malicious site can
have a very short lifetime and be taken down or moved well within the three day window.
With more consistent error rates, it was possible to place some degree of confidence in the
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Figure 5.2: Error rates in later experimental runs
indicative nature of the results. However, false positives for malicious sites had to be screened
out of the data.
False Malicious Results
All positive results from testing were manually inspected and compared with known or expected
operations within the virtual machine, this resulted in the vast majority of the malicious results
being recategorized as false positives1.
False positive were detected at a much higher rate in the known bad set (figure 5.4) than
in the unknown set (fig 5.5). Furthermore in the known malicious set the antivirus exhibited a
far higher rate of false positive than the other measures, but this trend did not carry over to the
collected URLs.
The false positives were caused a combination of the additional software installed and techni-
cal problems including: monitoring problems with the Capture client (including whitelist omis-
sions), unanticipated non-malicious network connections, and web servers running on unusual
ports.
1Any cases of a crashed web browser were categorized as malicious, as they may have been a case of a failed
memory corruption attack, such as a buffer overflow
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Figure 5.3: Error rates in known bad experimental runs
Monitoring problems with the capture client were the vast majority of the false positive re-
sults. In many of these it appeared that the capture client had not correctly hooked file operations,
as the logged operations indicated that a process (normally Internet Explorer’s iexplore.exe) had
modified the file “C:”, which is not a valid windows file path2. This indicates that the Capture
file monitor was misreading or not hooking the filesystem properly. Reinstall of the tools nor-
mally fixed this, however it sometimes seemed to occur spontaneously. These problems were
reduced in later tests through improving the whitelists based upon the results of the test runs and
decreasing system load reducing timeouts and monitoring errors.
Unanticipated non-malicious network connections caused the second largest group of false
positives. Verifying the status of these involved checking the connection header (banner grab-
bing) where possible, as some servers had since gone offline in the hours since testing (these
were categorized as malicious as most genuine web servers are not that transient). The vast
majority of the unanticipated connections made were undertaken by client software running on
the virtual machine to undertake operations that had not been whitelisted. These operations
2A valid Windows file path needs at least another “\” to indicate a directory, or a filename as well to indicate a
file. For example “C:\ ” and “C:\file.txt” are valid.
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Figure 5.4: False positive rates in known bad experimental runs
included:
• Port 554 - Real Time Streaming Control Protocol (RTSP) through either Quicktime or
Windows Media Player
• Port 843 - Flash Socket Policy Server 3
• Port 1935 - Real Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP), streaming media generally used by
the flash player
• Port 6667 - Internet Relay Chat (IRC) - Could be either malicious or non-malicious
• Shoutcast Streaming Media Servers (Various Ports)
Some combinations of these also occurred, for instance a page which used port 843 and 6667
was a flash based IRC client that automatically connected. Also encountered were HTTP servers
running on high ports other than 8080 for no apparent reason. Usually running the open source
Java based Jetty webserver [78], these were flagged as malicious. This was because it fits with
the expected situation for compromised machines as a part of a fast-flux network.
3Used to check with a host if flash is allowed to open a TCP connection to it [174]
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Figure 5.5: False positive rates in unknown/collected runs
Inconsistent behaviours and strange results
There were some issues with websites not acting in a completely predictable manner, with ma-
licious activity occurring sporadically, randomly, or once and no more. This is not an entirely
unexpected behavior, as it has been reported in [130, 106, 148]. Two measures were inves-
tigated as methods to manage the impact of this upon experimental results, the addition of a
referrer header to requests and the use of a larger sample set .
A blank referrer has been reported as a method in use by some exploit kits to detect hon-
eypots which visit the site directly rather than visiting it from a link on another page, and if
they suspect that a honeypot is visiting they either do not respond or present non-malicious
behaviour[172, 64]. To mitigate this an additional squid proxy was inserted on the gateway in
transparent mode and was set to replace the header of blank referrer with a referrer of twitter.com
search which the results came from. However, the method used for this, squid Access Control
Lists (ACL) will only modify existing headers, and cannot insert completely new headers. This
could have been achieved through the use of another ICAP server to handle header insertion,
however this would have overly complicated the experiment with minimal additional benefit. If
this testing methodology is used in future the handling of referrer headers should be investigated,
as discussed in section 7.3
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To increase the sample size a larger number of sites was visited than was thought strictly
necessary to investigate a proof of concept system’s effectiveness. The testing undertaken was
probably not sufficient to completely mitigate uncertainties and errors; for instance in run 4
Safesquid got a higher malicious rate than the unprotected system (which should not happen).
Future testing should use a much larger sample size to deal with this better as we discuss in 7.3
5.3.2 URLs Used
The URLs used in effectiveness testing were in two sets: known malicious (or known bad), and
gathered (or unknown).
The known bad URLs were taken from the malwareurl free database, a three day delayed
blacklist. The lists were initially in Comma Separated Value (CSV) format in chronological
order with other data including threat categories (such as phishing, fraud, or malware). Im-
mediately before testing the latest copy of this list was obtained and the URLs for the top one
thousand malware related results were taken and used for the test run.
The Automatically Gathered URLs were gathered by searching Twitter messages for links in
messages mentioning topics that were popular on Google Search and Twitter messages. Some-
times the names of prominent people feature highly, while some trends are are cryptic or quirky.
Experimental run 4 was run around the time of the 2010 soccer world cup final and some of the
trends that were used to gather URLs are shown below. Note that the names of many soccer
players appear.
• Andy Schleck
• Barefoot Bandit
• Bob Sheppard
• Closing Cere-
mony
• colton harris
moore
• dani jarque
• dumb and
dumber
• Dunga Burro
• espana
campeon
• Espanha
• Felipe Melo
• FIFA World
Cup
• free slurpee day
2010
• Furia Roja
• Hannah Mon-
tana Forever
• Holanda
• Hup Holland
Hup
• Iker Casillas
• iniesta shirt
• jimmy buffett
• jimmy buffett
tour dates 2010
• kevinhart
• lala vazquez
• margaritaville
• Museumplein
• Nelson Man-
dela
• Netherland
• Ocho Cinco
• Omaha Mall
• one love one
ocean
• paula creamer
• Pulpo Paul
• shamicka gibbs
• Sneijder
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• spain wins
world cup
• tna victory road
• uncle henry s
• Vuvuzela
• Walter
Hawkins
• Webber
• wewasgooduntil
• who won the
world cup 2010
• whyyouatchurch
• worldcup
Using these trends, the links that were found in the at the same time in messages were
gathered. Over the experimental runs that used gathered URLs, every URL used by capture
directly was from one of around around 5000 domains. Due to the source of the links (Twitter)
these were primarily the domains of URL shorteners, with the bit.ly service constituting by far
the most used service. The distribution of the top ten domains is illustrated in figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: The most common domains among gathered internet trends
Although it may initially seem that 5000 domains is a small number for around 100 000
URLs, the use of URL shorteners means that the variety of actual domains crawled is far more
diverse.
5.3.3 Effectiveness results in known bad set
For the runs over the known malicious dataset results from the the final run (run 7) are not
considered due to the error rate (inconsistent and Safesquid completely non-functional - see fig
5.3) and small size of the test (only one hour of testing).
In the tests that the results are considered for (5.1 and the continuation of it 5.2), the effec-
tiveness of the system developed appears to block some malicious activity compared with the
unprotected system, but only around 15% of it. This is a very small result, and while it appears
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to indicate some improvement, the antivirus system shows a far high level of mitigation. It is
worth noting that if the blacklist had been put into the blocklist for the System developed the
mitigation rate would have been 100%.4
This is probably for two reasons: antivirus engine detection levels and the location of the
antivirus system in the dataflow. Detection levels are likely to be high in AVG in this case
because a delayed (public) blacklist has given the antivirus provider three days to develop and
deploy signatures or blocklists. ClamAV also has virus signatures, but also a well known poor
detection rate. The use of a more effective virus detection engine may significantly improve this
for our system.
The position of antivirus in the dataflow may also lead to a higher detection rate irrespective
of the engine used. This is due to the fact that an antivirus engine running on the client machine
can inspect data right before it is executed and as it is executed on the system. Many techniques
used to evade detection (such as encoding, signature evasion, droppers, or loader packing) will
tend to be unravelled as the malware is run on the target system.
Figure 5.7: Malicious rates in experimental runs over known bad URLs
It is also suspected that the weight of the entries on the list used towards windows executable
files (.exe) may have caused some of the difference in rate. This is because many of the measures
4Only in this case however as we would be blocking our test data. If we had used one blacklist to test another
against we would have had a rate in the middle representing the overlapping entries, no blacklist is perfect.
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we deploy are good for use against drive by downloads that exploit weaknesses in software that
uses other data formats to deploy their payload. This is far more prevalent in the testing of the
URLs collected from trends.
5.3.4 Effectiveness Results in Unknown Set
The rates of malicious sites detected in this set, while consistent with expectations from the
literature at around half of one percent (as discussed in section 2.7.3), have the effect of adding
a large degree of uncertainty to the results due to the effective sample size. Testing was only
undertaken for indicative results and not conclusive results however, so while this should be
considered when drawing conclusions from these results it does not lead us to entirely discard
them.
Effectiveness
The verified malicious rates detected for the collected URLs were significantly lower than the
rates in the known malicious URLs. Where detected malicious rates in the the known malicious
were around one in four (25%), for the collected set it was one in two hundred (0.5%), or fifty
times lower. The two runs used for data collection, four and six, present substantially different
relative protection measurements for the protection measures. Run six approximately doubles
the malicious rate for unprotected and Safesquid, triples it for antivirus, but the level for the
ICAP system remains roughly the same. This is probably due to the large difference in the
number of pages visited between the protection measures within each run affecting the sample
used. This is shown in fig 5.8, which gives the number of sites visited.
When the results of the two runs are averaged, the new sample sizes range from around
5000 to around 11000. Spread remains between sample sizes, but there is a larger and more
similar sample set overall5. The detected malicious results from the two have also been averaged
(weighted by number of pages visited) to show the value across the larger sample set. The two
experimental runs and their weighted averaged results are shown in fig 5.9.
Run 4 has two areas of interest that indicate possible problems in the results: the Safesquid
system shows a malicious rate that is substantially higher than the unprotected system (which
is a control) in run four, and the antivirus system shows a higher weighted average than the
unprotected system.
5Averaging these values, and the results below is not entirely statistically valid as the results are not entirely
independent – there are some URLs that are in both sets
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Figure 5.8: Number of URLs tested in experimental runs over collected URLs
The Safesquid result in run four is likely due to the small sample size used in that run (687),
which is far smaller than the number of URLs visited by the other measures For a sample set
that size there are around 8 positive results, and a one or two positive results will alter the rate
by a large amount.
The cause of the antivirus having a higher malicious rate than unprotected in the weighted
results is less clear. The antivirus outperforms the unprotected in both runs, but when weighting
for the number of requests is undertaken the result is a higher rate. The rate of extra positive
results needs to be three times higher in run six to account for the rise, which in the same size
used (8000 sites) would be a substantial swing. There are two likely contributers to this outcome:
undetected false positives in the antivirus result set and errors in testing methodology.
The antivirus system exhibited far more false positives during testing across the known ma-
licious URLs than in the unknown set. It is possible, that false positives were not detected and
removed from the data as effectively in this data set. Examining the data regarding crashing and
non-crashing and non crashing malicious results hints that this may be the case. Figure 5.10
shows the raw breakdown for malicious results in run six (not adjusted for sample size), and it
is notable that the ratios between crashing and non-crashing malicious results are quite different
between the two proxy based systems and the unprotected and control systems.
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Figure 5.9: Malicious rates in experimental runs over collected URLs
Figure 5.10: Run six malicious results by web browser crash status
It is suspected that a bad whitelist combined with an incomplete knowledge of the system
processes and modifications made by the AVG antivirus resulted in many normal acitivites that
AVG undertakes being classified as malicious. Additionally, the much larger number of false
positives given in the known malicious data sets contribute to this conclusion.
Errors in testing may also have led to the unexpected results, as while the honeypots were
given the same URL list and the same duration to run, they did not sample exactly the same sites,
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or experience the same behaviours. This is due to different relative crawl speeds, and also due to
the non-casual behaviour of some malicious websites. An improved method for undertaking this
style of comparative protection effectiveness testing using client honeypots that should improve
this is proposed in future work section 7.3.2.
5.4 Performance Testing
Twelve representative script classes were tested through one hundred combinations of load that
affected performance. The tests varied the filesize of the requested file, number of requests
made per second, number of concurrent requests made, and file makeup (either random binary
or textual). All tests had a duration of 60 seconds and while this is quite a short time (system
stability issues may take longer to appear), the duration was kept low to make the number of
data points and total testing duration more manageable. The test cases for each script class were
manually compiled into tabular form (as shown by the table of results from a single test case in
Appendix I.2), from which the results discussed here were further processed.
5.4.1 General Performance response
The variables altered during testing either caused performance effects proportional to their addi-
tional network load, or increased throughput marginally until an inflection point was encountered
after while the performance gains reversed. The results for the four independent variables used
are given in table 5.10.
Variable General effect of increase Notes
File Contents Slightly faster for binary transfer
than HTML in most cases.
Results cannot be due to compresssion,
as random data is far less compressible
than the HTML data used.
File size Increased data throughput rate,
increased response time
Little additional effect until network
link saturation
Request Rate Little effect Little impact until resource saturation
when this causes drastic decrease in
performance
Concurrency Increased throughput rate and
decreased response time
Provides benefits until link or compo-
nent resource saturation
Table 5.10: The general results of performance testing as they relate to each independent variable
used
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5.4.2 File Contents
Request modification results are not relevant to this case, as the difference is in the response
contents. The two forms of file content used, random binary and HTML, were not expected to
exhibit much performance difference except in cases where content scanning would not modify
the file (due to it not being able to be parsed as a string or not containing some data being checked
for). However in testing a consistent performance advantage was measured, in both control cases
and non-control cases. The improvement was affected by connection concurrency, but a pattern
was unable to be discerned as concurrency did not appear to have a consistent effect. This is
shown in figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Percentage decreases in request duration from binary content files over HTML
content files (10 000 requests / minute, 100KB filesize, grouped by connection concurrency)
The difference seen in the final case on the graph, around 15%, is due to a combination of the
normal improvement seen in the control cases and reduced processing and network overhead that
results from the binary file not requiring modification as the textual string searched for “<body
... >” is not contained in the file.
5.4.3 File Size
File size showed performance characteristics similar to what would be expected. Smaller files
have a larger relative overhead (due to network connection handling and HTTP headers) than
larger files, but larger files require more network bandwidth to transfer. Thus, after smaller files
it was expected that the general trends would scale with the filesize. This is what was observed,
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as is illustrated in figure 5.12, although the 10KB filesize gave slightly shorter times than the
1KB filesize.
Figure 5.12: Effect of filesize upon time to service request for antivirus. (10000 requests /
minute, 100KB filesize)
5.4.4 Request Rate
Request rate did not show much change in experimental results other than increasing duration by
a factor of ten and moving timeout failure conditions down in most test cases by an order of ten.
This was primarily due to network and TCP connection saturation. For instance, where some
tests previously began to timeout with concurrency one-hundred they began to exhibit timeout
with concurrency of ten. This particularly problematic with large filesizes as with 1667 requests
per second link saturation was reached at a file sizer of around 68KB, and in most cases large
error and timeout rates occurred in the 100KB and larger test cases.
5.4.5 Connection Concurrency
Connection concurrency of the values tested provided peak performance (in requests per second)
at ten. A concurrency of less than ten appeared to be underutilized, whilst concurrency of two-
hundred and four-hundred causes the number of requests serviced per second to drop.
Figure 5.13 shows the response to concurrency exhibited by testing direct communication
with the web server. Both logarithmic concurrency sequences (1, 10, 100 and 100, 200, 400)
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follow straight lines on the graph with a logartithmic scale and are therefore follow linear pat-
terns of performance. If the concurrency is doubled then the connection delay approximately
doubles.
Figure 5.13: Effect of concurrency upon time to service request (Non-proxied, 100 KB filesize,
10 000 requests per minute)
With the ICAP header modification request script the relationship between concurrency and
time taken to service requests changes to only increase after ten requests per second. This is
illustrated in figure 5.14.
Furthermore, the rate of increase between the later points becomes higher, indicating that di-
minishing returns occur as concurrency increases. Thus, concurrency adds performance benefits
up to a point, but beyond it it actually decreases overall performance.
5.4.6 Performance response with different script types
The different operations performed require a differing degree of network communication and
system resources, and they therefore have differing performance characteristics. From the rep-
resentative cases and controls used in the performance testing the general observations in table
5.11 occurred.
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Figure 5.14: Effect of concurrency upon time to service request (ICAP header modification)
Script Class Performance Notes
ICAP Request Header Insertion Little performance impact
ICAP Request Header Alteration Little performance impact
ICAP Request URL Change Little performance impact
ICAP Request to Response Modifica-
tion
Little performance impact
ICAP Response Content Insertion -
Static
Little performance impact, except in high concur-
rency when timeouts occurred
ICAP Response Content Insertion -
Database (Non-caching)
Performance results very low, about 10 seconds per
request. Omitted from graphs for clarity
ICAP Response Content Insertion -
Database (Caching)
Little performance impact, except on requests that
require a database update. Caching mechanism
problematic, should be removed to external triggers
and not controlled by Greasyspoon.
ICAP Response Content Antivirus
Scanning
Moderate performance impact, except in high con-
currency when timeouts occurred due to network
link saturation .
ICAP Request & Response Multiple
Operations
Operations performed serially by Greasyspoon, so
delays are cumulative. Moderate performance im-
pact when problematic operations are removed.
Table 5.11: Script class results for performance testing
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Request Scripts
The performance of the requests script classes was very good, an overview is shown in figure
5.15. Note that the values have been adjusted to compensate for number of network transfers
necessary for each type (for instance direct transfers a file once, proxied twice, ICAP three
times).
Figure 5.15: Performance comparison for request scripts (10 000 requests per minute, 100KB
filesize)
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Although worse than the control in all cases except concurrency ten6, every test case used
for the 10 000 requests / minute runs gave a throughput of better than 200 requests per second.
While this is not enough for an enterprise grade system, it is more than enough for a home or
small business system and for a proof of concept system this indicates adequate performance is
possible for request operations..
Response Scripts
Response operations had a much larger performance overhead than the request scripts; primarily
this was due to the larger file sizes and more complex operations performed. Where a request is
a few kilobytes at most, the test cases shown in the figures below used 100KB files, and in cases
of higher concurrency this appears to have caused performance problems.
Note also that the values for both figures 5.16 and 5.17 have been adjusted to compensate for
number of network transfers as in the requests case above. From figure 5.16 it may be observed
that the database accessing content insertion script had performance issues (already discussed),
and that the response scripts developed had issues beyond 100 requests per second.
6It is suspected, but not verified) that the improvement in concurrency ten is due to the web proxy keeping the
TCP connection open.
132 CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
Figure 5.16: Requests per second performance for different response script types
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To clarify the reasons for this, response times rather than connections per second are used in
figure 5.17.
Figure 5.17: Response times for different script types (10 000 requests / minute, 100KB file size,
grouped by concurrency)
The response scripts add little to response time when concurrency is low, but at high concur-
rency the errors that occur cause connection timeout.
5.4.7 Performance results
The performance characteristics as currently implemented can handle request operations ade-
quately for a home or small business, but response operations can be problematic. For deploy-
ment the following are thought to be the maximum reasonable capacity: Eighty-percent network
link load (after all multiple transmission are accounted for), concurrency of twenty, file size of
less than one megabyte (standard web browsing), and a request load of no more than ten users.
Much of this would be significantly improved if all components were deployed on the same
physical system, thus network throughput is far less significant an issue.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Project Summary
This work describes the development, deployment, and testing of a secure web gateway using
open source tools. The system developed shows promise for meeting the goals which were
set for it to a proof of concept level. Testing showed some improvement in browser infection
rates, but performance problems with the system developed combined with stability problems
in testing mean that, while the results appear promising, conclusive results as regarding a full
deployment should not be drawn until system performance and testing reliability are improved.
Due to the complexity of the project, full conclusions shall be broken down into four areas:
An overall review, conclusions regarding system effectiveness at threat mitigation, conclusions
regarding system performance, and conclusions regarding the project hypotheses.
6.1.1 Development Review
The messaging service met requirements outlined to a proof of concept level. It met all require-
ments outlined with the exception of the requirements concerned with customer accounting.
This functionality is non-complex to implement and is unlikely to have had any effect upon the
results of the testing phases of the project.
The additional requirements necessary for the active security measures were all met to a
proof of concept level where they were well-defined. The requirements for “acceptable” perfor-
mance were less clearly defined, nevertheless the authors are of the opinion that they have been
met for the majority of the project’s functionality.
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6.1.2 Effectiveness Conclusions
The testing undertaken indicates that improved security was achieved for web clients over an
unprotected system. Testing stability was problematic, and should be considered indicative but
non-conclusive. Further effectiveness testing should be undertaken after improving system per-
formance and effectiveness testing reliability, but was not undertaken during the course of this
project due to time constraints.
The developed system exhibited slightly lower rates of malicious activity in the three-day
delayed known malicious dataset than the control and Safesquid systems, but higher rates than
the antivirus system (which had far lower malicious rates than the other methods) in this URL
set. This is suspected to be due to the antivirus system signatures having at least three days in
which to update, and the known poor detection rates of ClamAV which was used as the antivirus
engine for Safesquid and the system developed.
In the collected URL dataset, which had an unknown rate of malicious activity and was
gathered in real time while testing, the system developed showed malicious activity rates around
half those of the control system in the weighted results. When weighted results are used, the
developed system performs similar to the Safesquid system, but the Antivirus system shows
higher malicious rates than the control, indicating that problems exist in the testing methodology.
This is suspected to be due to the interaction between AVG and Capture-HPC causing web
browser crashes which were flagged as malicious.
6.1.3 Performance Conclusions
The system performed very well on request modification operations, but performance of the
response operations was mixed. Concurrency of ten requests provided the best throughput, but
request rate and file size had little impact (beyond that expected by the larger proportional size
of overheads in smaller files) when the link was not saturated. The system exhibited slight
performance improvements with binary over textual files which is probably due to non-textual
files following a shorter code path.
6.1.4 Conclusion Regarding Hypotheses
The primary hypothesis of this work, that ICAP can act as an application layer IPS for web
content, was not disproven, and results of this work indicate that it probably holds true.
The first secondary hypothesis (regarding improving web browsing security) appears to hold
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when rates are compared to the control, and indicative results show it is comparable in protection
to competing measures.
The second secondary hypothesis (regarding performance) appears to hold for request op-
erations in the system developed, but at present does not hold for response operations. This is
likely due to factors regarding performance optimization which can be remedied in future work.
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Chapter 7
Future Work
This project has a broad range of future work that can be undertaken to further knowledge and
expand upon the ideas investigated. These include improving and optimizing the system de-
veloped, extending the system developed, improvements and further investigations around the
effectiveness testing, improvements and further investigations around the performance testing,
and further developing the system developed into a full system usable in production environ-
ments.
7.1 Developed System - Fixes and Optimization
Some issues arose during development or testing need further investigation, primarily concen-
trated around response modification operations. The following should in particular be investi-
gated or improved:
• Proxy caching (also the effect of this upon security operations)
• Deployment of system components on the same physical system
• Concurrency issues in updating static and semi-static content such as blacklists and mes-
sages
• Database server and schema optimizations
• The use of a separate web server to handle messaging content (as used by Comcast[21])
7.2 Developed System - Enhancements and extensions
If performance surrounding core functionality is sufficiently improved then some extensions of
functionality that may be useful are suggested. These include general functionality improve-
ments and the implementation of specific additional functionality.
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7.2.1 General Extensions
Cross Site Request Forgery Safe Bypass Links
At present the bypass links are potentially vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery attacks that
a sufficiently informed attacker may use to manipulate web browsers into silently bypassing.
The implementation of a Cross Site Request Forgery safe warning bypass should be investi-
gated. Suggestions for this include linking requests, responses, and database entries to allow
the use of a random user specific, site specific and time limited nonce appended to links. (e.g.
http://www.website.com/file.exe&bypassAV=98FhwmdnSWl will download file.exe even if
the antivirus flags it as infected, but only that file, from that site, for that user within the next ten
minutes)
User accounting and support records
Although we have scripts to read the database, and write operations are trivial to implement,
scripts that performed database writes were not implemented due to the performance issues
encountered surrounding database access. If this is improved then it is likely to be beneficial for
scripts to store accounting and user confirmation data in the database.
Encrypted (SSL/HTTPS) Content Modification
The Squid web proxy has two recently introduced features (introduced while this project was
in the testing phases) that may allow this system to terminate the encrypted session, inspect
the content, and re-encrypt the content to send back to the client. The first feature is (termed
SSLBump [141]) enables Squid to terminate and reestablish secure connections, and the second
(Dynamic SSL Certificate Generation [140]) enables Squid to sign the client connection so that
certificate errors do not occur indicating a man in the middle attack (provided the proxy signs
with a root certificate that the client has installed). At present Squid is unable to perform the
dynamic certificate generation in transparent mode.
There are many issues surrounding this functionality, and regulatory, privacy, and legal fac-
tors must be considered in addition to the technical issues. In corporate or other tightly controlled
environments these are far less likely to be an issue and this functionality will allow additional
protection, as at present encrypted content cannot be inspected in any capacity.
CHAPTER 7: FUTURE WORK 141
7.2.2 Specific Improvements
The following improvements should be investigated as improvements to existing scripts:
• Antivirus - The use of an antivirus engine with better detection rates (since ClamAV is
known to have bad rates [37]), or the use of multiple antivirus engine scanning
• Antivirus - File hashing and hash result caching, so that files need not be rescanned
multiple times
• Version Checking - Check using more advanced methods than the user-agent sent (such
as injecting javascript that checks)
• User Messaging - Improve targeting to specific browsers and not just IP addresses
• Cross Site Scripting - Couple requests and responses to check for more advanced attacks
7.2.3 Partially or Conceptually Developed Functionality
Some functionality was not considered to be at a stage to be tested, and was only implemented
in a very rudimentary fashion or had been researched or planned out, but was not programmed.
Nevertheless some of this is worth noting here.
• Anonymizer - Removes or replaces user specific content from some sites (such as User-
agent, IP Address, installed Plugins, Cookies, Flash cookies)
• Dataloss Prevention (DLP) - Removes or warns user if certain patterns or information
is sent out in requests. This could include company secrets, Credit Card numbers, or
personal details.
• Standard Signature Scanning - Scans files for signatures in industry standard formats
such as that used by the SNORT Network Intrusion Detection System.
• Short URL Expander - Intercepts short URL links and replaces them with their full target
address
• Advertisement Blocking - Blocks known advertising network sites and domains
• User Setting Control - Integrates with the database to enable the user to control the
security operations performed by the system on their traffic inline (discussed further on)
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7.3 Effectiveness Testing
The effectiveness testing undertaken was using a novel methodology, unfortunately this also
resulted in issues being encountered that could not be easily resolved, particularly around the
areas of whitelisting and interaction between the monitoring components of the honeypot and
antivirus. Future work should be undertaken to improve the validity of results drawn from testing
in this project, and the testing methodology could be improved to enable more general real world
testing of web client security systems.
7.3.1 Improvements to Testing of Developed System
The effectiveness testing undertaken provided lots of data, but the any conclusions that can
be drawn are only tentative. To improve this the following recommendations are made before
further testing is undertaken:
• The use of a larger sample size and more test runs in both known bad and collected data
sources
• Testing the system with honeypots that are utilizing a more representative software set and
not deliberately vulnerable.
• Inserting an additional proxy and ICAP server to handle referrers sent to malicious web
sites so that honeypot detection is more difficult
• Investigate the use of a honeypot that crawls websites to collect the links rather than work-
ing through ba list of pre-provided links
7.3.2 Extend methodology and investigate as a more general security metric
The testing methodology could be used as a new method for evaluating web client security pro-
vided that any testing investigates the previously discussed enhancements. There are additional
functions that should be investigated, including the development and use of a proxy that records
sites on first pass, and then sends this cached identically to all clients in an attempt to prevent
the effects of randomness and blacklisting techniques used as honeypot evasion on results.
7.4 Performance Testing
Although the performance testing results showed quite consistent results, they were dependent
upon system performance issues which remain to be solved. We recommend that the effects of
the following upon performance be investigated:
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• The effect of performance optimizations (such as all components deployed on same phys-
ical system) upon performance in the current system
• The effect of using an alternative web proxy (other software, or hardware based)
• The effect of deployment in load-balanced situations
• The effect of additional System resources upon performance
• Testing with a broader range of file sizes and types
• Testing with content gathered from real websites in the same way a real web browser
would access it (many files, not all accessed at once, but a few at a time in order)
• The use of in-script performance monitoring and adaptive setting change.
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Appendix A
The HyperText Transfer Protocol
A.1 HyperText Transfer Protocol HTTP
A.1.1 General HTTP operation
The HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) operates in a very simple request response fashion,
assuming the client and server are already connected directly via TCP:
1. Client sends request chain.
2. Web server sends a response code with appropriate content, or error.
For example if a client wishes to request index.html from a server already connected to, the
operation proceeds as in figure A.1 below.
Figure A.1: Direct connection in simplified HTTP transaction
This is a simplified version, as there are more fields and details that may be used depending
on the specific version and implementation.
A.1.2 History and versions
The initial version of HTTP, version 0.9, allowed only the operation given above where a client
could only request a resource and would always receive an HTML file in response. This was
expanded upon in later versions and there are now two later versions still in use, versions 1.0[13]
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and 1.1[50] (Although 1.1 is near universal, a few simple devices use 1.0 still where 1.1 additions
are unnecessary). Version 1.0 was introduced in May 1996[13], and allowed the protocol to
perform more complex operations than version 0.9.
Although some of these features were already in use unofficially, HTTP version 1.0 officially
introduced the following features (among others):
• MIME media types - non-HTML content can be carried
• The POST request method - clients can send content to the server.
• Content encodings - compression or encryption of content
• Multipart responses
• Proxy server support
• Simple caching support - sending and handling expiry details.
There were some shortcomings in HTTP 1.0 however, and HTTP 1.1[50][51] improved upon
1.0. The main differences between version 1.0 and 1.1 are in the areas of[86]:
1. Extensibility - Additional headers and the ability to “UPGRADE” a request to a different
set of protocols
2. Caching - Better cache control
3. Bandwidth Optimization - Partial requests and more detailed compression handling
4. Network Connection Management - TCP connection reuse and request pipelining. (Ver-
sion 1.1 had full connection TCP connection set up and tear down for each request)
5. Message Transmission - Required overhaul to fit with network connection management
(above).
6. Internet Address Conservation - Multiple hostnames can exist on one server as clients
must specify the host
7. Error Notification - More comprehensive
8. Security, Integrity, and Authentication - Digest authentication, MD5 content integrity
checks, cookies for state management.
9. Content Negotiation - Allowing the client to request specific content, such as by specific
language
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The additions in HTTP 1.1 made it a more complex protocol than version 0.9, but it is
capable of accomplishing a more varied role. We shall now discuss its operation in more detail,
discussing the operation only of HTTP versions 1.0 and 1.1. It is necessary to discuss both here,
for while most modern browsers are 1.1 compatible, the squid Web proxy (see section 3.6.1) is
only fully conformant to HTTP 1.0.
A.1.3 Request operation
Care must be taken here as the term request is a slight misnomer: it refers not simply to a client
requesting a specific file, but to any message sent from an http client (such as a web browser) to
an http server. This can include the sending of data via a POST method (discussed below). Fur-
thermore, note that at this stage we are only discussing direct (i.e.unproxied) communications
between client and server.
An HTTP request chain is the series of HTTP communicaions and headers sent from a
client to a server. According to the definitions in the IETF Request For Comment (RFC)[51],
an HTTP request chain contains the following separated by newlines (CRLF), with the body
separated from the headers by a further blank line:
1. Request line
2. HTTP headers
3. Request body
The Request Line
The first line in an HTTP request, the request line, is of the form:
Method <space> request-uri <space> http-version <CRLF>
We will discuss each briefly in turn.
The HTTP Request Method parameter specifies which type of operation the client would
like to perform with the web server. This will generally be either requesting a file, or placing
some content to the web server, but there are many more options in the protocols. HTTP 1.0
allows three method types, while HTTP 1.1 offers an additional five types. Only three are
directly relevant to this project:
• GET
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• POST
• CONNECT
The GET request method is used to single request a file or resource from the web server.
It is the most commonly used, and also conceptually the simplest method available in HTTP. It
is available in all HTTP versions.
The POST request method requests are used to submit some content to be processed by
a resource on the web serer. Normally this will be some input for a server side script. It is
available from HTTP version 1.0 onwards and in this project this method is used for analysis of
(and protection from) cross-site scripting or cross-site request forgery attacks (see sections 2.5.1
and 2.5.2).
The CONNECT request method is used to allow an intermediate web proxy (see sections
2.1.1 and 2.1.3) to dynamically switch to being a tunnel. It is available only in HTTP version
1.1. This method is relevant to the discussions here as it enables an intermediary proxy (that
terminates and reestablishes a TCP connection) to tunnel encrypted content without needing to
decrypt it. This is discussed in 2.1.3 below in more detail.
The request-uri parameter is given as a path relative to the root of the server when non-
proxied. For example, to request (GET) the file http://www.example.com/pages/page1.html
The server will connect to the server at www.example.com and request:
GET /pages/page1.html ...
It will also send the required host-header of:
Host: www.example.com
The http-version parameter in the request line is used for backwards compatibility to let the
server know which HTTP versions the client supports. Ordinarily this will be HTTP/1.1.
HTTP Headers
There are 19 header types in HTTP 1.1 [51], however, the only mandatory one in requests is the
HOST header. The other headers are optional and generally irrelevant to this work, with three
exceptions: proxy-auth, referrer, and user-agent.
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The HTTP host header specifies the hostname to which the request is being sent. This allows
a server to host multiple web pages sites on the same IP address and port. whereas previously it
was only possible to run one web site per IP/Port combination.
The HTTP referrer header is used to specify the page on which the requested link was
referenced; it should be empty if the address was typed directly. This feedback is useful for
those running servers as it allows them to track things such as traffic origin, and some sites use
it to prevent deep linking1. It also can be a potential privacy issue for users. User tracking can
also be more pervasive with content hosted off the main server the user is accessing (such as
advertisements), as this allows a larger proportion of the user’s activities to be tracked.
The HTTP user-agent header contains the type and version of the software being used to
make the request, normally a web browser. In modern browsers it also tends to contain infor-
mation on the browser’s plugins (discussed in section 2.5.5). This allows a server to serve up
different content depending upon the browser being used, which is useful for page rendering be-
tween browsers which render a page differently. This is becoming a security risk to some users,
as it allows precise Fingerprinting of the user’s software for attacks such as drive by downloads
(see section 2.5.4).
The HTTP proxy-authorization header is used to respond to a request from a web proxy for
authorization (see section A.1.3); it was used in our testing to allow simple separation between
“users” without requiring complicated transparent proxy rules and multiple systems.
Request Body
This is where any content that needs to be sent and cannot be sent in an HTTP request header is
contained. This is only relevant this project with the POST method and is used for analysis of
(and protection from) cross-site scripting or cross-site request forgery attacks (see sections 2.5.1
and 2.5.2).
1Where a single page or file on a web server is linked to on an external site - examples of this include placing
an image off one site on another without permission. This not only uses bandwidth of the other party, but can have
copyright implications.
APPENDIX A: THE HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL 165
A.1.4 Response operation
HTTP response operations are the communications sent from the HTTP server to an HTTP
client, and are structured almost identically to HTTP requests, although the message contents
differ. An HTTP response chain is the series of communications that is sent from the client to
the server. According to the definitions in the RFCs [51], an HTTP response chain contains the
following separated by newlines (CRLF) with the body separated from the headers by a further
blank line:
1. Status line
2. HTTP response headers
3. Response (entity) headers and body
Status Line
The first line in an HTTP response, the status line is of the form:
http-version <space> status-code <space> reason-phrase <CRLF>
These are briefly discussed next.
HTTP-version is used to let the client know which HTTP version the server is using, mainly
for backwards compatibility reasons. Ordinarily this will be HTTP/1.1, but with some limited
functionality or single purpose web servers this could be HTTP/1.0.
The Status Code and Reason Phrase parameters are probably the most significant part of
the response other than the body for clients. This is because the these handle not only the con-
tent, but also error handling. The status code is a 3 digit numeric number corresponding to a
code from the protocol specification, where the first number denotes which class of status.
There are five classes of status code in the HTTP specification:
• 1xx Informational
• 2xx Success (200 - OK)
• 3xx Redirection e.g. 301 (moved permanently, 302 found)
• 4xx Client Error (407 - proxy authentication required)
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• 5xx Server error
The full list of status and reason codes is in section 6.1.1 of RFC 2616[51], but the purposes of
this work only a few statuses are relevant, namely 200, 301, 302, and 407.
The response status 200 - OK indicates success for the method it is in response to. In the case
of a GET request then 200 response includes the requested resource in the response body (see
section 2.7.4 below), and in the case of a POST request the response body describes or contains
the result of the action.
The response statuses 301 - Moved Permanently, 302 - Found, and 303 - See Other are
used to redirect clients to another location, and for the purposes of this project they are consid-
ered identical. If in response to a GET request then this response is normally handled transpar-
ently by web browsers which will then automatically request the resource from the new URL.
If in response to a POST request then the redirection should not be automatic for 301 and 302
requests, but for a 303 redirection a client may automatically use the new resource location.
These statuses are important for this project as not only do we use them to redirect clients in
our system, but many URL Shorteners (see section 2.4.3) also use them for transparent redirec-
tion.
The response status 407 - Proxy Authentication Required is returned by a proxy to a client
before the proxy services the request if authentication is required to user the proxy. This response
also gives an appropriate challenge for the client to use in any following authentication. The
client is not required to respond, but should it do so it will need to use a proxy-authorization
header (see section A.1.3 above).
Response Headers
In addition to the response status line, the server will send response headers that are used for
many purposes, examples of which include assisting the client in rendering the content, or in-
structing caches along the way. For this project, the only response header directly used is the
content-type header.
The HTTP content-type header indicates to a client what media type follows in the body of
the response so that the client knows how to correctly handle it (if possible). For an HTML page
this is text/html. Some other relevant media types for this project are given in table A.1
APPENDIX A: THE HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL 167
Content Media Type Description
application/binary-stream Any binary data not otherwise treated (base 64 encoded)
application/javascript Javascript elements
application/msword Microsoft Word Documents
application/pdf PDF Documents
application/x-shockwave-flash Shockwave Flash Elements
application/zip Zip Archives
image/jpeg JPEG Images
image/gif GIF Images
image/png PNG Images
text/plain Any textual content not otherwise handled
text/html HTML Content
text/css Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) Content
Table A.1: Some relevant media types
Response Body
The response body contains content that is not carried in the headers of the response. For this
project, the response body is used for giving the response to GET requests, for giving a redi-
rection URL, and for giving the challenge for proxy-authorization requests. The majority of our
project’s security operations also require inspection and alteration of this section of an HTTP
response.
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Appendix B
Testbed Component Layout
Machine (OS)a Component (Interface) Address : Port
1 (U) Firewall / Gateway (External Side) (Eth0) 132.181.19.2
Firewall / Gateway (Internal Side) (Eth1) 10.1.1.1
1/2?? Clam Antivirus 10.1.1.1
2 (U) Squid HTTP Proxy 10.1.1.2 3128
SafeSquid HTTP Proxy 10.1.1.2 8080
3 (XP) Greasyspoon ICAP Server 10.1.1.3 1344
GreasySpoon Admin N/A (client)
4 (U) Mysql Server 10.1.1.5 3306
(U) Free Radius Server 10.1.1.20 : 1812
5 (XP) Capture HPC 1 (Unprotected) 10.1.1.10 : 902
(U) CHPC Server (Unprotected) 10.1.1.10 : 7070
(U) Web Polygraph Server 10.1.1.20
6 (XP) Capture HPC 2 (Client Protection) 10.1.1.11 : 902
(U) CHPC Server (Antivirus) 10.1.1.11 : 7070
(U) Web Polygraph Server 10.1.1.20
7 (XP) Capture HPC 3 (GreasySpoon ICAP) 10.1.1.12 : 902
(U) CHPC Server (SafeSquid) 10.1.1.12 : 7070
(U) Web Polygraph Client 1 10.1.1.20
8 (XP) Capture HPC 4 (SafeSquid) 10.1.1.13 : 902
(U) CHPC Server (Greasyspoon) 10.1.1.13 : 7070
(U) Web Polygraph Client 2 10.1.1.22
a U = Ubuntu 10.04, XP = Windows XP professional Service Pack 3
b Bridged means ...
Table B.1: Testbed components and network details
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Appendix C
Comcast System Requirements in full
4. Design Requirements
This section describes all of the requirements taken into
consideration for the design of this system.
4.1. General
REQ1: TCP Port 80: The system should provide notifications via TCP
port 80, the well-known port for HTTP traffic.
REQ2: Block Listing: It is possible that the HyperText Markup
Language (HTML, [RFC1866]) or JavaScript [RFC4329] used for
notifications may cause problems while accessing a particular
website. Therefore, such a system should be capable of using
a block list of website Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs,
[RFC2396]) or Fully Qualified Domain Named (FQDNs, Section
5.1 of [RFC1035]) that conflict with the system, to instruct
the system to not provide a notifications related to certain
sites, in order to reduce any errors or unexpected results.
REQ3: Instant Messaging (IM): Some IM clients use TCP port 80 in
their communications, often as an alternate port when
standard, well-known ports do not work. This system should
not conflict with or cause unexpected results for IM clients
(or any other client types).
REQ4: Handling of Active Sessions: To the extent that a web
notification system must temporarily route TCP port 80
traffic in order to provide a notification, previously
established TCP port 80 sessions should not be disrupted and
should be routed to the proxy layer.
REQ5: No TCP Resets: The use of TCP resets has been widely
criticized, both in the Internet community generally as well
as in [RFC3360]. As such, except for the case of
unintentional errors, the use of TCP resets must be avoided.
REQ6: Non-Disruptive: The web notification system should not
disrupt the end user experience, such as causing significant
clients errors.
REQ7: Notification Acknowledgement: Once a user responds and
acknowledges a notification, the notification should
immediately stop.
REQ8: Non-Modification of Content: Such a system should not
significantly alter the content of the HTTP response from any
website the user is accessing.
REQ9: Unexpected Content: The system should transparently handle
traffic for which it cannot provide a web notification.
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Thus, widely varying content should be expected, and all such
unexpected traffic should be able to be handled by the system
without generating errors or unexpected results.
REQ10: No Caching: Web content must not be cached by the system.
REQ11: No Advertising Replacement or Insertion: The system must not
be used to replace any advertising provided by a website, or
insert advertising into websites where none was intended by
the owner of a given website.
4.2. Web Proxy
REQ12: Open-Source Software: The system should use an open source
web proxy server, such as Squid. (While it is possible to
use any web proxy, the use of open source, and openly
documented software is recommended.)
REQ13: ICAP Client: The web proxy server should have an integrated
ICAP client.
REQ14: Access Control: Access to the proxy should be limited
exclusively to the IP addresses of users for which
notifications are intended, and only for limited periods of
time. Furthermore, if a Session Management Broker (SMB) is
utilized, as described in Section 5.1 below, then the proxy
should restrict access only to the address of the SMB.
4.3. ICAP Server
REQ15: Request and Response Support: The system should support both
request and response adaptation.
REQ16: Consistency: The system must be able to consistently provide
a specific notification.
REQ17: Multiple Notification Types: The system must be able to
provide many different types of notifications.
REQ18: Simultaneous Differing Notifications: The system must be able
to simultaneously serve multiple notifications, including
notifications of varying types, to different users. As a
result, User A should be able to get the notification
intended specifically for User A, at the same time that User
B receives an entirely different notification, which was
intended specifically for User B.
4.4. Messaging Service
REQ19: Messaging Service: The Messaging Service, as described in
Section 5.1 below caches the notifications for each specific
user. Thus, by caching the notification messages, the system
may provide notifications without significantly affecting the
web browsing experience of the user.
REQ20: Process Acknowledgements: The Messaging Service should
process acknowledgements to properly remove entries from the
cache and forward acknowledgements to the Messaging Service.
REQ21: Ensure Notification Targeting Accuracy: The Messaging Service
must ensure that notifications are presented to the intended
users.
REQ22: Keep Records for Customer Support: The Messaging Service
should maintain some type of record that a notification has
been presented and/or acknowledged, in case a user inquires
with customer support personnel.
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Threat Surveys and Studies
Source Type Source URL
General
Vendor
Microsoft Security http://www.microsoft.com/sir/
IBM X-Force http://xforce.iss.net//
Government
agency and
other
non-vendor
OECD Report http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/34/40724457.pdf
Australian House
Standing Committe
on Communications
Inquiry into Cyber
Crime
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/coms/
cybercrime/report.htm
Internet Crime Com-
plaint Center (IC3)
http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx
US-Computer Emer-
gency Response Team
(US-CERT)
http://www.us-cert.gov/resources.html
Anti Phishing Working
Group
http://www.antiphishing.org/resources.html
Antivirus
Vendor
Bit Defender http://www.bitdefender.com/site/view/
BitDefender-E-Threats-Landscape-Report.html
ESET http://www.eset.com/threat-center
Fortiguard http://www.fortiguard.com/ListOfArticles.html
G Data http://www.gdatasoftware.co.uk/about-g-data/
press-centre/news.html
Kaspersky http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis
McAfee http://www.mcafee.com/apps/
resource-library-search.aspx?region=us
Sophos http://www.sophos.com/security/
Symantec http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeid=
threatreport
Trend Micro http://us.trendmicro.com/us/trendwatch/
research-and-analysis/threat-reports/index.html
Other
Security
Vendors and
Commercial
Security Labs
AV Comparatives http://www.av-comparatives.org/comparativesreviews
Barracuda Labs http://www.barracudalabs.com/research_resources.
html
Cascadia Labs http://www.cascadialabs.com/clients.html#examples
Dasient http://blog.dasient.com
M86 Security http://www.m86security.com/labs/resources.asp
Malware Intelligence http://www.malwareint.com/docs.html
Messagelabs http://www.messagelabs.com/resources/mlireports
Zscaler http://www.zscaler.com/resourcesindustryreports.
html
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Appendix E
Configuration Settings
E.1 System Settings
E.1.1 Squid
squid.conf
#disable cache completely
cache deny all
icp_access deny all
htcp_access deny all
#Access control lists
acl manager proto cache_object
acl localhost src 127.0.0.1/32
acl to_localhost dst 127.0.0.0/8
acl localnet src 10.0.0.0/8
acl SSL_ports port 443
#Allow many ports, otherwise squid doesn’t allow strange ports which we want for malware testing.
acl Safe_ports port 21
acl Safe_ports port 70
acl Safe_ports port 80
acl Safe_ports port 210
acl Safe_ports port 280
acl Safe_ports port 443
acl Safe_ports port 488
acl Safe_ports port 591
acl Safe_ports port 777
acl Safe_ports port 1025-65535
acl CONNECT method CONNECT
#Access Control Lists, so Squid knows who it is allowed to accept as clients.
http_access allow manager localhost
http_access deny manager
http_access deny !Safe_ports
http_access deny CONNECT !SSL_ports
http_access allow localnet
http_access allow localhost
http_access deny all
#The port squid operates on
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http_port 3128
#Logging Directory
access_log /var/log/squid3/access.log squid
##ICAP Settings FOLLOW
#Enable ICAP
icap_enable on
#Stop Squid From bypassing ICAP after errors
icap_service_failure_limit -1
icap_service_revival_delay 30
#Not used, but doesn’t hurt
icap_preview_enable on
#Send client IP and username to the ICAP server
icap_send_client_ip on
icap_send_client_username on
icap_client_username_header X-Authenticated-User
icap_client_username_encode on
#Icap Server address and details
icap_service greasyspoon_req reqmod_precache 0 icap://10.1.1.3:1344/greasyspoon_req
icap_service greasyspoon_resp respmod_precache 0 icap://10.1.1.3:1344/greasyspoon_resp
icap_class class_1 greasyspoon_req
icap_class class_2 greasyspoon_resp
icap_access class_1 allow all
icap_access class_2 allow all
#Miscellaneous settings follow
coredump_dir /var/spool/squid
E.1.2 Greasyspoon
greasyspoon.ini
######################################################
# ICAP OPTIONS parameters
# Only Values Changed form Defaultsa Shown
Options-TTL=180
Max-Connections=50
Preview=1000
Keep-Alive=enable
path=conf;lib;serverscripts;lib/mysql-connector-java-5.1.12-bin.jar;
maxtimeout = 60000
errorthreshold = 0
bypassonerror = true
icapserver.conf
proxyhost 10.1.1.2
proxyport 3128
tcp_lowlatency on
icap GreasySpoon * 1344 greasyspoon.ini
#Logging settings omitted
#Web editor settings omitted
#Admin Interface settings Omitted
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Testing Configuration
F.1 Effectiveness Testing
F.1.1 CaptureHPC Server
<c o n f i g x m l n s : x s i ="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema -instance"
xs i :noNamespaceSchemaLoca t ion ="config.xsd">
<!−− version 2 . 6 −−>
<g l o b a l c o l l e c t −modi f i ed− f i l e s ="true"
c l i e n t −default="iexplorebulk"
c l i e n t −default−v i s i t −t ime ="90"
c a p t u r e−network−p a c k e t s−m a l i c i o u s ="true"
c a p t u r e−network−p a c k e t s−be n i gn ="false"
send−e x c l u s i o n− l i s t s ="false"
t e r m i n a t e ="true"
g r o u p s i z e ="5"
v m s t a l l e d a f t e r r e v e r t t i m e o u t ="180"
r e v e r t t i m e o u t ="120"
c l i e n t i n a c t i v i t y t i m e o u t ="120"
v m s t a l l e d d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n t i m e o u t ="600"
s a m e v m r e v e r t d e l a y ="12"
d i f f e r e n t v m r e v e r t d e l a y ="24"
/>
<e x c l u s i o n− l i s t m o n i t o r ="file" f i l e ="FileMonitor.exl" />
<e x c l u s i o n− l i s t m o n i t o r ="process" f i l e ="ProcessMonitor.exl" />
<e x c l u s i o n− l i s t m o n i t o r ="registry" f i l e ="RegistryMonitor.exl" />
<v i r t u a l −machine−s e r v e r t y p e ="vmware-server" a d d r e s s ="10.1.1.10" p o r t
="902"
username ="user" password ="password">
<v i r t u a l −machine vm−p a t h ="C:\Virtual Machines\Win XP (
Unprotected)\Windows Xp Professional.vmx"
c l i e n t −p a t h ="C:\Progra~1\
capture\CaptureClient.
bat"
username ="user"
password ="password" />
<v i r t u a l −machine vm−p a t h ="C:\Virtual Machines\Win XP (
Unprotected 2)\Windows Xp Professional.vmx"
c l i e n t −p a t h ="C:\Progra~1\
capture\CaptureClient.
bat"
username ="user"
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password ="password" />
−−> < / v i r t u a l −machine−s e r v e r>
< / c o n f i g>
F.1.2 Code used in URL Collection
F.1.3 Used twythonSearch.py to collect Urls to file
import twython . core as twython
import re
import random
import time
import googleTrending
import datetime
filename = "C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop\Capture Directories\urls.
txt"
def is_ascii ( s ) :
return all ( ord ( c ) < 128 f o r c i n s )
d e f g e t S e a r c h R e s u l t s L i s t ( searchTerm , r e s u l t S e t M a x S i z e ) :
""" Instantiate Twython with no Authentication """
t w i t t e r = twython . s e t u p ( )
e r r o r F o u n d = F a l s e
w h i l e ( e r r o r F o u n d == F a l s e ) :
t r y :
r a w s e a r c h r e s u l t s = t w i t t e r . s e a r c h T w i t t e r ( searchTerm , rpp =
r e s u l t S e t M a x S i z e )
e r r o r F o u n d = F a l s e
s e a r c h R e s u l t s = [ ]
f o r t w e e t i n r a w s e a r c h r e s u l t s [ "results" ] :
i f i s a s c i i ( t w e e t [ "text" ] ) :
s e a r c h R e s u l t s . append ( t w e e t [ "text" ] )
r e t u r n s e a r c h R e s u l t s
e x c e p t :
e r r o r F o u n d = True
t ime . s l e e p ( 3 6 0 )
p r i n t "Sleeping to let the api calm down..."
d e f g e t u r l s ( r e s u l t s S e t ) :
r e t u r n S e t = [ ]
i f r e s u l t s S e t i s n o t None:
f o r t w e e t i n r e s u l t s S e t :
u r l s = r e . f i n d a l l ( r ’(https?://\S+)’ , t w e e t )
r e t u r n S e t . e x t e n d ( u r l s )
r e t u r n r e t u r n S e t
d e f p r o c e s s T r e n d s ( t r e n d s ) :
r e t u r n L i s t = [ ]
t r e n d s = t r e n d s [ "trends" ] . v a l u e s ( ) [ 0 ]
f o r t r e n d i n t r e n d s :
i f t r e n d [ ’name’ ] . s t a r t s w i t h ( ’#’ ) :
i f i s a s c i i ( t r e n d [ ’name’ ] [ 1 : ] ) :
r e t u r n L i s t . append ( t r e n d [ ’name’ ] [ 1 : ] )
e l s e :
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i f i s a s c i i ( t r e n d [ ’name’ ] ) :
r e t u r n L i s t . append ( t r e n d [ ’name’ ] )
r e t u r n r e t u r n L i s t
d e f a p p e n d T r e n d U r l s T o T r e n d s F i l e ( f i l e n a m e , trendName , u r l s ) :
f =open ( f i l e n a m e , ’a’ )
now = d a t e t i m e . d a t e t i m e . now ( )
f o r u r l i n u r l s :
f . w r i t e ( u r l + ’\n’ )
f . c l o s e ( )
d e f appendCommentLineToTrendUr lsToTrendsFi le ( f i l e n a m e , commentLine ) :
f =open ( f i l e n a m e , ’a’ )
now = d a t e t i m e . d a t e t i m e . now ( )
f . w r i t e ( "#Written: " + s t r ( now ) + "\n" )
f . w r i t e ( commentLine + ’\n’ )
f . c l o s e ( )
d e f main ( ) :
t w i t t e r = twython . s e t u p ( )
t o t a l U r l s = 0
w h i l e T r u e :
t r y :
t w i t t e r C u r r e n t T r e n d s R a w = t w i t t e r . g e t C u r r e n t T r e n d s ( )
t w i t t e r D a i l y T r e n d s R a w = t w i t t e r . g e t D a i l y T r e n d s ( )
tw i t t e rWeek lyTrendsRaw = t w i t t e r . g e t C u r r e n t T r e n d s ( )
t w i t t e r C u r r e n t T r e n d s = p r o c e s s T r e n d s ( t w i t t e r C u r r e n t T r e n d s R a w )
t w i t t e r D a i l y T r e n d s = p r o c e s s T r e n d s ( t w i t t e r D a i l y T r e n d s R a w )
t w i t t e r W e e k l y T r e n d s = p r o c e s s T r e n d s ( tw i t t e rWeek lyTrendsRaw )
g o o g l e T r e n d s = g o o g l e T r e n d i n g . g e t T r e n d s ( )
p r i n t "Found " + s t r ( l e n ( g o o g l e T r e n d s ) ) + " Google Trends."
p r i n t "Found " + s t r ( l e n ( t w i t t e r C u r r e n t T r e n d s ) ) + " Current
Twitter Trends."
p r i n t "Found " + s t r ( l e n ( t w i t t e r D a i l y T r e n d s ) ) + " Daily Twitter
Trends."
p r i n t "Found " + s t r ( l e n ( t w i t t e r W e e k l y T r e n d s ) ) + " Weekly Twitter
Trends."
t r e n d s L i s t = g o o g l e T r e n d s + t w i t t e r C u r r e n t T r e n d s +
t w i t t e r D a i l y T r e n d s + t w i t t e r W e e k l y T r e n d s
p r i n t "Found " + s t r ( l e n ( t r e n d s L i s t ) ) + " Total Trends."
commentLine = "#All Trends: "
f o r t r e n d i n t r e n d s L i s t :
commentLine = commentLine + ", \"" + trend + "\""
appendCommentLineToTrendUr lsToTrendsFi le ( f i l e n a m e , commentLine )
f o r t r e n d i n t r e n d s L i s t :
s e a r c h R e s u l t s = g e t S e a r c h R e s u l t s L i s t ( t r e n d + s t r ( " http" ) ,
60)
t empUr l s = g e t u r l s ( s e a r c h R e s u l t s )
numFound = l e n ( t empUr l s )
commentLine = "#Trend: \"" + trend + "\", " + s t r ( numFound ) +
" results."
appendCommentLineToTrendUr lsToTrendsFi le ( f i l e n a m e ,
commentLine )
a p p e n d T r e n d U r l s T o T r e n d s F i l e ( f i l e n a m e , t r e n d , t empUr l s )
t o t a l U r l s = t o t a l U r l s + numFound
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p r i n t "Found " + s t r ( l e n ( t empUr l s ) ) + " urls for " + t r e n d +
", for a total of " + s t r ( t o t a l U r l s ) + " so far.."
e x c e p t :
p r i n t "Exception ocurred... Waiting"
p r i n t "Waiting an hour or so before updating..." ,
randNum = random . r a n d i n t ( 3 0 0 0 , 4 0 0 0 )
p r i n t " Waiting " + s t r ( randNum ) + "seconds..."
d e l a y = randNum
t ime . s l e e p ( d e l a y )
i f n a m e == "__main__" :
main ( )
F.1.4 To collect Google Trends googletrending.py
import urllib
import re
from BeautifulSoup import BeautifulSoup
def getTrends ( ) :
trends = [ ]
feedURL = "http://www.google.com/trends/hottrends/atom/hourly"
fp = urllib . urlopen ( feedURL )
content = fp . read ( )
reg = r"(<ol).*?(ol>)"
regx = re . compile ( reg , re . DOTALL )
results = regx . search ( content )
content = results . group ( 0 )
soup = BeautifulSoup ( content )
tagLinks = soup . findAll ( "a" )
for tag in tagLinks:
trends . extend ( tag . contents )
return trends
F.2 Performance Testing Automation
The following was used, a near identical version (proxy parameter removed from the apachebench argu-
ments) was used in on non-proxied tests .
# ! / b i n / bash
datetime= ‘date +%F−%H%M ‘
serveraddress="http://10.1.1.11/"
durations = ( 6 0 )
numreqs=(10000 100000)
concurrencies=(1 10 100 200 400)
fileexts=(".html" ".file" )
filesizes=("1KB" "10KB" "100KB" "1MB" "10MB" )
proxtype="proxied"
proxip = ’ 1 0 . 1 . 1 . 2 : 3 1 2 8 ’
if [ $# −ne 1 ] ; t h e n
echo "You must enter a test designator"
echo "usage: <scriptname> <testdesignator>"
exit
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fi
parentfoldername="proxied_${1}"
echo "making folder $parentfoldername "
mkdir $parentfoldername
cd $parentfoldername
mkdir results
cd results
echo "Making folder $datetime}"
mkdir $datetime
cd $datetime
for duration in ${durations [∗ ]}
do
for reqcount in ${numreqs [∗ ]}
do
for concurrency in ${concurrencies [∗ ]}
do
for filext in ${fileexts [∗ ]}
do
for filesize in ${filesizes [∗ ]}
do
echo "Testing $filesize $filext file for $duration seconds with $reqcount requests and 
concurrency of $concurrency."
# echo ” r u n n i n g : ab −r −n $ r e q c o u n t −c $ c o n c u r r e n c y − t $ d u r a t i o n −X $ p r o x i p −g d a t a . ${
f i l e s i z e }${ f i l e x t } . ${ d u r a t i o n } s e c . ${ r e q c o u n t } r e q s . conc${ c o n c u r r e n c y } . ${ p r o x t y p e } .
t x t −e summary . ${ f i l e s i z e }${ f i l e x t } . ${ d u r a t i o n } s e c . ${ r e q c o u n t } r e q s . conc${
c o n c u r r e n c y } . ${ p r o x t y p e } . c sv ${ s e r v e r a d d r e s s } $ f i l e s i z e s }${ f i l e x t } >
a b o u t p u t $ { f i l e s i z e }${ f i l e x t } . ${ d u r a t i o n } s e c . ${ r e q c o u n t } r e q s . conc${ c o n c u r r e n c y } . $
{ p r o x t y p e } . l o g ”
ab −r −n $reqcount −c $concurrency −t $duration −X $proxip \
−gdata . ${filesize}${filext } . ${duration}sec . ${reqcount}reqs . conc${concurrency } . ${
proxtype } . txt \
−e summary . ${filesize}${filext } . ${duration}sec . ${reqcount}reqs . conc${concurrency } . ${
proxtype } . csv \
${serveraddress}${filesize}${filext} \
> ab_output_${filesize}${filext } . ${duration}sec . ${reqcount}reqs . conc${concurrency } . ${
proxtype } . log
done
done
done
done
done
cd . .
cd . .
cd . .
echo "Results saved in ${parentfoldername}/results/${datetime}."
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Appendix G
Database Schemas
G.1 usermessages
CREATE TABLE userMessages (
id int ( 1 1 ) unsigned NOT NULL auto_increment ,
UserName varchar ( 6 4 ) NOT NULL ,
MessageContents varchar ( 2 5 3 ) NOT NULL default ’’ ,
PRIMARY KEY ( id ) ,
KEY UserName ( UserName ( 3 2 ) )
) ;
CREATE TABLE globalUserMessages (
id int ( 1 1 ) unsigned NOT NULL auto_increment ,
MessageContents varchar ( 2 5 3 ) NOT NULL default ’’ ,
PRIMARY KEY ( id ) ,
) ;
CREATE TABLE userContentSettings (
id int ( 1 1 ) unsigned NOT NULL auto_increment ,
UserName varchar ( 6 4 ) NOT NULL ,
SettingName varchar ( 2 5 3 ) NOT NULL default ’’ ,
SettingValue varchar ( 6 4 ) NOT NULL default ,
PRIMARY KEY ( id ) ,
KEY UserName ( UserName ( 3 2 ) )
) ;
CREATE TABLE userOverlaySettings (
id int ( 1 1 ) unsigned NOT NULL auto_increment ,
UserName varchar ( 6 4 ) NOT NULL ,
SettingName varchar ( 2 5 3 ) NOT NULL default ’’ ,
SettingValue varchar ( 6 4 ) NOT NULL default ,
PRIMARY KEY ( id ) ,
KEY UserName ( UserName ( 3 2 ) )
) ;
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Appendix H
Example Greasyspoon Code
H.1 Helper Code
H.1.1 The HTML Inserted to place a Message
<!−− J a v a s c r i p t f u n c t i o n s t o h i d e and show t h e o v e r l a y −−>
<script type="text/javascript">
function hideOverlay ( ) {
document . getElementById ( ’ ICAPoverlay ’ ) . style . display = ’none ’ ;
document . getElementById ( ’ ICAPoverlayTab ’ ) . style . display = ’block ’ ;
}
function showOverlay ( ) {
document . getElementById ( ’ ICAPoverlay ’ ) . style . display = ’block ’ ;
document . getElementById ( ’ ICAPoverlayTab ’ ) . style . display = ’none ’ ;
}
< / script>
<!−−The Main c o n t a i n e r DIV t h a t c o v e r s t h e whole page −−>
<div id="ICAPoverlay" style="position:fixed; bottom:0; left:0; width:100%;
height:40px; background -color:#FFDDCB; z-index:99999">
<!−− S t a r t Message −−>
<div style="width:80\%; position:absolute; left:0px; font-weight:bold; font
-size:large;">
Welcome username <a href="#">Link to click .< / a><br>
< / div>
<div style="width:20%; position:absolute; right:10%;">
<button type="button">And a button to press !< / button>
< / div>
<!−− End Message and add Cont ro Over l ay −−>
<div style="position:fixed; bottom:0; right:0; width:10%; height:40px;
background -color:#FFDDCB; z-index:99999">
<a href="#" onClick="javascript:hideOverlay();">Minimize Warning< / a>
< / div>
< / div>
<!−− The DIV t h a t shows as a l i t t l e t a b down t h e bot tom −−>
<div id="ICAPoverlayTab" style="display:none; position:fixed; bottom:0; right
:0; width:10%; height:40px; background -color:#FFDDCB; z-index:99999">
<a href="#" onClick="javascript:showOverlay();">Show Warning Overlay< / a>
< / div>
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H.1.2 DBMethods.java
package gspis ;
import java . sql . ∗ ;
public class DBMethods{
public static String getMessages ( String dbClassName , String host , String
database , String user , String password , String SQLSelect , String fieldName
) throws SQLException , Exception{
String globalMessages = "" ;
try{
/ / l o a d t h e j d b c c l a s s e s and c r e a t e c l a s s f a c t o r y
Class . forName ( dbClassName ) ;
String dburl = "jdbc:mysql://" + host + ":3306/" + database ;
Connection dbconn = DriverManager . getConnection ( dburl , user , password ) ;
Statement stmt = null ;
ResultSet rs = null ;
stmt = dbconn . createStatement ( ) ;
/ / P o t e n t i a l l y V u l n e r a b l e t o SQL I n j e c t i o n i f c a r e i s n o t t a k e n i n t h e
/ / s e l e c t s t a t e m e n t used , must s a n i t i s e i n t h e s c r i p t t h a t c a l l s t h i s .
/ / I d e a l l y s h o u l d move t o p r e p a r e d s t a t e m e n t s o r s i m i l a r .
rs = stmt . executeQuery ( SQLSelect ) ;
rs . last ( ) ;
if ( rs . getRow ( ) > 0 ) {
rs . first ( ) ;
globalMessages = rs . getString ( fieldName ) ;
}
dbconn . close ( ) ;
return globalMessages ;
}catch ( SQLException ex ) {
throw ex ;
}
catch ( Exception e ) {
throw e ;
}
}
}
H.2 Sample GreasySpoon Scripts
H.2.1 Clam Antivirus Scan
#rights=ADMIN
/ /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / == S e r v e r S c r i p t ==
/ / @name a n t i v i r u s
/ / @ s ta tu s on
/ / @ d e s c r i p t i o n
/ / @include .∗
/ / @timeout 5000
/ / ==/ S e r v e r S c r i p t ==
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / Note : use h t t p M e s s a g e o b j e c t methods t o m a n i p u l a t e HTTP Message
/ / use debug ( S t r i n g s ) method t o t r a c e i t e m s i n s e r v i c e l o g ( wi th l o g l e v e l
>=FINE )
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
import java . io . ∗ ;
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import java . net . ∗ ;
/ / S e t t h i s t o t r u e t o d i s p l a y a l o t o f debugg ing messages on t h e c o n s o l e . . .
private static boolean VERBOSEMODE = false ;
private static String CLAMAV_IP = "10.1.1.2" ;
private static int CLAMAV_PORT = 3310 ;
public void main ( HttpMessage httpMessage ) {
/ / I f a n u l l r e s p o n s e t h e n e x i t
if ( httpMessage . getUnderlyingBytes ( ) == null ) {
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "\n\n\nUnderlying bytes null" ) ;
return ;}
else if ( httpMessage . getUnderlyingBytes ( ) . length == 0) {
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Underlying bytes empty" ) ;
return ;
}
/ / Our I n i t i a l C o n t r o l Networking V a r i a b l e s
Socket controlSocket = null ;
PrintWriter controlOut = null ;
BufferedReader controlIn = null ;
/ / Our I n i t i a l ByteData Networking V a r i a b l e s
Socket dataSocket = null ;
OutputStream dataOut = null ;
try{
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Making Control Socket Connection
" ) ;
String body ="" ; / / The body v a r i a b l e t o use i f we r e w r i t e t h e body
l a t e r on
/ / Open our clam AV c o n t r o l c o n n e c t i o n
controlSocket = new Socket ( CLAMAV_IP , CLAMAV_PORT ) ;
controlOut = new PrintWriter ( controlSocket . getOutputStream ( ) , true ) ;
controlIn = new BufferedReader ( new InputStreamReader ( controlSocket .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
/ / T e l l i t we wish t o STREAM a f i l e
controlOut . println ( "STREAM" ) ;
/ / Read t h e p o r t we a r e t o use
String port = controlIn . readLine ( ) ;
port = port . substring ( port . lastIndexOf ( ’ ’ ) + 1 ) ;
int dataPort = Integer . parseInt ( port ) ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Av scan port: " + dataPort ) ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Opening Data Port: " ) ;
/ / Open t h e Data s o c k e t t o STREAM t o
dataSocket = new Socket ( CLAMAV_IP , dataPort ) ;
dataOut = dataSocket . getOutputStream ( ) ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Sending Content for scan..." ) ;
/ / Get our raw c o n t e n t and send i t
byte [ ] bodyBytes = httpMessage . getUnderlyingBytes ( ) ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Content Length:" + httpMessage .
getUnderlyingBytes ( ) . length ) ;
dataOut . write ( bodyBytes ) ;
dataSocket . close ( ) ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Readng response..." ) ;
/ / Read t h e r e s p o n s e
String response = controlIn . readLine ( ) ;
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if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Clamd says: " + response ) ;
/ / i f we f i n d some th ing
if ( response . indexOf ( "FOUND" ) != −1){
/ / R e w r i t e t h e message t o l e t t h e u s e r know i t i s b l o c k e d
httpMessage . deleteHeader ( "Content-Type" ) ;
httpMessage . addHeader ( "Content-Type" ,"text/html; charset=UTF-8" ) ;
body = "A Virus was found, File blocked!\n<br>" ;
body += "Clam Antivirus reports: " + response + "<br />" ;
httpMessage . setBody ( body ) ;
System . out . println ( "Clamd found something: " + response ) ;
}else{
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Nothing found: " + response ) ;
}
/ / Clean up
dataOut . close ( ) ;
controlSocket . close ( ) ;
}catch ( UnknownHostException e ) {
/ / No h o s t !
System . out . println ( "Host error!" + e ) ;
}catch ( IOException e ) {
/ / No IO !
System . out . println ( "IO Error!" + e ) ;
}
}
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H.2.2 Block PDF by file header signature
#rights=ADMIN
/ /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / == S e r v e r S c r i p t ==
/ / @name b l o c k p d f b y s i g
/ / @ s ta tu s o f f
/ / @ d e s c r i p t i o n
/ / @include .∗
/ / @exclude
/ / @responsecode 200
/ / ==/ S e r v e r S c r i p t ==
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / Note : use h t t p M e s s a g e o b j e c t methods t o m a n i p u l a t e HTTP Message
/ / use debug ( S t r i n g s ) method t o t r a c e i t e m s i n s e r v i c e l o g ( wi th l o g l e v e l
>=FINE )
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
import java . util . concurrent . ConcurrentHashMap ;
import java . util . Arrays ;
public void main ( HttpMessage httpMessage ) {
try{
/ / System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( h t t p M e s s a g e . g e t R e s p o n s e H e a d e r s ( ) ) ;
/ / System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( h t t p M e s s a g e . getBody ( ) ) ;
String body = httpMessage . getBody ( ) ;
ConcurrentHashMap<String , Object> sharedCache = httpMessage .
getSharedCache ( ) ;
byte [ ] contentBytes = httpMessage . getUnderlyingBytes ( ) ;
byte [ ] signature = {’%’ , ’P’ , ’D’ , ’F’ , ’-’ } ;
byte [ ] newContentBytes = new byte [ signature . length ] ;
System . arraycopy ( contentBytes , 0 , newContentBytes , 0 , signature . length ) ;
boolean matches = true ;
for ( int i =0;i<signature . length ; i++){
if ( signature [ i ] != newContentBytes [ i ] ) {
matches = false ;
break ;
}
}
if ( matches | | ( httpMessage . getResponseHeader ( "Content-Type" ) == "
application/pdf" ) ) {
httpMessage . deleteHeader ( "Content-Type" ) ;
httpMessage . addHeader ( "Content-Type" ,"text/html; charset=UTF-8" ) ;
body = "Sorry, PDF Files are blocked!" ;
httpMessage . setBody ( body ) ;
System . out . println ( "match on sig" ) ;
}else{
httpMessage . deleteHeader ( "Content-Type" ) ;
httpMessage . addHeader ( "Content-Type" ,"text/html; charset=UTF-8" ) ;
/ / body = ”NOWAI˜ : ” ;
/ / body += ” h e a d e r was : ” + new S t r i n g ( newConten tBytes ) ;
/ / body += ”\ nand s i g n a t u r e was : ” + new S t r i n g ( s i g n a t u r e ) ;
/ / h t t p M e s s a g e . se tBody ( body ) ;
System . out . println ( "no match on sig, sig was: " + new String (
signature ) + " header was:" + new String ( newContentBytes ) ) ;
}
/ / h t t p M e s s a g e . t o J s o n ( ) ;
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httpMessage . minify ( ) ;
}catch ( Exception e ) {
debug ( e . getMessage ( ) ) ;
httpMessage . setBody ( e . getMessage ( ) ) ;
}
}
H.2.3 Redirect PDF to google’s online viewer
#rights=ADMIN
/ /−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / == S e r v e r S c r i p t ==
/ / @name o n l i n e d o c u m e n t v i e w e r
/ / @ s ta tu s on
/ / @ d e s c r i p t i o n
/ / @include .∗ pdf
/ / @exclude
/ / @timeout 300
/ / ==/ S e r v e r S c r i p t ==
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / Note : use h t t p M e s s a g e o b j e c t methods t o m a n i p u l a t e HTTP Message
/ / use debug ( S t r i n g s ) method t o t r a c e i t e m s i n s e r v i c e l o g ( wi th l o g l e v e l
>=FINE )
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
/ / −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
public void main ( HttpMessage httpMessage ) {
String [ ] extensions = {"pdf" ,"ppt" ,"doc" ,"docx" } ;
boolean VERBOSEMODE = false ;
String url = httpMessage . getUrl ( ) ;
boolean redirect = false ;
String referrer = httpMessage . getRequestHeader ( "Referer" ) ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Endswith pdf?: " + url . toLowerCase ( ) .
endsWith ( "pdf" ) ) ;
if ( ! url . contains ( "docs.google.com" ) && ! referrer . contains ( "docs.google.
com" ) ) {
for ( int i = 0 ; i < extensions . length ; i++){
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Checking " + url + " for: " +
extensions [ i ] ) ;
if ( url . toLowerCase ( ) . endsWith ( extensions [ i ] ) )
{
redirect = true ;
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Url needs to be
redirected... " ) ;
break ;
}
}
if ( redirect == true ) {
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Redirecting Url to docs
viewer: " + url ) ;
String encodedPageUrl = java . net . URLEncoder . encode ( url ) ;
String redirectUrl = "http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=" +
encodedPageUrl ;
String redirectHeader = "HTTP/1.0 302 Found" + "\r\n" + "
LOCATION:" + redirectUrl + "\r\n" ; / / + ”PRAGMA: no−cache \ r \n
” ;
httpMessage . setHeaders ( redirectHeader ) ;
/ / h t t p M e s s a g e . se tBody ( r e d i r e c t H e a d e r ) ;
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/ / System . o u t . p r i n t l n ( h t t p M e s s a g e . getBody ( ) ) ;
}else{
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Url ignored for
extensions): " + url ) ;
}
}else{
if ( VERBOSEMODE ) System . out . println ( "Url google docs already: " + url
) ;
}
}
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Appendix I
Sample Results
I.1 Sample Drive by download steps taken from an Capture-HPC
Log in the experiment
Some of the steps undertaken by a drive by download that used a weak version of Java to get onto the
system and start itself without user interaction are given below. Only the various executions of different
binaries are shown here, but during the steps shown settings and files were changed to make things
automatically start, temporary files and cookies were deleted (so users would need to re-login to websites)
and similar.
Internet Explorer -> Java Web Start
Java Web Start -> Java
Java -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\0.14564161834687983.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\teste1_p.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\q1.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\miraage.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\fFollower.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\avto.exe
teste1_p.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\lsass.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\6_ldry3no.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\4_pinnew.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\2_load.exe
6_ldry3no.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\sdra64.exe
avto.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\svc.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\1your_exe.exe
miraage.exe -> C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\jkkhef.dll
0.14564161834687983.exe -> opeA.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> 1276966669.exe
0.14564161834687983.exe -> 1_goo.exe
1your_exe.exe -> ijwxv.exe
1your_exe.exe -> wljrkxt.exe
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I.2 ApacheBench Data
Test parameters: 10,000 Requests, Concurrency 1
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